Are International Immunities at Stake? The CICIG Case Before Guatemalan Justice

[Gabriel Andrés Concha Botero is a Colombian lawyer and consultant at the International Direction of the National Agency for Legal Defense of the State, and currently pursuing a Master’s in International Law at Universidad del Rosario]

On June 2, 2025, Guatemala’s Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity requested arrest warrants for Iván Velásquez and Adriana Camargo, both Colombian nationals and former members of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Velásquez, who served as Commissioner from 2014 to 2019 and later as Colombia’s Minister of Defense, currently holds the post of Colombian Ambassador to the Holy See, while Camargo is the current Attorney General of Colombia.

Background: Creation, Mandate, and Backlash of CICIG

Following the Guatemalan government’s request, and in line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/239 of December 23, 2003, the UN took note of Guatemala’s intent to establish a commission to address pressing issues of public order. Officially created in 2006 with UN support, the Commission aimed to assist the Public Prosecutor’s Office, National Police, and other state institutions in dismantling criminal networks of illegal security forces and clandestine structures that had undermined human rights in the country. Although the Commission was initially granted a limited mandate, Guatemala’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs requested an extension from the UN Secretary-General. Throughout its tenure, the Commission contributed to the prosecution of key political figures connected to high-level corruption, including former presidents Alfonso Portillo and Otto Pérez Molina. In 2013, Iván Velasquez was appointed as Commissioner of the CICIG by then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Beginning in 2016, both the executive and legislative branches of Guatemala embarked on a strategy to curtail CICIG’s investigations. In 2017, the Guatemalan government declared Commissioner Velásquez persona non grata and ordered his expulsion. These efforts culminated in 2019 with the unilateral termination of the agreement with the United Nations by then-President Jimmy Morales. Morales alleged that CICIG engaged in illegal activity, abuse of authority, and constitutional violations. Although Guatemala’s Constitutional Court ruled against the president and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to CICIG, the decision ultimately resulted in the Commission’s dismantling.

Six years later, the Guatemalan Prosecutor’s Office submitted an application to the Court of Appeals requesting arrest warrants for Velásquez and Camargo in connection with their alleged involvement in the transnational Odebrecht corruption case during their time at CICIG.

International Reaction to the Warrant

The issuance of these warrants presents a valuable case study in the scope and application of immunities afforded to international officials. The Colombian government has rejected Guatemala’s request. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the represents “Worrying manipulation of international judicial mechanisms, contrary to the spirit of legality, cooperation, and justice that should prevail in relations between states”, and as stated by former Chancellor Laura Sarabia on her X account, “It violates the fundamental principles of international justice and represents a serious deviation from international law standards.” However, apart from criticizing the measure, no specific reference was made to the immunity regime. Meanwhile, the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary General considered that:

“the Commission’s international personnel, under the terms of the agreement between the UN and the Government of Guatemala regarding the establishment of the Commission, enjoys immunity from legal process with respect to acts done in the performance of their mission, which continues even after the completion of their employment with the Commission.  The Secretary-General recalls that under this agreement, the Government of Guatemala agreed to protect the personnel of CICIG — whether international or national — from abuse, threats, reprisals or acts of intimidation in virtue of their work with the Commission.”

For its part, INTERPOL has confirmed it will not issue red notices against either official. Although no official statement was issued, local media confirmed that INTERPOL informed the central office in Lyon about the functional immunity enjoyed by officials for their time on the commission.

Legal Framework: Functional and Personal Immunities

The cases of Velásquez and Camargo are illustrative in light of the current debate and potential adoption of draft articles on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, following the second report of the Special Rapporteur Claudio Grossman. In fact, the report considers the existence of exceptions to functional immunity. Nevertheless, such exceptions do not apply to the present case. 

While Velásquez currently enjoys diplomatic immunity as Colombia’s ambassador to the Holy See, his immunity from Guatemalan jurisdiction arises specifically from the 2006 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Guatemala. That agreement provides for both personal and functional immunity for the Commissioner. As stated:

“The Commissioner shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, exemptions, and facilities accorded to diplomatic agents under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”

This explicitly includes:

“(b) Immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction in accordance with the Vienna Convention.”

It is thus clear that the Commissioner is granted immunity for acts performed in the exercise of official functions, as well as protection from legal proceedings, even for acts outside those functions, for the duration of the mandate.

