Uniting for Peace in Gaza: A Test for the General Assembly

[Kushtrim Istrefi is associate professor of public international law and human rights law at Utrecht University and coordinator of the Research Platform on Peace, Security and Human Rights]

On 5 September 2025, a group of 45 United Nations human rights experts, composed of UN Special Rapporteurs, UN independent experts and UN Working Group members, called the UN General Assembly to invoke the Uniting for Peace resolution in order to respond to the escalating famine and genocidal conditions in Gaza. In their joint statement, the experts urged the Assembly to (i) recommend a peace operation, (ii) demand that all crossings into Gaza be opened under UN supervision, (iii) suspend humanitarian mechanisms that had proved dangerous or ineffective, (iv) call upon Mediterranean states to deploy humanitarian naval missions, (v) authorize UN-led humanitarian convoys to supervise all crossings, and (vi) demand a permanent ceasefire alongside the release of detainees and hostages.

In this contribution, I argue that each of the six proposals by the UN experts is compatible with the UN Charter (see Articles 10-14) and the practice of the General Assembly. As the International Court of Justice has ruled in the Certain Expenses (p 163) the Security Council has the primary but not exclusive responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Over time, the Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions that have helped clarify its powers and responsibility on issues of peace, decolonization, and the fight against apartheid, among others. Its actions have been significant especially when the Security Council has failed to discharge its tasks under the Charter.

The paralysis of the Security Council during the Korean War led to the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 377(V) in November 1950, known as Uniting for Peace. The resolution declared that if the Council failed to discharge its responsibility because of a lack of unanimity among its permanent members, the Assembly could convene an “emergency special session” and recommend collective measures, including “the use of armed force when necessary”. Since then, emergency special sessions under Uniting for Peace have been convened a dozen times, most recently in 2022 regarding the war in Ukraine. 

The ICJ in its advisory opinion on Kosovo has affirmed the legal weight of the Uniting for Peace resolution (see para. 403). The reference of the UN experts to the Uniting for Peace carries not only a legal but also political weight. As some scholars have argued, the Uniting for Peace is often invoked not only to refer to enhanced powers of the General Assembly but also to show the urgency of the situation and the imperative for a robust response when the Security Council is paralysed by the veto. In all its past actions, the General Assembly, by filling the gap left by the Council, has first and foremost demonstrated its vital role and its commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and international law. Hence, the response of the General Assembly to this plea may also serve as a litmus test for its legacy and its commitment to international law and justice.

A Peace Operation under Assembly Recommendation

The first demand of the UN experts was that the Assembly recommend the establishment of a peace operation. The UN experts do not specify how the peace operation should look like. They leave it to the General Assembly to determine its scope and mandate. This plea aligns with established practice. In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, the Security Council was blocked by the vetoes of the UK and France, both parties to the conflict. The General Assembly, meeting in emergency special session under Uniting for Peace, adopted Resolution 1001 (ES-I), recommending the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). This was the first UN peacekeeping force, and it was deployed with the consent of the host state, Egypt. UNEF remained in place until 1967, and its creation marked the beginning of UN peacekeeping as a central tool of international security.

UNEF I showed that the General Assembly can recommend peace operations when the Security Council is paralyzed. Later examples, such as the deployment of observer missions in the Middle East, similarly relied on Assembly recommendations. Although these missions were limited by the requirement of host-state consent, they demonstrated that Assembly recommendations could translate into effective field operations. These recommendations were not legally binding. Yet, its practice proved to be politically decisive.

Humanitarian Access under UN Oversight

The second proposal was that the Assembly demand the opening of all crossings into Gaza for unrestricted humanitarian access under UN oversight. The Assembly has a long history of demanding humanitarian access. During the Syrian conflict, for instance, the Assembly repeatedly called for unfettered humanitarian assistance. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Resolution 47/121 (1992) urged the establishment of humanitarian corridors. 

