Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations: The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion in a Nutshell

[Emilia Klebanowski is a PhD candidate in international human rights law at Radboud University. Her research explores reparations for gross human rights violations.]

On 22 October 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its advisory opinion on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Although the advisory opinion contains a great deal of material to unpack, this blog focuses specifically on the main points of the ICJ’s ruling. In addition, it addresses the key disagreements highlighted in the judges’ separate opinions and declarations.

Advisory Opinion Request

On 20 December 2024, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) requested that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the following question: 

What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations, in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, including its agencies and bodies, other international organizations and third States, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population, and in support of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination? 

In short, the UNGA tasked the ICJ with delineating Israel’s obligations, as an occupying power and UN member, to cooperate with the UN and other actors in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to ensure unhindered humanitarian aid, basic services, and support for the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. As already observed by Marko Milanovic and Eliav Lieblich, the Court was on almost all points unanimous, with Judge Sebutinde dissenting on points mostly pertaining to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 

This request follows two prior advisory opinions in relation to Palestine, namely the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Wall from 2004, and the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem from 2024. Furthermore, it also needs to be interpreted in the context of the ongoing contentious cases of South Africa v Israel concerning the application of the Genocide Convention, and Nicaragua v Germany on alleged breaches of certain international obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. For more background context, see here.

Jurisdiction and Discretion

Before diving into the substance of the question, the Court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to render the opinion, and if so, whether it should nonetheless decline to do so. Whereas the Court’s jurisdiction to render the advisory opinion was clear cut (see paras. 18-22), the Court covered the issue of discretion in more detail due to some of the participating States arguing that the Court should decline to give the opinion because: the advisory opinion would prejudge elements of the pending contentious case of South Africa v Israel (paras. 26-31); the question had already been addressed in the previous advisory opinions referred to above (paras. 32-35); the Court did not have the competence to undertake significant factual investigations (paras. 36-37); and that the request constituted an abuse of the international juridical process (paras. 38-40). Ultimately, the ICJ rejected all these arguments and decided that “there are no compelling reasons for it to decline to give the opinion”. Notably, not all judges agreed with the Majority’s approach concerning the exercise of discretion. In her separate opinion, Judge Sebutinde (who has been accused of bias and impartiality recently) argued that it should have exercised its discretion to decline rendering the advisory opinion based on the arguments put forward above.

Scope of the Question

A first point of contention was how broadly (or narrowly) the ICJ would interpret the question posed by the UNGA. The Court took a rather formalistic approach when interpreting the question, observing that the question “concerns the identification of the ‘obligations of Israel’” (para. 77), and thereby clearly differentiated it from previous advisory opinions which asked the Court to determine the legal consequences of any breach of relevant obligations (see, for example, the two prior advisory opinions concerning Palestine, here and here; but also the advisory opinions on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius or Obligations of States in respect of climate change which concerned both state obligations and legal consequences). It is important to note that the Court focuses only on Israel’s primary (substantive) obligations, whereas it could have also considered whether Israel was under any remedial obligations, such as cessation or reparation, which would have necessitated the Court to look at the question of Israel’s responsibility.

When it comes to the temporal scope, this advisory opinion is the first one to address facts after 7 of October 2023. Indeed, in its 2024 advisory opinion, the Court explicitly excluded conduct by Israel in the Gaza Strip in response to the attack carried out by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023 (para. 81). By contrast, in the more recent advisory opinion, the Court adopted a very extensive approach including facts as they stood as of 2 May 2025, which concerns the day of closure of oral proceedings (para. 80). Interestingly, it also includes subsequent developments which were issued, at the Court’s request, by the UN, Israel, and Palestine (para. 80). The Deputy-Registrar of the Court had specifically requested “the United Nations, the State of Israel and the State of Palestine to give explanations on the situation since 7 May 2025 with regard to the provision of urgently needed essential supplies and basic services for the Palestinian civilian population in and in relation to the Gaza Strip.”. While the Registry’s letter has not (yet) been made publicly available on the Court’s website, it raises interesting questions as to the legal basis of its request and the procedural justification for seeking additional information after the close of oral proceedings.