The Guatemalan Prosecutor’s Office has mistakenly claimed that such immunity lapses once the Commissioner’s term ends. However, only the United Nations, in the exercise of discretionary authority, may waive this immunity. The controlling legal instrument remains the Agreement between the UN and Guatemala. Article 10 of that Agreement incorporates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to extend criminal and other immunities to the Commissioner. In fact, article 10(3) states:

“The privileges and immunities of the Commissioner and CICIG personnel are granted in the interests of the Commission and not for the personal benefit of the individuals concerned. The right and duty to waive such immunity, when it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which it is granted, shall, in the case of the Commissioner, rest with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and in the case of CICIG personnel, with the Commissioner.”

ICJ´s Role in Defining International Official Immunity 

It is important to emphasize that this immunity does not automatically expire at the conclusion of the mandate. As the International Court of Justice confirmed in its 1989 Advisory Opinion, Special Rapporteurs enjoy continued immunity under article VI, Section 22 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. That article provides:

“This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations.”

This was reaffirmed in the Cumaraswamy case:

“…what is decisive is that they have been entrusted with a mission by the United Nations.”

In this context, the position of Commissioner may be analogized to that of a Special Rapporteur: not a UN staff member per se, but an individual entrusted with a specific mandate. As the ICJ noted:

“The purpose of Section 22 is… evident, namely, to enable the United Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have the status of an official of the Organization, and to guarantee them ‘such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions’… The essence of the matter lies not in their administrative position but in the nature of their mission.” 

To comprehend the scope of the protection, one must ask whether the figure of the Special Rapporteur may be compared with that of a Commissioner. In this context, the 1946 Convention does not explicitly mention either of these roles; rather, it refers to “experts on mission for the United Nations,” excluding officials covered by Article V (i.e., those with UN personnel status). The 1989 Advisory Opinion concluded that Special Rapporteurs fall within the category of personnel referred to in Article VI.

Although the role of Commissioner was not directly addressed by the Court, it is reasonable to draw an analogy with the figure of the Special Rapporteur. While the Commissioner is appointed directly by the Secretary-General under a specific agreement, the Special Rapporteur is typically appointed by a UN body such as the Human Rights Council. Moreover, the Commissioner receives a salary, although not as an official UN staff member. In contrast, Special Rapporteurs are not paid.

Nevertheless, both roles are intended to carry out special and independent missions. In any case, even if the 1946 Convention were found not to be directly applicable, the 2006 Agreement extends its scope to grant the same regime of immunities. This comparison demonstrates that issues such as remuneration are not determinative in granting immunity; rather, what matters is the mandate and the functional immunity derived from a treaty.

Accordingly, the Guatemalan government was obliged to formally notify the Secretary-General of its intent to prosecute the Commissioner. Only the Secretary-General has the authority to lift such immunity. Guatemala’s failure to do so could trigger proceedings under article VIII, Section 30 of the 1946 Convention. Moreover, the lack of an effective examination regarding immunity as a preparatory act exemplifies the vagueness of the wording in  Draft article 9 of the ILC Second Report, while reaffirming the importance of Draft article 10. 

Immunity of Other CICG Personnel

The same reasoning applies to Attorney General Camargo. Although not a Commissioner, article 11 of the UN-Guatemala Agreement states that other CICIG personnel are subject to the provisions of article VI of the 1946 Convention.

It is worth noting that the Agreement distinguishes between the Commissioner, who is governed by the Vienna Convention, and other personnel, who fall under the 1946 Convention. This distinction may appear to contradict the notion that the Commissioner can be equated with a Special Rapporteur. However, article 39 of the Vienna Convention provides that while personal immunity ceases once the individual departs the host country, functional immunity continues for acts performed in the course of official duties.

Therefore, even if the Guatemalan Prosecutor’s Office were to argue that the alleged acts fell outside the scope of official functions, the ICJ’s jurisprudence on UN mission personnel would provide subsidiary protection.

Legal Consequences and Dispute Mechanisms

Although the Guatemalan government has criticized the Prosecutor’s decision, any formal dispute could trigger the dispute resolution clause under article 12 of the Agreement, which mandates negotiation or other peaceful means of resolution. The 1946 Convention also provides for the possibility of seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ—an especially relevant path, given that Guatemala has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, thereby limiting available practical remedies.

Finally, it shall be stated that, regardless of any potential responsibility the Colombian officials may have incurred – or not – during their tenure, immunity takes precedence as one of the cornerstones of modern international relations.