Between Sovereignty and Universality: Iran’s Draft Bill on International Crimes in Comparative Perspective

[Heybatollah Najandimanesh is an associate professor of international law at Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran]

Introduction  

The incorporation of international crimes into domestic legislation marks a pivotal stage in the development of international criminal law (ICL). Iran’s proposed Iran’s Draft Bill on International Crimes (IDBIC) seeks to criminalise genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression within its national legal framework. This initiative is not merely a matter of legislative discretion but reflects binding obligations under international law. As a State Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Iran is required to adopt legislation providing effective penal sanctions for grave breaches (Common Article 1). Likewise, under the  1948 Genocide Convention, Iran is obliged to criminalise acts of genocide domestically (Article V). Although Iran has not ratified the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, many of its provisions—particularly those concerning the protection of civilians and prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks—are widely recognised as customary international law. Furthermore, substantial portions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court– which Iran has signed-, especially the definitions of core crimes, are considered declaratory of existing customary norms.  

Against this backdrop, Iran’s legislative initiative represents a significant step in aligning domestic law with international obligations. It also reflects constitutional commitments under Article 158 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979), which empowers the judiciary to draft bills concerning criminal law, and broader global trends towards the domestication of ICL. The obligation to criminalise international crimes domestically is therefore grounded in customary international law, treaty law, and constitutional law, underscoring the necessity of Iran’s Draft Bill.  

This post offers a critical overview of Iran’s proposed Bill, highlighting its key advances and remaining challenges. While the Bill represents an important step toward incorporating core international criminal law norms into domestic legislation—such as defining international crimes and establishing jurisdiction—it also raises questions about clarity, sentencing, and practical implementation. Rather than providing an exhaustive legal analysis, the discussion situates the Bill against major international instruments, including the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions, and reflects on its broader implications for justice, accountability, and Iran’s engagement with the international legal order.

Contextual Background  

On 19 October 2025, the Iranian government submitted the IDBIC to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) for legislative consideration. The Bill must be situated within this global movement towards the nationalisation of ICL. Its preamble explicitly frames the initiative as a response to the international community’s rejection of impunity for perpetrators of core international crimes, emphasising that the globalisation of ICL—particularly through the adoption of the Rome Statute and its principle of complementarity—has provided the normative basis for national criminalisation.  

The preamble further grounds the Bill in Islamic and constitutional principles. It highlights the emphasis of Islam on human dignity, justice, and the prevention of oppression, alongside the safeguarding of political and social freedoms within the limits of law. It situates the Bill within the constitutional mandate of Article 158 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979, amended 1989), which empowers the judiciary to draft bills concerning criminal legislation. Article 158 specifies that the head of the judiciary is responsible for establishing the organisational structure necessary for the administration of justice, drafting judiciary bills appropriate for the Islamic Republic, and appointing, promoting, and managing judges in accordance with the law.  

Beyond Article 158, the Bill reflects broader constitutional principles. Article 4 requires all laws to be based on Islamic criteria. Article 96 entrusts the Guardian Council with determining the compatibility of legislation with Islam and the Constitution. Article 152 frames foreign policy around independence, rejection of domination, and defence of the rights of Muslims. Article 77 stipulates that all international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved by the Majlis, underscoring the role of parliamentary oversight in the incorporation of international norms into domestic law. Taken together, these constitutional provisions demonstrate that Iran’s approach to international crimes is not only a matter of harmonisation with global standards but also an expression of constitutional identity and political sovereignty. The Draft Bill thus embodies a dual orientation: convergence with ICL and divergence through the integration of Islamic legal principles and national constitutional safeguards. This duality makes the Bill a valuable departure point for scholarly analysis, as it reflects the tension between universal norms and domestic constitutional frameworks.

Genocide (Bill Article 3; Rome Statute Article 6)  

Both texts adopt the canonical definition of genocide: acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The five modalities—killing, serious harm, destructive conditions of life, preventing births, and forcible transfer of children—are faithfully reproduced. This convergence demonstrates Iran’s commitment to aligning its domestic law with the Genocide Convention.  

Yet differences remain. The Rome Statute requires that conditions of life be “calculated to bring about physical destruction,” emphasizing purposive design and causal nexus. The Bill instead uses the broader phrase “harsh conditions of life,” which may expand the scope of liability but risks interpretive ambiguity. Moreover, the Bill integrates genocide into Iran’s penal hierarchy by prescribing imprisonment and fines—Grade 1 for killing and Grade 2 for other acts—whereas the Rome Statute prescribes custodial sentences only, up to life imprisonment. This reflects Iran’s effort to harmonize international crimes with its domestic penal traditions, though it departs from the ICC’s custodial focus.

