Two Distinct Legal Regimes of State Recognition: Somaliland, Israel, and the African Union

[Mahemud E. Tekuya, a former lecturer of Law at Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia, holds a JSD/Ph.D. from McGeorge School of Law, where he received the 2022 Award of Excellence for JSD Achievement (highest GPA and scholarship achievement). He is the author of The Nile in Legal and Political Perspective: Between Change and Continuity. 1st ed. Boston: BRILL, 2023]

On December 26, 2025, Israel officially recognized Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, contending that Somaliland satisfies “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” Somalia, together with regional institutions and twenty-one Arab, Islamic, and African states, rejected the recognition as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (see here, here, here, here, and here). More specifically, the African Union (AU) stated that “recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity…runs counter to the fundamental principles of the African Union.”

This development raises a critical question about the interplay between general international law on state recognition and the legal obligations of African states under the AU Constitutive Act. Situating the recent Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the AU’s response at the intersection of two normative regimes governing state recognition, this piece argues that while the general international law allows Israel, as a non-AU member, to recognize Somaliland, African states are bound by the doctrine of non-recognition, a distinct regional legal doctrine established to ensure regional stability. 

Despite fulfilling the requirements for Statehood, no United Nations member state other than Israel has recognized Somaliland. This limited recognition is largely attributed to geopolitical factors, including the desire to discourage “other secessionist movements in East Africa” and the doctrine of non-recognition, which binds African states under the AU Constitutive Act.

The next section briefly reviews recognition of a state under international law, highlighting the theories and requirements of state recognition and the doctrine of non-recognition. Then, the piece scrutinizes the legality of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in light of these principles. The final section analyzes the African regional approach to state recognition.

Recognition of States Under General International Law

Recognition of states is one of the most consequential issues under international law. However, it is also one of the most controversial areas of discipline (see here,  here, & here). Scholars have long debated the very nature of the subject, including when a given entity can be accepted as a state and what legal effects recognition entails. Despite this controversy, certain general propositions tend to be accepted. First, while the traditional view considers recognition as a “constitutive” of a given entity’s statehood, conferring it international legal personality, the contemporary and most widely held view is that recognition is a mere “declaration” of an already existing state, established after the fulfillment of certain objective conditions (see here, here, & here).

Second, in order to avoid premature or precipitate recognition and to respect the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, a state contemplating recognition must carefully evaluate the extent to which the entity in question fulfills the objective requirements of statehood (see here and here). The 1933 Montevideo Convention sets forth the most widely accepted criteria. In the relevant part, it provides that “[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with…other states.”

Third, while recognition of a state remains generally permitted, the doctrine of non-recognition prohibits recognition in certain exceptional circumstances. Derived from the legal maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, the doctrine bars states from recognizing territorial acquisitions arising from unlawful acts, including, inter alia, the threat or use of force and occupation. In this regard, following Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon “all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it.” Similarly, in relation to apartheid South Africa, the Security Council called upon “all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called ‘independent’ Bantustans.” The Security Council also determined that Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was “null and void” and called upon “all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation.” More recently, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, stated that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”

The legality of Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland

For Israel’s recognition of Somaliland to be valid under international law, it must neither constitute (1) premature or precipitate recognition nor (2) a recognition of a situation resulting from an unlawful act. On its face, the recognition appears to be neither.

(1) With respect to the question of premature or precipitate recognition,Israel asserts that Somaliland satisfies “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” Measured against the four Montevideo Convention requirements mentioned above, Somaliland presents a coherent claim to statehood.

The first requirement—a permanent population—comprises two elements: “permanent” and “population.” While permanence does not preclude migration, it requires “some degree of stability of population.” Somaliland has a stable population residing within a defined territory. Although the population has a quantitative aspect, international law does not prescribe a minimum population (see here, here, and here). Vatican City, which is considered a state under international law, has a population of approximately 503 (see here and here). Somaliland, by contrast, has a population of more than 6.2 million.  Therefore, Somaliland fulfils the requirement of a permanent population.