What distinguishes the Gaza proposal is its emphasis on “direct UN oversight.” Yet this too is not without some comparable practice. The Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, though established by the Security Council, was administered by UN agencies under UN supervision, and its functioning was subject to regular review by the General Assembly. In Bosnia and Lebanon, UN agencies directly monitored crossings and convoys. Thus, while the Assembly cannot compel states to open borders, it can recommend oversight mechanisms involving UN supervision, which would be consistent with established practice.

Suspension of Failed Aid Mechanisms

The third element of the UN experts’ call was the suspension of aid mechanisms that have caused harm, such as by leading to deaths at distribution points. To my knowledge, there is no direct precedent of this nature. However, the essence of the plea is in line with earlier resolutions and with the UN’s work to mitigate humanitarian suffering, even when caused indirectly. A striking example is the case of the UN comprehensive sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. Comprehensive sanctions were blamed for causing widespread humanitarian harm, particularly to children. In response, the Assembly urged exemptions and adjustments, and its continued pressure contributed to the development of the Oil-for-Food Programme. A similar resolution on Gaza could delegitimize failed aid mechanisms and exert political pressure on those responsible for their design and implementation.

Humanitarian Naval Missions

The experts are also demanding Mediterranean states to deploy humanitarian naval missions. States are already undertaking such missions in relation to Gaza. Prior to the arrival of President Trump, the US too has deployed humanitarian naval missions to Gaza. The Assembly has often appealed for humanitarian assistance, for example during the famine in Ethiopia and other countries in the region famine in 1984 and following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Thus, recommending humanitarian naval missions would be bold, but it would not be without comparable practice. 

UN-Led Humanitarian Convoys

The experts also called for UN-led humanitarian convoys with full UN authority to supervise all crossings into Gaza. The Assembly cannot legally “authorize” such convoys in the same way the Security Council can under Chapter VII. However, it has frequently recommended similar measures. For illustration, it endorsed UN humanitarian convoys in Bosnia through Resolution 47/121 (1992) and urged international monitoring of aid deliveries in Syria, through the Resolution 67/262 (2013). 

Ceasefire and Release of Detainees

Finally, the experts demanded an immediate and permanent ceasefire, along with the release of detainees and hostages. This is the most familiar type of GA resolution. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Assembly repeatedly called for ceasefires. More recently, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Assembly adopted emergency special session resolutions demanding withdrawal of Russian troops.

Similarly, the demand for the release of detainees is consistent with Assembly practice. During apartheid, the Assembly repeatedly called for the release of political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela. 

Conclusion

Rebecca Barber, in her piece The Evolving Role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council in the Maintenance of Peace, rightly argues that GA resolutions are not only adequate but can also have legal effect, and that they have often been relied upon by international courts and tribunals. She rightly obverses how the ICC Prosecutor considered the GA resolution on Crimea in 2014 as “the legal framework” for analyzing the alleged crimes in Crimea and Sevastopol, and the ICJ has repeatedly referred to GA resolutions in cases such as The Gambia v. Myanmar, where it concluded that the Rohingya faced a “real and imminent risk of genocide”. Likewise, the GA resolution on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which also calls for full reparations, has been used as a key source in advancing proposals for an aggression tribunal, sanctions, the register of damage, and the claims commission. These examples suggest that GA resolutions on peace and security are not only common but also impactful. 

In addition, the Uniting for Peace has created a legitimate expectation that the General Assembly will act, especially when the Security Council fails to do so. The General Assembly just like the Security Council bears responsibility for the maintenance of international peace.

The Uniting for Peace resolution turns 75 this November. What started as a resolution pertaining to a specific situation in Korea over time became a sound legal framework and concept that describes the powers of the General Assembly to contribute to maintenance of peace and security and a commitment to deliver on the principles and purposes of the UN Charter especially when the Security Council is in deadlock. 

In light of the raison d’être of the Uniting for Peace resolution, the inaction of the General Assembly in the situation in Gaza may also undermine its original promise, and impact is legacy. Action under Uniting for Peace is no guarantee of immediate practical impact. However, at the very least, it would ensure that the UN continues to uphold international law, including humanitarian law, mobilize states and agencies, and sustain its own constitutional integrity.