I noted in the update to my response to Margulies that the Hamdan military commission rejected the government's argument that JCE is a viable alternative to conspiracy as an inchoate crime. It's worth adding that the Khadr military commission rejected the same argument. A brief filed by Khadr provides the necessary background (pp. 2-3; emphasis mine): On 2 February 2007, the Office...
[David J. R. Frakt, Lt. Col., USAFR, is a legal scholar and former lead counsel, Office of Military Commissions-Defense.] I write in response to the amicus brief submitted by “former government officials, military lawyers, and scholars of national security law” including my good friends Peter Margulies, Eric Jensen and several other esteemed and highly accomplished colleagues, discussed in Kevin Jon Heller’s excellent...
Announcements From September 23-26, 2013, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law will be running a new four day programme called International Law in Practice. Led by many of the Institute's leading researchers and practitioners, the course will provide a broad introduction to key issues in international and comparative law – from public to private and from commercial to human rights....
Peter's reply is posted at Lawfare, and it addresses both my criticisms (here and here) and Steve Vladeck's (here). The reply is largely non-responsive to the points that I made in my posts; most of it is dedicated to establishing that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to conclude that al-Bahlul participated in a JCE to commit 9/11 --...
As I noted in my first post, the amicus brief's central argument is that it does not matter that al-Bahlul was convicted of a non-existent war crime -- conspiracy as an inchoate offence -- because (p. 13) “the defendant had adequate notice that he was charged with conspiracy as a mode of liability for a completed war crime and was offered...
Here is a paragraph you don't often see in the mainstream American media: The conviction of Manning, in other words, would also be a conviction of Bill Keller. Most importantly, if Manning is found guilty on the charge of aiding the enemy, it would strike a deep blow at the stated reason for the New York Times' existence. From the beginning,...
The Space Frontier Foundation’s NewSpace 2013 conference is currently underway in Silicon Valley. The program description explains that: The three day event will focus on the current, near term, and future potential and challenges of the emerging commercial space industry. People from throughout the space, advocacy and technology industries to those in startups, government and media bring their ideas for opening...
On page 23, the amicus brief concludes that al-Bahlul's "convictions should be affirmed." Presumably, that means the brief is asking for the DC Circuit to affirm al-Bahlul's conviction for conspiracy as an inchoate offence -- that was the charge on the charge sheet, and that is the charge that was upheld by the military commission in its findings. (The other convictions were...
A group of scholars and former military lawyers, including a number of good friends, have filed an amicus brief that argues the DC Circuit should uphold al-Bahlul's conviction by redescribing his conviction for conspiracy as an inchoate crime, which does not exist under international criminal law, as a conviction for completed war crimes via conspiracy as a "mode of liability,"...
[José Alvarez is the Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law at New York University School of Law and is the Co-Editor-in-Chief (along with Benedict Kingsbury) of the American Journal of International Law] As the new co-editor in chief of the AJIL, I, along with my co-EIC, Benedict Kingsbury, are very grateful to Chris Borgen and Opinio Juris for hosting this...
I am grateful for the three incisive and insightful comments. Due to space limitations I will not be able to do justice to any of the comments in this response, but they will certainly help in my future work on this subject. I will use this brief response to clarify some parts of my argument and to situate the article in my broader research project.
To clarify my argument and hint at its potential significance I will use the pending case before the International Court of Justice concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening). The dispute focuses on Japan’s discretion to issue “special permits” for killing whales arguably for scientific research as provided by Article 8(1) of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946). The said Article allows a member state to issue permits and impose conditions “as the Contracting Government thinks fit.” Japan interprets this obligation as a “good faith” obligation, arguing that neither the International Whaling Commission nor the ICJ “have power to approve or disapprove the issue of a special permit.” (Public seating, 4 July 2013, afternoon, verbatim record, p. 36 paras. 23-24). Australia argues, however, that Japan must demonstrate the scientific value of the permits because “Japan does not ‘own’ the whales it catches.” (Public seating, 10 July 2013, morning, verbatim record, p. 65 para. 23). As stated by Professor James Crawford, arguing for Australia: “In respect of resources in the international public domain, to recognize a wide margin of appreciation is, in effect, to allocate those resources to the exploiting State.” (id., para. 22). Given the global commons problem, continues Crawford, the Convention requires “a proper showing … that [research] proposals are genuinely motivated by scientific considerations and adapted appropriately to achieve scientific goals.” Moreover, Japan must “consider seriously” the views of the IWC and its subsidiary organs, otherwise the conclusion will be “that the project is not being carried out for the purposes of scientific research, but for some other purpose inconsistent with the Convention.” (id. at para. 26).
The trusteeship concept that I develop suggests that states are subject to rigorous accountability requirements not only with respect to their treatment of endangered migratory species, but also when they are using transboundary resources they share with a few other states, and even when they manage their “own” resources. For states do not fully “own” their “own” resources. Stated otherwise, following the German Basic Law concept of ownership (Article 14), “Ownership entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” As discussed in my article (at pp. 311-12), the same rationale applies with even greater force to states.
To some extent, such accountability obligations are minimal because they do not restrict the scope of sovereign discretion. If Australia is right, Japan would have to provide more data and expert analysis to prove the scientific basis for its decision to permit the killing of whales, and pay serious attention to the views of the IWC and others. But the ultimate decision would stay with Japan. Others may remain skeptical, and their suspicion may even have a stronger basis, but nothing more. This would be an “imperfect” obligation, in the sense that it would be a non-justiciable one; but an imperfect obligation is not necessarily an ineffective one, as anyone exposed to public shaming will appreciate.
The question whether the ICJ may question Japan’s explanation is a different and rather difficult one, which requires further deliberation. In my article I identified this as a question to be addressed at a later stage. Such an inquiry will have to assess the legitimate scope of review of national policymaking by external bodies such as international tribunals, in light of concerns with the impartiality of the judges, their competence to make better judgment calls than the reviewed sovereigns, and the potentially stifling impact of their interventions on domestic democratic processes. It may make sense, for example, for the reasons stated by Crawford, to authorize international tribunals to review national discretion when it applies to the use of migratory species but not to the management of domestic stocks.
This minimalist vision seems insufficient for von Bogdandy and Schmalz who want to “Push[] Benvenisti Further.” The opposite push comes from McCrudden who regards my position as “anything but ‘modest’ or ‘minimal’.”
