Imagining Gaza, Thinking Kosovo: The (De)similarities of UN Security Council Resolutions 2803 (2025) and 1244 (1999)

[Qerim Qerimi is a professor of international law and former rector at the University of Prishtina (Kosovo), and is currently a member of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission.

He served as a member and coordinator of Kosovo’s legal team in the advisory proceedings before the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. The views expressed here are the author’s own.]

Introduction

On 17 November 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing a comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict, establish transitional governance, and authorize an international stabilization force. Remarkably, the architecture of that resolution evokes memories of another comparable framework: Resolution 1244 (1999), which placed Kosovo under international administration following armed conflict. Resolution 1244 established a far-reaching international administration that, across years of learning, frustration, and institutional engineering, helped Kosovo move from crisis to stability and from an indeterminate status to statehood. For Palestinians, it would imply a paradigmatic shift in strategy, a move away from a national movement to a state-building movement.

This post asks a focused question: what legal and institutional lessons can be drawn from Resolution 1244 for the implementation of Resolution 2803, particularly regarding (1) transitional governance, (2) conditionality and the sequencing of self-determination, and (3) exit from international administration? The comparison is not an exercise in analogy for its own sake. Rather, in thinking of Gaza through the lens of Kosovo, it seeks to illuminate the possibilities and risks embedded in Resolution 2803.  

The contexts differ profoundly, and those differences matter. Yet the structural similarities are striking enough to justify careful reflection. If Kosovo illustrates the promise and limits of international territorial administration, Gaza may test whether those lessons can be transposed to its own reality. Kosovo’s experience, however, provides both inspiration and caution in imagining Gaza’s future.

Formal Symmetries: Annexes, Mandates and Near-Consensus Votes 

Resolutions 1244 and 2803 share a distinctive institutional structure. Each contains annexes setting out political principles and operational arrangements. Each authorizes both civilian and security presences. And each was adopted without a vote against. China abstained on resolution 1244, and China and Russia abstained on resolution 2803.

This formal resemblance is more than symbolic; a substantive, if nuanced, resemblance defines the broader design and logic of the concept. Both resolutions establish a dual transitional architecture. The institutions of this architecture are meant to be the foundation of both governance transitions. 

Under Resolution 1244, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was entrusted with an exceptionally broad civilian authority. On the other hand, the Board of Peace (BoP), though less robust in scope, is tasked with coordinating reconstruction, financial management, political reform, and the return of effective Palestinian Authority (PA) governance. Under Resolution 1244, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was tasked with ensuring the withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serb forces, monitoring the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), restoring order, and supporting the international civilian presence. Under Resolution 2803, ISF is charged with border security, civilian protection, demilitarization, and security-sector restructuring. 

Finally, both resolutions aim at political transition: Kosovo toward “substantial self-government,” followed by status settlement (Resolution 1244, para. 11 and annexes 1 and 2); Gaza toward a conditional roadmap for Palestinian self-determination and statehood (Resolution 2803, para. 2 and para. 19 of annex 1). Ultimately, the relevant question is whether these structures are designed to cultivate local ownership, political legitimacy, and a credible pathway to self-determination and statehood.

The Promise and Limits of International Administration: Kosovo after 1244 

Kosovo’s post-1244 trajectory offers a concrete measure for assessing how international administration can both enable and constrain local empowerment and political development. 

Local Self-Government under International Oversight

UNMIK’s mandate was extraordinarily broad. It administered public services, police, courts, customs, and economic policy. It also organized elections, drafted and promulgated legislation, and facilitated the establishment of provisional institutions of self-government (PISG). 

Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the Kosovo experience is how its institutions were built. Institution-building unfolded through several mutually reinforcing mechanisms, most notably a phased internationally managed transitional governance framework that progressively embedded local ownership through capacity-sharing. First, UNMIK created the core administrative, legal, and regulatory frameworks from scratch, introducing rule of law and contemporary public administration standards. Second, it staffed key ministries, courts, police units, and public utilities with international officials while simultaneously recruiting and training local counterparts. Third, UNMIK institutionalized capacity-building by pairing international leadership with local participation in mixed structures (i.e., joint judicial panels, co-administered ministries, and integrated police units). Fourth, once basic functionality was established, UNMIK deliberately transferred competencies to the PISG. Finally, the mission helped entrench these institutions through repeated electoral cycles and legal harmonization.

The success was neither automatic nor uncontested. UNMIK faced criticism for bureaucratic inertia, absence of accountability, and uncertain political legitimacy. Sovereignty remained suspended for an extended period, and frustrations accumulated. Yet its achievements, such as public order, institution-building, and an eventual path toward statehood, are clear and substantial.

The first lesson, therefore, is structural. International administration can succeed when it integrates and institutionalizes local participation early and meaningfully, and sequences the transfer of authority in a credible and transparent manner. 

“Standards before Status” and the Limits of Conditionality 

Kosovo’s experience also exposes the risks of technocratic conditionality. The early 2000s brought mounting frustration with the international administration and the absence of clarity regarding a final settlement. The UN’s “Standards before Status” policy conditioned discussion of Kosovo’s final status on the fulfillment of governance benchmarks, such as functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, economic reform, human rights and minority protections.

Over time, this sequencing generated political fatigue. Benchmarks multiplied, but the status remained uncertain. In 2005, Kai Eide, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, delivered a decisive assessment acknowledging both progress and profound stagnation. He concluded that benchmarks could not serve as a precondition for status talks and that “time has come to commence this process” (para. 62). His assessment was blunt: “Kosovo cannot remain indefinitely under international administration” (para. 86). 

The second lesson emerges here. Benchmarks can guide reform, but when detached from a credible political horizon they risk undermining legitimacy. Conditionality must be politically sequenced, not bureaucratically perpetuated. 

Negotiating Status and Designing an Exit

Following Eide’s Report, Martti Ahtisaari led negotiations on Kosovo’s final status. His 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement provided for “independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community” (para. 5). It designed a constitutional blueprint for a multiethnic Kosovo, grounded in respect for the highest level of internationally recognized human rights, robust minority protections, and an international civilian presence to supervise compliance.

Although the Ahtisaari plan was not formally adopted by the Security Council, it laid the foundation for Kosovo’s post-independence constitutional architecture. Independence was declared in 2008 under its framework, and supervision formally ended in 2012. This helped preventing governance from hardening into permanent dependency. 

The third lesson is thus temporal and normative: international administration must contain a credible and time-bound exit strategy. 

Altogether, Kosovo’s post-1244 journey illustrates that international administration can succeed when it builds institutions, listens to local desires and frustrations, adapts benchmarks to political realities, negotiates status in good faith, and exits on time.

Gaza through the Kosovo Lens

Seen against this background, Resolution 2803 appears both ambitious and ambiguous at times, but not without precedent. Its design incorporates elements that echo Kosovo’s architecture, but its success will depend on whether it internalizes the structural lessons outlined above. 

Transitional Governance and Local Ownership

The BoP, conceived as “a transitional administration with international legal personality” (Resolution 2803, para. 2), resembles UNMIK’s role. It is mandated to supervise reconstruction, coordinate donors, and oversee a technocratic local committee responsible for day-to-day administration. 

The crucial question is whether this arrangement will genuinely ensure Palestinian ownership from the outset. Kosovo’s experience suggests that early and meaningful local participation is indispensable. 

Security Stabilization 

The ISF’s robust mandate, such as civilian protection, border security, demilitarization, and police training mirrors the role of KFOR. In an environment as complex and volatile as Gaza, a credible international security presence is indispensable not only for de-escalating violence, but also for creating the conditions necessary for the civil administration to establish itself and consolidate. 