Obligations in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the UN, Other IOs, and Third States

The Court also underscored Israel’s obligations as an occupying power by reference to international humanitarian law, and international humanitarian law. In this blog post, I will not dive deeper into the Court’s general reasoning as this has already been analysed comprehensively by Eliav Lieblich. In sum, the Court found that “the local population in the Gaza Strip has been inadequately supplied within the meaning of Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention” emphasising that “Israel, as an occupying Power, is under an obligation to agree to and facilitate relief schemes” within the meaning of Article 59 (para. 109). 

The Court also found that Israel had insufficiently substantiated the claim that UNRWA was neutral (para. 118). Throughout its reasoning, the Court indeed highlighted the indispensable nature of UNRWA, and emphasised that “in the current circumstances, it is not possible to replicate the capacity of UNRWA … UNRWA cannot be replaced on short notice and without proper transition plan” (para. 121). 

While the Court did consider alternative mechanisms for aid distribution, such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which effectively replaced UNRWA (for background, see here), it highlighted that this organisation has faced significant criticism from the United Nations and other international actors (see, for example, here and here). The Court also observed that its operations have also led to the death of over 2,100 Palestinians near distribution sites (para. 123). Crucially, the Court appeared to suggest that only the UN currently possesses the capacity to deliver the scale of humanitarian assistance required, whereas private entities, such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, cannot meet these needs at this point in time. Nonetheless, as noted above, the Court did not exclude the possibility of other entities assuming this role in the future, provided that a proper transition plan is established.

Duty to Cooperate with the UN under Article 2(5) UN Charter

Building on the Court’s emphasis on the indispensable role of the UN in humanitarian relief, a related and contentious issue arose concerning Israel’s duty to cooperate with the UN under Article 2(5) UNC. This article states that “[a]ll Members shall give the [UN] every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the [UN] is taking preventive or enforcement action”. Unfortunately, the Court failed to further clarify the meaning and scope of Article 2(5) and simply stated that it “must be read together with the provisions of the Charter relating to the powers of the various organs of the [UN]”. This lack of clarity was also raised in the separate opinions and declarations. For example, Judge Charlesworth, referring to the Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion, highlights that the general duty to assist the UN in all activities under its competence “potentially [goes] beyond the four corners of the Charter” (para. 5). Similarly, Judge Xue favours a broad interpretation of Article 2(5). Other judges, namely Abraham and Cleveland, stipulate that this duty only arises in conjunction with other, pre-existing binding duties that States might have. Both these types of interpretations are rather ambitious as they locate the duty to cooperate not only internally from within the UNC, but also from obligations external to it. As argued by Eliav Lieblich, there are many different ways to conceptualise the duty to cooperate and the Court’s lack of clarification leaves a lot of space for discussion.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the advisory opinion is not legally binding, it nonetheless carries significant authoritative weight in clarifying Israel’s obligations under international law. The non-binding nature of the opinion does certainly not exempt Israel from compliance with the substantive legal duties identified by the Court. However, Israel’s continued disregard for the orders of the ICJ’s orders poses a real risk to the rule-based international order. As cautioned by Judge Tladi in 2024 however the “Court is only a court!”, emphasising that the political organs of the UN are under an “obligation to resolve this problem” (Declaration Judge Tladi, para. 13). In his declaration, Judge Tladi also voiced his frustration, asking what should happen when “no heed is paid to this Advisory Opinion and to the other recommendations and resolutions of the United Nations?”, recalling Judge Lauterpacht’s warning that persistent defiance of the Organisation’s expressed will may lead to “the conviction that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principles and Purposes of the Charter” (para. 14). 

Beyond its implications for Israel, the advisory opinion also bears significance for third States. It reinforces the obligations of all States to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, including through their policies on humanitarian assistance. Against this background, the opinion potentially also carried important weight for those States that suspended or reduced funding for UNRWA (see, for example, here). The Court’s findings appear to vindicate UNRWA’s indispensable role in providing humanitarian aid and may prompt renewed engagement and support for it. Ultimately, however, whether this advisory opinion will produce any tangible change in practice is doubtful and remains to be seen.