Crimes Against Humanity (Bill Article 4; Rome Statute Article 7)  

The Rome Statute establishes that crimes against humanity must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, explicitly linked to a State or organizational policy. This contextual requirement ensures that isolated or sporadic acts are excluded, thereby maintaining a threshold of seriousness and institutional involvement. In contrast, Article 4 of the Bill defines such offenses as widespread or organized attacks against civilians undertaken “in furtherance of a general public program or policy,” with knowledge of the attack’s organized or widespread character. The Bill therefore adopts a broader and less determinate formulation, emphasizing the existence of a public program or policy rather than its institutional source. While this approach potentially expands liability, it departs from the Rome Statute’s insistence on State or organizational involvement, raising concerns about definitional precision and the contextual threshold for establishing crimes against humanity.

A notable innovation of the Bill is its criminalization of unilateral sanctions that deprive populations of essential goods. This reflects Iran’s political and legal stance against unilateral coercive measures, particularly those imposed by the United States. By framing sanctions as crimes against humanity, the Bill aims to deter States from imposing measures outside the United Nations framework and to discourage third States from enforcing them. In effect, the Bill elevates unilateral sanctions to international crimes, delegitimizing them and creating potential liability. Although normatively significant, this innovation diverges from the Rome Statute, which does not recognize sanctions as crimes against humanity.

War Crimes (Bill Article 5; Rome Statute Article 8)  

Both texts criminalize grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and serious violations of IHL in both international and non‑international armed conflicts. They converge on prohibitions against willful killing, torture, unlawful deportation, hostage‑taking, attacks on civilians and civilian objects, perfidy, pillage, use of prohibited weapons, sexual violence, child soldiering, and starvation of civilians.  

The Bill expands the list to thirty‑two categories, adding attacks on nuclear facilities, environmental destruction, and humiliation of dignity. The explicit criminalization of attacks on nuclear installations is particularly noteworthy. Unlike the Rome Statute, which does not single out nuclear facilities, the Bill reflects Iran’s specific historical and geopolitical experience. Iran has repeatedly been the target of threats and covert operations directed against its nuclear infrastructure, including cyber‑attacks and discussions of pre‑emptive strikes by foreign powers. From Iran’s perspective, these facilities are civilian installations dedicated to peaceful energy production and scientific development. By criminalizing attacks on nuclear facilities, the Bill seeks to elevate such conduct to the level of war crimes, reinforcing the principle that civilian infrastructure indispensable to national development and public welfare must be protected under IHL. This provision also reflects Iran’s self‑identification as a victim of unlawful coercive measures and hostile actions, asserting a sovereign right to safeguard its peaceful technological progress against external aggression.  

In non-international armed conflicts, the Bill extends most prohibitions from international conflicts, with exceptions, and adds specific clauses such as prohibiting death sentences without due process. This structure parallels the Rome Statute’s distinction between Common Article 3 violations and additional serious violations, but the sovereignty clause underscores Iran’s emphasis on territorial integrity, potentially limiting accountability in internal conflicts. Moreover, while the Rome Statute defines non-international armed conflicts flexibly in terms of intensity and organization, excluding mere riots or disturbances, the Iranian Draft Bill adopts a narrower and more rigid definition. It requires that organized armed groups under responsible command exercise stable control over part of the State’s territory for at least six months. This territorial and temporal threshold, absent from the Rome Statute, reflects a sovereignty-oriented perspective and significantly shapes the scope of war crimes in internal conflicts under Iranian law.

Aggression (Bill Article 7; Rome Statute Article 8 bis)  

Both adopt the leadership clause, requiring that the perpetrator be in a position to control or direct a State’s political or military action. Enumerated acts include invasion, bombardment, blockade, attacks on armed forces, misuse of basing agreements, and use of territory for aggression.  

The Rome Statute requires that the act of aggression, “by its character, gravity and scale,” constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The Bill omits this threshold, broadening scope to potentially include lesser uses of force. The Rome Statute also includes mercenaries and irregular forces, which the Bill does not. Sanctions again differ: the Bill prescribes imprisonment and fines, while the Rome Statute allows up to life imprisonment. By codifying aggression, Iran demonstrates commitment to comprehensive coverage, though enforcement is politically sensitive.

