The 24th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute: Time to Act

[Ezequiel Jimenez has a PhD in international law (Middlesex University, United Kingdom), works at Amnesty International and is Senior Fellow at the Center for International Law Research and Policy. His forthcoming book about the history and practice of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute will be published on 18 December 2025.]

The 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute will gather this week in The Hague for their 24^th session. Fresh from their first ever Special Session on the crime of aggression in July this year, where no result was achieved, the Assembly of States Parties cannot afford to treat this regular meeting as business as usual. For the learned observer it might seem that each Assembly session is crucial for the survival of the International Criminal Court. In the early 2000s the Court was a nascent institution that needed political and technical support. It also co-existed with the Global War on Terror and opposition from the United States. In the mid-2010s, the Court faced severe backlash because its docket consisted of cases limited to one geography, Africa. More so, the Court was consistently accused of underdelivering while some of its judgments and prosecutorial choices were criticised by academics and practitioners alike. Prisoner to its laudable objectives, the Court faced calls for review and reform just as the Covid-19 pandemic hit. The Independent Expert Review and subsequent Review Mechanism crowned a moment of realization that the project of 1998 Rome was no longer applicable to the realities of the next century. These cascading crises took hold while three elements were consistently true: unrealistic budgets for the delivery ask, chronic lack of cooperation to arrest fugitives and internal organizational disfunction and lack of staff wellbeing. Confronted by this diagnosis, today’s status or current polycrisis is remarkably worse and realistically worrying. This time is different. 

First, the United States has decided to take all action possible to end the mandate of the Court. Sanctioning its judges, Office of the Prosecutor and anyone aiding the important work of international justice is coupled with an imminent decision to sanction all companies doing business with the Court. So much that the Court’s IT has ditched Microsoft for a German State owned software solution. IT solutions mean processing evidence, maintaining Court records, communications and aiding investigations. Second, the Assembly of States Parties will be reduced from 125 parties to 121 as Hungary, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger prepare to withdraw the Rome Statute in 2026. A reduction of member states means less budget, less political cover and less jurisdictional reach. It also means that the Assembly’s aim to achieve universality of the Rome Statute goes so far as it fail to retain the current members, less so welcome new ones. Third, the Prosecutor is on leave of absence while waiting for a determination of the external investigation into alleged wrongdoing. The external report was expected in October. While the 24^th session will not make any determination about this, that the Office of the Prosecutor is without its main leader during a time of increasing challenges and that the Bureau has allowed the investigation to drag so long begs the question if the Assembly is discharging its governance role appropriately. More so, the questionable legal nature of the external investigation and the deficient role of the Bureau in leading it further put undue pressure on a battled Court facing a polycrisis. 

Fourth, the Court is embarking in drafting the 2026-2029 Strategic Plan whereas its central feature is ‘institutional resilience, with frameworks for continuity in technology, security, and finance, all grounded in values of accountability, fairness, and inclusion’. No Strategic Plan can move forward without ample, clear and powerful States Parties support for the Court. Finally, in 2026, the Assembly will elect six new judges and a whole new Bureau. In every change of leadership, if the priorities are not based on long-term consensus and objectives, it can destabilize further the delicate reality of the Court. For these main reasons, the 24th session cannot be another diplomatic meeting with pre-approved decisions. Above everything, it needs to be a session where political support translates into action, tangible action. 

Thus, looking at the provisional agenda there are several areas where political support must translate into tangible action. First, across all items and in particular the segment of the General Debate (point 7) must be used by States Parties, non-Party States and civil society to explain in no uncertain terms how they plan to support, protect and reassure the work of the Court in 2026. The General Debate portion of any Assembly meeting can be tedious and repetitive. This time around repetition about the depth of action each State will take to protect the Court from further intervention by the United States, Russia, Israel and other actors, is needed. States Parties in particular need to adopt local legislation that can affirm the immunity and privileges of the Court. In particular for European Union States Parties, their leadership to enact a blocking statute against United States sanctions is overdue. Agenda items related to the report by the Court President, the Registrar, a representative from the Office of the Prosecutor, the International Criminal Court Bar Association, and the Board of the Trust Fund for Victims need to be carefully and actively listened to by States Parties. In each of these reports, each relevant organ or part of the Rome Statute system will be asking for tangible ways in which States Parties should enable their mandate. Needless to say these stakeholders will require the Assembly moves fast on the review of the crime of aggression to finally provide the Statute with jurisdictional sense. Aligning the crime of aggression with other Statute crimes is a prerequisite to shore up the Court and secure its role in the international accountability framework, even when threatened. The Assembly could begin this important work by, at least, finding a Chair for the Working Group on Amendments sub-group on aggression. 

Next, the Assembly must take a new attitude towards its financial stewardship role. It cannot be that as of February 2025 the Court coffers were missing €74 million in assessed contributions (€50 million of the 2025 budget, and €24 million of prior years), with 37 States Parties owing their share for more than one year, and 16 ineligible to vote under Article 112(8). Clearly there are harsh national realities that prevent some States Parties from making their contribution in a timely fashion but the diplomatic tactic of only asking without consequences does not go far enough to entrust the Court with the resources it needs. More so when the Assembly is being asked to approve a 2026 budget with a meagre 1.1% increase. While the budget of the Court is certainly large (€193 million for 2026), so are their responsibilities and liabilities created by the sanctions pursued by the United States. Now is the time to invest in the Court.

Another tangible way to reassure the Court is for States Parties to use the damming Bureau report on non-cooperation to begin a process to discuss punitive measures for non-cooperation. The current Rome Statute provisions on cooperation are wide enough to consider penalties for recalcitrant States Parties, such as Hungary, Italy, Tajikistan and Mongolia in 2025. These measures could be financial, consider removing voting rights and blocking these non-compliant States from fielding candidates for elections. And, if the Rome Statute is in need of reform, States Parties can use Article 122, a less complicated amendment regime, to install momentum. Without trials, there is no Court. Finally, elections to the powerful Assembly subsidiary bodies must be on the basis of candidates’ background and professional integrity for roles in the Committee on Budget and Finance and the Trust Fund for Victims. Traditionally, States Parties seek to compromise on candidates to avoid competitive elections. A tangible way to support the Court would be to provide these subsidiary bodies with the most competent professionals via competitive elections, and in the event States Parties are not able to secure enough candidates, these positions could be open to civil society, including academia. 

These areas for Assembly action are only a starting point. In fact, civil society organizations have crafted their own recommendations on the role of the Assembly confronting the United States, on responding to non-cooperation and avoiding withdrawals from the Rome Statute. The Assembly has a duty to govern the International Criminal Court. Governing requires States Parties to put aside their national interest and seek decisions that protect the mandate of the Court. As seen here, governance can translate into tangible action starting at the very beginning of the 24^th session. If the Assembly resorts to business as usual, the Court will face 2026 without the political capital, financial backing and support it needs to do its job. This time is different.

Photo attribution: “Twenty-third session of the Assembly of States Parties opens in The Hague” by International Criminal Court / Cour pénale internationale