Is International Law Adequate? Two Years After the Kakhovka Dam Destruction

[Meng Wang is a PhD Candidate in the International Law Department at Maastricht University, researching the protection of water in armed conflict across different branches of Public International Law.

Andrés Cáceres Solari is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of International Law, Faculty of Law of Maastricht University, researching the compatibility of international humanitarian law with modern warfare]

On 6 June 2023, the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam unleashed one of the deadliest environmental and humanitarian crises of the Russia–Ukraine war. The Kakhovka Dam, located on the Dnieper River in southern Ukraine, was built in 1956 and served primarily for hydroelectric power, irrigation, and water supply. It created the Kakhovka Reservoir, which provided a crucial water source for agriculture and industry in southern Ukraine.

Two years later, out of the wreckage of war, we are witnessing something extraordinary: the birth of a new ecosystem and parts of the flooded zone are transforming. Natural vegetation is returning to the reservoir site, enabling the restoration of up to 1,800 sq km of ecosystems—including 1,000 sq km of climate-resilient forests—and freeing 250 km of the Dnipro. This would mark the largest environmental project in history and a decisive Ukrainian contribution to the EU’s goal of restoring 25,000 km of rivers by 2030.

In this post, we briefly examine the challenges international law faces in addressing not only the immediate consequences of large-scale water infrastructure destruction, but also the altered ecosystems that emerge in its aftermath. The question arises: is international law adequate to respond to environmental issues arising in the aftermath of armed conflict?

How International Law Could Still Respond

This section primarily outlines the concrete actions taken under specific treaties—and the potential for further treaty-based engagement from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Environmental Law (IEL).

Regarding IHL, the destruction of the dam constitutes a violation of Article 147 Geneva Convention IV (which protects the civilian population) for being the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,” which is also considered a grave breach of this Convention. In addition, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, prohibits the targeting of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population in Article 54. Article 56 specifically protects dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations from attacks that may cause the release of dangerous forces and result in severe losses among the civilian population.

This is also protected under customary IHL’s (CIHL) rule 42, which prohibits the destruction of installations that contain dangerous forces, rule 45 which prohibits the use of methods/means of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment (Also see Additional Protocol I Article 55, Article 35(3)). The environmental consequences of the dam’s destruction—including flooding, chemical contamination, and long-term ecological harm—underscore the applicability of these provisions.

From an IEL perspective, under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, states are obliged to protect wetlands of international importance (Ramsar Sites). Following the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, the Ramsar Secretariat coordinated a rapid environmental assessment, which documented widespread flooding, desiccation of wetlands, and impacts extending to Ramsar Sites, UNESCO Biosphere Reserves, and the Pan-European Ecological Network.

The Bern Convention on the the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention) and its Emerald Network are also directly implicated, given the damage to riparian habitats and wetland-dependent species. Scientific studies have highlighted the Emerald Network’s contribution to reforestation and forest conservation, noting that protected areas in Ukrainian-controlled regions maintained or even increased forest cover (+8% to +10% between 1996 and 2020), despite ongoing conflict. Scholars have further suggested that the Emerald Network offers a robust institutional and management framework, facilitating the implementation and monitoring of conservation policies even under challenging conditions.

Other multilateral environmental agreements are also relevant. Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies given the risk of nutrient and pollutant flows from the Dnipro River into the semi-enclosed Black Sea. To date, however, to the best knowledge of the contributors, no formal actions have been taken under these treaties. Still, their provisions remain highly pertinent, offering potential avenues to address the ecological impacts of the dam’s destruction and to support the achievement of their protective goals.

Can International Law Handle Newly Emerging Natural Habitats?

Two years later, as the phase shifts from deconstruction to the long-term phase of restoration and reconstruction, international law offers no single and unified framework. There is no “post-reconstruction treaty” designed for situations like the Kakhovka Dam, where ecological devastation gives way to entirely new habitats. Instead, states are left to navigate a patchwork of overlapping regimes.

As indicated earlier, under IHL, provisions such as Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I prohibit warfare that causes widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage. Yet these rules focus on restraint during conflict, not on obligations once the fighting ends. From the perspective of IEL, general principles—including the no-harm rule and the duty to cooperate—could guide post-conflict reconstruction, particularly where downstream states along the Dnipro River or the Black Sea are affected.

The reality, however, is that no coherent regime dictates what must happen after the destruction of a major dam, especially in dealing with the newly developed ecosystem after the flooding. Instead, responses are pieced together from IHL and IEL each offering fragments of guidance, but none providing a complete blueprint for recovery.

In the wake of the Russian destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, the Ukrainian government has approved a resolution to rebuild this critical infrastructure, with the state-owned enterprise Ukrhydroenergo designated as the main customer. Concurrently, two years after the dam’s destruction, the European Union and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have launched a EUR 30 million project aimed at restoring Kryvyi Rih’s water system, previously dependent on the Kakhovka Reservoir. Since the disaster, the city has relied on degraded and insufficient alternative water sources.

However, the proposed restoration of the Kakhovka Reservoir presents a legal and policy conundrum. Proceeding with reconstruction would necessitate the destruction of the 1,800 square kilometers of emergent ecosystems, most of which are forests. Such destruction would conflict with principles of sustainable development, undermine Ukraine’s commitments to increase forest cover, and raise potential questions under domestic and IEL regarding the balancing of infrastructure reconstruction with ecosystem preservation.

This situation underscores a tension between post-conflict infrastructure recovery and environmental restoration—a tension that Ukraine, policymakers, and international partners must navigate carefully to reconcile urgent human and economic needs with long-term ecological sustainability.

This dilemma also raises critical governance questions: Who coordinates such a restoration project? How can it be aligned with domestic priorities, regional environmental frameworks, and international obligations? Who oversees compliance and ensures accountability? Financing is equally complex: should Ukraine rely on international donors, EU funds, or reparations and compensation from Russia? And if compensation is pursued, who manages and monitors the use of such funds to ensure they serve long-term restoration rather than short-term political or economic interests?

To Rebuild or Not to Rebuild—and How?

The International Law Commission has developed a set of principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. For instance, one practical suggestion (Principle 22) is the integration of environmental restoration into peace processes through peace agreements, as seen in contexts such as Colombia and Uganda.

Another recommendation is enhanced cooperation between States and international organizations in areas such as environmental assessment and restoration planning. International frameworks—including the Ramsar Convention (which has begun developing methodologies for assessing wetland loss in armed conflict) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—can offer methodological guidance, technical expertise, and financial support. At the same time, organizations such as UNEP are well-placed to coordinate cross-disciplinary teams—bringing together ecologists, hydrologists, engineers, and legal experts—to assess environmental, social, and economic impacts holistically.

From a financial perspective, two potential avenues for funding could be explored: reparations that Russia may be legally obliged to provide, and contributions from donors and investors, including the World Bank and other stakeholders. Comparable models, such as the Chornobyl “sarcophagus” project, illustrate how such multi-stakeholder arrangements can work in practice.

Still, while these ideas look promising on paper, the reality is far more complicated. Peace processes take time and are often fragile. The war in Ukraine is now in its third year, and Russia shows little sign of slowing its aggression or complying with international law. Cooperation is urgently needed, but far from guaranteed. On top of that, it remains uncertain how well Ukraine’s institutions will be able to function once the fighting stops. All of this makes it clear that turning legal principles into real environmental protection on the ground will be anything but straightforward.

Photo Attribution: “Flooding in Kherson after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam” by АрміяInform is licenced under CC BY 4.0.