Search: Affective Justice: Book Symposium: A Response
08 Oct Guest Post: On ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, ‘Lawmaking’ Moments and What the ‘Law Ought to Be’–Counseling Caution Against a New ‘Affirmative Defense to Art. 2 (4)’ After Syria
[Carsten Stahn is Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice at Leiden University and Programme Director of the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies. He is Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Leiden Journal of International Law, Executive Editor of the Criminal Law Forum and project leader of the Jus Post Bellum Project.] Harold Koh’s thought-provoking post on Just Security on ‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention – Part II’ illustrates the struggles of international law to cope with injustices and violations of legal norms, including the ban of the prohibition...12 Jan Space Law Update – US Won’t Build Death Star, Also Does Not Support Blowing Up Planets
terms of Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE TO: Secure resources and funding, and begin construction of a Death Star by 2016. This Isn’t the Petition Response You’re Looking For By Paul Shawcross The Administration shares your desire for job creation and a strong national defense, but a Death Star isn’t on the horizon. Here are a few reasons: The construction of the Death Star has been estimated to cost more than 850,000,000,000,000,000. We’re working hard to reduce the deficit, not expand it. The Administration...
18 Jun Framing Prolonged Occupation
...in response to Israel’s occupation policies. But the Dáil motion’s purposeful use of “de facto annexation” to describe Israeli activities is notable. This is not simply because the Dáil’s framing made Ireland the first state to declare that Israel has annexed territory otherwise understood as occupied. The conceptual shift that informed the Irish pronouncement finds its antecedents in the International Court of Justice’s Wall Opinion which described the construction of a separation barrier as amounting to a fait accompli that threatened permanence and would thus constitute de facto annexation. More...09 Feb A Response to Gabriella Blum by Kevin Jon Heller
armed conflict without taking into account the comparative justness of their causes. Consider the distributive-justice rationale for CDRs. Blum says that “[i]n transposing distributive justice arguments onto war, the question arises whether the general moral obligations that are owed by one society to another endure when the two societies are at war.” How can that question be answered without considering whether one party to the conflict is an aggressor and one is simply defending itself? As far as I can tell, there is no coherent normative rationale for assuming that...16 Feb The Digitial Dialogue Series – The Fight against Impunity for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in the Central African Republic
The United Nations Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict and its partners launched in July 2020 a series of webinars, the Digital Dialogue Series . It is designed to allow academics, policymakers and practitioners to have open discussions, provoke critical reflections, and hopefully inspire a community of practice for the delivery of truly accessible and effective survivor-centered justice. On 17 November 2020, the fourth Digital Dialogue focused on the justice response to sexual violence committed in the Central African Republic (CAR) , and...10 Feb A Response to John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt by Zenichi Shishido
...capital markets. It is also important to note that they provide an analytical framework for analyzing different modes of business law reform in general, from the perspective of demand- and supply-side factors, which could be applied to a wide range of legal reforms. The article starts by raising a good question of why the regulatory responses to hostile takeovers are very different among the three countries who share the similar capital markets (the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan). After applying their analytical framework to the three countries, the...03 Jul A Response to Ben Wittes
...the Senate bill appears to contain no such language. On the contrary, it ties detention authority squarely to the 2001 AUMF, and describes the scope of that detention authority precisely as the courts (and Obama Administration) have done in the Guantanamo habeas cases in the federal courts. It also, for the first time, makes express Congress’ intention that detention under this authority be carried out pursuant to the law of war.” In response, Ben asks: “Is there a softening here of opposition to detention legislation? Or is the apparent complacency...24 Nov A Response to Douglas Guilfoyle by Beth Van Schaack
...(a point acknowledged in the above commentary but not in the article itself). Nor does IHL provide national authorities with any authority to capture and detain individuals engaged in non-international armed conflicts without the privilege of doing so. Rather, such responses will continue to be governed by other sources of national and international law, including the law of the sea and international human rights law. So, even applying IHL to this potential scenario results in a renvoi to a law enforcement model of capture, detention, and prosecution. Regardless of the...02 Jul A Response to Galit Sarfaty
...the two requirements of CIL. On the other hand, a vague definition runs the risk of being empty rhetoric that does not require the World Bank to do much of anything, let alone out of a sense of legal obligation. Sarfaty concludes her response by asking whether one should distinguish between legal internalization and social or political internalization. My answer, both here and in the article, is an emphatic “yes,” and the current requirements of CIL provide the place for us to look to discern whether a moral norm has...14 Feb A Few Thoughts on Eugene Kontorovich’s Response to My Post
Eugene has graciously responded to my earlier post; you can find his new post here. It’s well worth a read. I just want to offer a few thoughts on Eugene’s response, because I think it fails to address the core of my critique: that it is incorrect to claim, as Eugene did in his first post, that Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death penalty is based on the idea that “minors are not really responsible for their actions.” I argued that, on the contrary, Europe’s opposition to the juvenile death...