Second, regarding the defined territory, Somaliland, located on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden, borders “Ethiopia to the south and west and Djibouti to the northwest.” Its territory covers approximately 176,120 square kilometers and includes a coastline of about 850 kilometers on the Red Sea. Some commentators further note that “the British protectorate established clearly defined borders for Somaliland by treaties in the 19th century… [which] were confirmed upon Somaliland’s declaration of independence in 1960.”

Somaliland indeed faces a territorial dispute with Puntland, a self-declared autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, in the Sanaag and Sool regions (see here and here). Nevertheless, Somaliland satisfies the requirement of a defined territory. Under international law, this requirement does not demand fully settled or undisputed boundaries. A state may be recognized as a legal person even where boundary disputes exist, as long as its government exercises effective control over a consistent area of territory. In this regard, the Somaliland government clearly exercises authority over a substantial and identifiable territory.

As to the third requirement, the Somaliland government has effective control over both the population and the territory. After the Somali National Movement (SNM), a Somaliland-based movement that ousted the military junta of President Siad Barre, declared Somaliland’s independence in May 1991, the people of Somaliland adopted a constitution through a referendum and established a multiparty presidential system. The government has subsequently established “its own currency, flag, military and police force.” It also ensures peace and security, making the territory “an ‘oasis’ for stability in a turbulent region.” Somaliland has held free and fair elections and has become “one of the most stable democracies in the region.”

Fourth, although Israel is the first country to recognize Somaliland (the second, if Taiwan is counted), Somaliland has long engaged in diplomatic relations with several countries, including by opening representative or diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, Djibouti, London, Sanaa, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., Brussels, South Africa, Sweden, and Oslo (see here and here). While Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, Taiwan, and Denmark maintain diplomatic or representative missions in Somaliland, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and Djibouti recognize Somaliland-issued passports (see here and here). Moreover, Somaliland has concluded a number of agreements with Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see here, here, and here). Accordingly, Somaliland not only possesses the capacity to engage in international relations with other states but is already actively doing so.

(2) With respect to the doctrine of non-recognition situation arising from unlawful acts, Somalia’s independence is not related to the threat or use of force, coercion, occupation, or any other unlawful conduct. Somalia and the Palestinian Authority have alleged that “Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could be linked to a plan to displace Palestinians.”  Somaliland, for its part, has stated that “any move by Israel to recognize its independence would not have anything to do with the Palestinian issue.” Other analyses have linked Israel’s engagement with Somaliland to its geostrategic location and potential security cooperation, including “countering threats from Yemen, particularly from Iran-backed Houthi rebels who have repeatedly targeted international shipping.” Therefore, in the absence of conclusive evidence establishing a causal link between Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and an independently unlawful act, these allegations alone do not render the recognition unlawful under international law.         

Even assuming, arguendo, that Israel’s recognition was motivated by Israel’s intent to ethnically cleanse Palestinians and to resettle them in Somaliland, the relevant legal question remains whether Israel is recognizing an entity created through the threat or use of force, coercion, occupation, or other unlawful conduct. Somaliland does not fall within that category. As noted above, following the ouster of the military junta of President Siad Barre in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence and has maintained its de facto existence since then. In its advisory opinion on Kosovo, the International Court of Justice remarked that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and concluded that “the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.”  Therefore, Israel is not recognizing a situation arising out of an unlawful act.

It should be noted, however, that if the allegations advanced by Somalia and the Palestinian Authority were to materialize, such conduct would constitute a clear violation of international law, including the prohibition of the deportation or transfer of civilians under customary international humanitarian law. Since Somaliland’s independence was not the result of any such violation, this would not affect the legality of Israel’s recognition. In that event, the doctrine of non-recognition would impose a duty on all states to refrain from recognizing any unlawful demographic outcome in Gaza or treating the settlement in Somaliland as a lawful result.

Accordingly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is consistent with international law. It is based on internationally recognized objective criteria, is not premature, and does not violate the doctrine of non-recognition.

