In association with the International Commission of Jurists

Recent Posts

21 Aug

[Bobby Chesney is an Associate Professor at Wake Forest University School of Law, and the Chair of the AALS Section on National Security Law. He is the author of the forthcoming article Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations (Iowa Law Review 2007)] As Adrian noted yesterday in his post “First-Order and Second-Order Judgments,” he and Eric...

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21 Aug

As an interesting side note to the debate on counterrorism techniques, the American Psychological Association (APA) rejected a proposal on Sunday that would have prohibited psychologists from assisting interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and other military detention centers:Instead, the group approved a resolution that reaffirmed the association's opposition to torture and restricted members from taking part in interrogations that involved...

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21 Aug

Let me say a few general words about one of Lou’s points, as endorsed and restated by Marty in his comment: “First, the Framers had seen up close what can happen when too much "emergency" power is concentrated in the executive (short answer: it wasn't pretty), and therefore established substantial checks (mostly structural, but, esp. in the Bill of Rights...

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20 Aug

Vermeule and I agree one one point: "A crucial issue in this conversation is that of presidential motivation." There, however, I think the agreement ends. Vermeule's third sentence is an adequate starting point: "Yes, the executive’s capacities may be impressive, but its motivations are suspect (the suggestion often runs)." True as the second half of the argument...

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20 Aug

There is an issue that comes up repeatedly in discussions of national security law. Suppose we define “law” broadly to include the optimal allocation of institutional authority to establish and execute national security policy. On what grounds can academic commentators who lack expertise in national security policy argue for any particular allocation of such authority, in particular circumstances?...

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20 Aug

A crucial issue in this conversation is that of presidential motivation. Explicit or implicit claims about presidential motivations underpin many worries about increased deference to the executive in emergencies. Yes, the executive’s capacities may be impressive, but its motivations are suspect (the suggestion often runs). Thus Kevin Jon Heller suggests, en passant, that the executive’s motivation is...

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20 Aug

[Louis Fisher is with the Law Library of the Library of Congress. He is the author of numerous books, including Presidential War Power (2d ed. 2004).] In their book, "Terror in the Balance" (2007), Posner and Vermeule make a straightforward defense of placing emergency power in the President and advise federal courts and Congress not to interfere. I think their...

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20 Aug

Well, at least they're honest. Posner and Vermeule admit that the massive expansion of executive power that has taken place under the Bush administration is no anomaly, no temporary response to the horrors of 9/11. On the contrary, they insist that by demonstrating that "the public is more vulnerable to a devastating terrorist attack today than it has...

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20 Aug

[Eric Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago School of Law. Adrian Vermeule is professor of law at Harvard Law School] Our thanks to Opinio Juris for organizing this symposium. The market has become crowded with post-9/11 books and articles discussing the role of courts in the war on terror. Most of...

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20 Aug

The first part of Posner and Vermeule’s book offers a forceful theoretical defense of executive authority during times of emergency. The book offers a thoughtful and well-reasoned perspective on the cost-benefit analysis at play when government seeks the optimal balance between the competing goods of security and liberty. Posner and Vermeule argue that there is a Pareto security-liberty...

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