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Guest Post: Why 50 Years of Imprisonment is an Adequate Sentence for Charles Taylor

[Marina Aksenova is a Researcher/PhD Candidate in complicity issues in international criminal law at the European University Institute.] The Special Court for Sierra Leone recently convicted Charles Taylor to 50 years of imprisonment. This pronouncement stirred public debate as to whether this sentence is acceptable. Kevin Jon Heller, for example, expressed his concern about the length of Taylor’s sentence, mainly because it resonates with the Trial Chamber finding that Taylor is a mere accomplice, rather than a primary perpetrator of the crimes committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. Arguably, 50 years of imprisonment is a disproportionately lengthy sentence for this type of criminal participation. This conclusion, in turn, leads to a more general question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to find Taylor responsible as a perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise – a mode of liability that usually justifies heavier sentences. It appears that the judges of the SCSL placed Taylor “in a class of his own” when deciding upon his punishment. His leadership role as the former president of Liberia, and not the particular way in which he got involved in the crimes, appears to have played the central role at sentencing. More detailed analysis will have to wait until the sentencing judgment is released, some initial thoughts could be outlined here. I would like to defend the length of the sentence imposed on Taylor and the mode of criminal participation under which he stands convicted. I am not trying to assess the evidence presented in the proceedings and the appropriateness of Chamber’s findings on the merits. Rather, my goal is to support the hypothesis that complicity, as a mode of liability, is compatible with a relatively heavy punishment given to Taylor. I agree with the Trial Chamber’s decision to assign relatively little weight to Taylor’s form of participation, mainly because it is just one of the factors to be considered at sentencing, and not the definitive one. This is especially true in the absence of the sentencing regime in international criminal law, which would require the judges to follow guidelines or certain rules at sentencing or give reasons for the departure, as it is the case, for example, in England and Wales. In fact, most national jurisdictions follow the principle nulla poena sine lege by stipulating sentencing tariffs in the statutes or formal sentencing guidelines. Usually, these provisions explain the relative importance (if any) to be attributed to the mode of participation of the convicted person.