An African Approach to the Law of State Recognition

In an apparent response to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, on December 16, 2025, the Chairperson of the African Union issued a press release stating, inter alia, that “any initiative or action aimed at recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity” must be rejected, recalling that “Somaliland remains an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” The statement further emphasized that “[a]ny attempt to undermine the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia runs counter to the fundamental principles of the African Union.”

These principles, although not binding on non-member states, are enshrined in three principal regional instruments: the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 16 (I), adopted in 1964 at the first session of the Conference of African Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, Egypt (the “Cairo Declaration”); and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The OAU Charter, under Article III, requires member states, inter alia, to adhere to the principles of “non-interference in the internal affairs of States” and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.” The Cairo Declaration, noting that “border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension” and recognizing that “the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality,” solemnly reaffirms strict respect for the principles set out in Article III of the OAU Charter and declares that all member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing at the time of their achievement of national independence.” More recently, the Constitutive Act of the African Union reiterates this commitment, providing in Article 4(b) that member states shall respect “borders existing on achievement of independence.”

The underlying purpose of these principles has been further clarified in judicial commentary. In his separate opinion in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Niger, Judge Yusuf noted that the main objective of these principles, particularly the obligation articulated under the Cairo Declaration, was “to discourage territorial annexation by force as well as irredentist, pan-nationalist and secessionist claims” (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the explicit obligation of states not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states under the OAU Charter, together with the obligation to respect borders existing at the time of independence as articulated in the Cairo Declaration and codified in the AU Constitutive Act, gives rise to a corollary duty of non-recognition with respect to secessionist breakaway regions.

African institutional practice also supports this conclusion. When Biafra attempted to secede from Nigeria and unilaterally declared its independence on 30 May 1967, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted Resolution AHG/Res. 51 (IV), treating the situation in Nigeria as an internal affair and condemning Biafra’s attempt to secede. One year later, the OAU adopted Resolution AHG/Res. 61 (IV), requesting “the secessionist leaders to co-operate with the Federal authorities in order to restore peace and unity to Nigeria.”

Similarly, the OAU condemned the island of Anjouan’s attempt to secede from the Union of the Comoros, imposed sanctions on separatist leaders on the island, and expressed its determination to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a united Comoros. Likewise, the AU declared the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad’s (MNLA) proclamation of independence from Mali “null and of no value.” In doing so, the AU underscored the “fundamental principle of the intangibility of borders inherited by the African countries at their accession to independence,” reiterating its “unwavering commitment to the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali.”

Despite this consistent rejection of unilateral secession, Africa has welcomed two new States following the end of the Cold War: Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011. However, in both cases, independence was not the result of a unilateral declaration but of negotiated political processes in which the mother states, both Ethiopia and Sudan, consented to the creation of the new States.

Therefore, under the AU system, non-recognition of secessionist or breakaway regions is the norm. At the same time, recognition of a seceding entity is an exception, permitted only with the consent of the parent state.

Conclusion

This piece demonstrates the coexistence of two divergent approaches within the general international law and the legal framework established under the African Union. It shows that international law generally permits state recognition, except when it is premature or the result of an unlawful act. In the AU system, however, non-recognition is the norm, with recognition of a seceding entity exceptionally allowed only with the consent of the parent state. Therefore, although general international law allows non-AU members, such as Israel, to recognize Somaliland, African states are bound by the doctrine of non-recognition, a regional treaty-based obligation derived from the AU Constitutive Act and related instruments. They should exercise particular caution in matters of recognition to avoid breaching their obligations under these instruments.

Ultimately, it is a longstanding principle of international law that “everything which is not prohibited is permitted.” Against this background, and in order to reconcile the obligations of African states under the African Union framework with the permissive rules of general international law, the doctrine of non-recognition should be understood as a special, treaty-based regional rule applicable to all African States. As Judge Yusuf observed, it is “specific to the African continent, where it is considered part of the public law of Africa applicable to all African States, but has no claim to being a general principle or a customary rule of international law.” Understood in this way, African states are bound by the prohibition arising from the treaty, without affecting the legal position of non-member states.