Eighteen years after independence, virtually no one questions the continued presence of KFOR. If anything, its deployment is viewed as a source of reassurance rather than intrusion, reflecting a deeply rooted sense of security and stability, a sentiment underscored by Kosovo’s own aspiration to join NATO as a full-fledged member. 

A comparable security umbrella in Gaza could provide the indispensable security framework for a nascent civil administration, a form of what Agha and Khalidi call “soft sovereignty.” Such an arrangement would offer the strategic depth of external security guarantees, while leaving civil governance in Palestinian hands. It could be framed as a pragmatic interim step that acknowledges the present realities of Gaza, removes existential fears, and buys time for institutional development, political consolidation, and a genuinely Palestinian order to emerge.    

Ultimately, Kosovo’s experience reveals that external security guarantees can endure if they are perceived as protecting, rather than constraining, local aspirations. Whether the ISF can achieve that balance is an open question of paramount importance. 

The Road to Independence 

Resolution 2803 envisages “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” (para. 2) once governance reforms and reconstruction benchmarks are met. In this respect, it echoes the incremental philosophy applied in Kosovo. 

Yet the comparison reveals a paradoxical conundrum. Resolution 1244 did not explicitly reference statehood, yet that outcome was ultimately materialized. By contrast, in Gaza, the right to self-determination is internationally affirmed, including by the International Court of Justice, but the Security Council framework ties it to conditional benchmarks. 

Kosovo’s experience warns against allowing conditionality to harden into indefinite postponement. Benchmarks must be realistic, transparent, and explicitly linked to political progress. Otherwise, they risk reproducing the very legitimacy crisis that afflicted “Standards before Status” phase in Kosovo. 

Divergences and Transferability Constraints

Despite structural similarities, important contextual differences condition the transferability of the Kosovo model. 

First, the identity and perceived neutrality of the administering authority differ. UNMIK operated under broad consensus. The Gaza plan, although endorsed by the Security Council, is closely associated with U.S. sponsorship. In a delicate context where perceptions of partiality are acute, legitimacy will likely depend on how equitably and transparently the BoP operates.

Second, regional dynamics are more intricate. Kosovo’s external environment, though geopolitically contested, was relatively contained. Gaza is entangled in a much wider web: Israeli policy, Egyptian interests, intra-Palestinian politics, and broader regional rivalries. 

For Gaza, however, regional states must be partners, but the Palestinian people themselves must own their future.

Third, the risk of indefinite administration may be higher. Statehood is prescribed in Resolution 2803, but only after conditions whose fulfillment depends partly on external actors. In this context, the absence of external obstruction and presence of internal cohesion are indispensable virtues.   

These differences, while evident, do not invalidate the comparison. Rather, they underscore the nuanced nature of transferability and identify the core challenges involved. 

Conclusion

Resolution 2803 echoes the architecture of Resolution 1244 in ambition: transitional governance, reconstruction, demilitarization, and a pathway to statehood. Both establish a dual international structure combining civilian oversight with security guarantees. 

Kosovo’s experience suggests three lessons of prime importance. First, international administration must ensure early and meaningful local ownership. Second, conditionality can guide reform but must not be used to hinder the attainment of the ultimate objective. Third, a credible, time-bound exit strategy is central to the legitimacy of international administration. 

Gaza’s path may be more complex. Its political divisions are deeper, its security environment more volatile, and its regional landscape far more intricate. Yet Kosovo shows that transitions born out of devastation can succeed when guided by genuine engagement with the people whose future is at stake.

The Kosovo model is not perfect, but it has worked. The real test of Resolution 2803 is thus whether it internalizes the structural lessons that made Kosovo’s transition, however imperfect, ultimately successful.  

To imagine Gaza by thinking of Kosovo is to allow hope a cautious space. It is to acknowledge that even a scarred land can rebuild, that institutions can be nurtured amid ruins, and that statehood, though deferred, can eventually be realized. International administration can provide an institutional foundation, but never a substitute for self-determination.