In association with the International Commission of Jurists

Author: Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters

01 Oct

[Nicolas Hachez is a PhD student at the institute for International Law and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Jan Wouters is Professor of International Law and International Organizations, Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam EU and Global Governance, and Director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Institute for International Law at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven).] First of all, we would like to thank Prof. Treves for his kind words on our chapter, and for his very interesting ‘think outside the box’ comments. Prof. Treves’ observations contain three main points:
  • Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as an alternative to arbitration
  • The recent denunciation of the ICSID convention by a number of state parties
  • The possibility to mirror the ‘prompt release’ procedure set out in art. 292 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention in international investment law.
We will address Prof. Treves’ points in that order.
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01 Oct

[Nicolas Hachez is a PhD student at the institute for International Law and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Jan Wouters is Professor of International Law and International Organizations, Jean Monnet Chair Ad Personam EU and Global Governance, and Director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and Institute for International Law at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven).] This chapter, entitled ‘International investment dispute settlement in the twenty-first century: does the preservation of the public interest require an alternative to the arbitral model?’ takes a close look at the arbitral mechanism which is the preferred dispute settlement mode in investment disputes between foreign investors and host states, and reviews the criticism which arbitration is currently facing in this context. The starting point of such criticism is that investor-state disputes concern questions of public law as they allow for the review of domestic legislations. Arguably, the arbitral model would not be suitable to settle disputes which directly engage the public interest. The argument is usually articulated around the following concerns:
  • The arbitral model is designed after commercial arbitration and would fail to live up to the rule of law requirements of administrative review. This is evidenced notably by the fact that arbitral proceedings are one-off procedures not amenable to appeal, thereby allowing for inconsistent decisions, or by the fact that proceedings involving questions of public interest are untransparent as confidentiality is the rule in commercial arbitration.
  • Arbitral tribunals would lack independence, as there are no incompatibilities for arbitrators and remuneration by the claim would be an encouragement for arbitrators to take legal positions that encourage the lodging of future claims and therefore increase the arbitration business. Likewise, it has been noted that a number of arbitrators are also practicing lawyers regularly advising multinational corporations, and would therefore have an interest to adopt pro-investor decisions so as to serve the interest of their clients.
  • Arbitrators would lack impartiality, as the arbitral system would be structurally biased towards investors’ interests and towards the application of investment disciplines even when they potentially conflict with other bodies of international or domestic law.
The result of such deficiencies would be that the arbitral model for settling investor-state disputes disregards issues of public interest which such disputes naturally entail, and would be biased towards preserving the private economic interests of foreign investors. In the face of such criticism, the international investment arbitration regime (notably under the impulsion of ICSID, UNCITRAL, the PCA, and through the amendment of certain investment treaties like NAFTA) underwent reform under several counts aiming at increasing consideration of issues of public interest: 
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