Ne bis in idem (Bill Article 14; Rome Statute Article 20)  

Both the Rome Statute and Iran’s Draft Bill uphold ne bis in idem as a fundamental principle and human right, prohibiting double prosecution for the same conduct while allowing exceptions for sham or inadequate proceedings. The Rome Statute limits retrial to cases involving shielding or lack of independence and impartiality. The Iranian Bill, in Article 14, adopts this logic but expands it by permitting retrial whenever foreign penalties are inconsistent with the penalties prescribed under the Bill. From an international law perspective, this is problematic, as foreign courts are not bound to apply another state’s sentencing standards, risking legal friction and undermining ne bis in idem.

Sentencing and Penalties (Bill Articles 6, 9–13; Rome Statute Articles 76–78)  

Sentencing under the Rome Statute is discretionary, calibrated to the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, with imprisonment extending up to thirty years or, in exceptional cases, life. Fines and forfeiture serve as supplementary measures. By contrast, the Iranian Draft Bill adopts a rigid, tiered sentencing framework, integrating mandatory fines into the penal hierarchy and excluding mitigation, parole, and suspension. Corporate liability is expressly recognized, with sanctions including dissolution and confiscation—an innovation absent from the Rome Statute. Victim reparations are embedded directly into sentencing, with confiscated proceeds allocated to victims, thereby institutionalizing a victim-centered approach within the penal system.

A further notable feature of the Draft Bill is the omission of capital punishment from its sanctioning provisions. Unlike many areas of Iranian criminal law where the death penalty remains available, the Bill prescribes only imprisonment and fines for international crimes. This exclusion may be interpreted as a significant normative step, signaling an initial move towards limiting, and potentially abandoning, the death penalty in the context of international crimes.

Overall, the Bill’s stricter and more punitive model reduces judicial flexibility but innovates in corporate liability and victim reparations. It reflects Iran’s penal traditions while diverging from the ICC’s individualized, discretionary approach, and its avoidance of capital punishment marks a potentially important development in the evolution of domestic criminal justice policy.

Reparations (Bill Articles 19–23; Rome Statute Article 75)  

Both frameworks recognize reparations as integral to justice. The Rome Statute includes restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation, ordered directly against perpetrators or through the Trust Fund for Victims. The Bill focuses on confiscation and compensation, exempting victims from court fees. Rehabilitation is not explicitly mentioned, and no trust fund exists.  

The Bill’s direct, asset‑based model ensures tangible compensation but diverges from the ICC’s broader restorative justice framework. By embedding reparations into confiscation provisions, the Bill reflects Iran’s effort to integrate victim‑centered justice into its penal system, though its emphasis is more punitive than restorative.

Overall Assessment  

Iran’s Draft Bill on International Crimes constitutes a significant and largely comprehensive effort to domesticate the core principles of ICL. Substantively, it aligns with the Rome Statute in its definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, while introducing notable innovations such as corporate liability, mandatory fines, and victim-centred reparations. Its dual legitimacy—anchored simultaneously in Islamic and constitutional principles and in international legal norms—positions the Bill as a potential bridge between global standards and assertions of national sovereignty.

At the same time, important divergences remain. The Bill’s sentencing framework is rigid and tiered, excluding mitigation and parole, yet it notably omits capital punishment. This exclusion, in contrast to other areas of Iranian criminal law, may be interpreted as a normative step toward limiting, and potentially abandoning, the death penalty in the context of international crimes. Such a development carries broader implications for Iran’s penal policy and its engagement with evolving international human rights standards. Other divergences—relating to jurisdictional scope, the treatment of unilateral sanctions as crimes against humanity, the omission of the “manifest violation” threshold in defining aggression, and the explicit criminalisation of attacks on nuclear facilities—underscore the tension between universality and particularity that characterises the Bill’s sovereignty-oriented approach to international norms.

Beyond the Iranian context, the Draft Bill also speaks to a wider moment of contestation within ICL itself. At a time when some states appear to be retreating from international criminal institutions or seeking to limit their reach, others continue to pursue domestication as a means of reinforcing accountability through national law. The Iranian Bill reflects this global duality: it simultaneously affirms the enduring normative force of ICL while reshaping it through domestic constitutional, political, and ideological frameworks. Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on institutional capacity, judicial independence, and political will, particularly in relation to sensitive provisions on aggression and sanctions. Nonetheless, the Bill illustrates both the resilience and the fragility of ICL in the current international landscape, highlighting how national engagement may serve not only as a site of fragmentation, but also as a potential source of renewal for the international criminal justice project.