Evacuated or Expelled? The Legal and Political Realities of Forced Displacement and Return in South Lebanon

[Jasmin Lilian Diab is an Assistant Professor, and Director at the Institute for Migration Studies, at the Lebanese American University]

Introduction

The language of war is often wielded as a tool of obfuscation, sanitizing acts of violence and displacement under the guise of protection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the forced displacements in South Lebanon amid the Israel-Hezbollah conflict since October 2023. Israeli authorities and international actors have framed these population movements as “evacuations,” implying voluntary relocation for civilian safety. However, on the ground, civilians were driven from their homes under duress, often with no choice and no guarantees of return, restitution, or security.

With the announcement of a ceasefire in late 2024, attention has shifted to the obstacles to return. While many displaced civilians initially hoped to rebuild their lives, they now face destroyed villages, stalled reconstruction, and bureaucratic barriers. The Lebanese government has yet to outline a comprehensive return strategy, leaving thousands in a state of uncertainty. Meanwhile, continued Israeli military presence in border areas and sporadic ceasefire violations further complicate prospects for return.

This article interrogates how evacuation rhetoric masks the reality of forced displacement, the legal and identity implications for those displaced, and the broader failures of international law in addressing internal displacement. By engaging with international legal frameworks—including the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution—it situates the Lebanese case within global displacement discourse. It also examines how inadequate Lebanese state policies, continued Israeli military activity, and international legal gaps contribute to prolonged displacement.

The Language of Evacuation: Masking Coercion and Displacement

Evacuations are traditionally understood as protective measures—temporary displacements aimed at shielding civilians from immediate harm. However, when civilians flee due to military bombardments, destruction of infrastructure, and threats of violence, the notion of voluntary movement collapses. In South Lebanon, Israeli airstrikes, artillery barrages, and evacuation orders have resulted in the displacement of over one million people, with entire villages left uninhabitable. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s September 2024 statement urging civilians to leave Hezbollah-controlled areas in Lebanon illustrates how state actors manipulate language to justify mass displacements under the guise of security.

This rhetoric distorts the reality that displacement under duress constitutes forced displacement under international law. Civilians given mere minutes to evacuate before an airstrike, those with no access to safe passage, and families who return to find their homes in rubble cannot be considered voluntary evacuees. Rather, they are victims of systematic expulsion. The forced nature of these evacuations is further compounded by the absence of viable pathways for return, meaning displacement often becomes permanent exile.

Legal Frameworks and the Failure of Protection

The distinction between evacuation and forced displacement is not merely semantic—it carries significant legal consequences. International humanitarian law, particularly Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of civilians, except when absolutely necessary for their security or for imperative military reasons. Even in such cases, displacement must be temporary, and civilians must be guaranteed the right to return once conditions allow. Similarly, the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution affirm that displaced persons must be able to reclaim their property and receive adequate compensation. Yet, Lebanon’s fragmented displacement governance has left many without legal recognition, restitution, or support.

Unlike refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) lack binding international legal protections. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, while providing a soft-law framework for IDP rights, remain unenforceable. Lebanon does not formally recognize IDPs, leaving displaced Lebanese without structured assistance or pathways to reclaim their homes. This legal limbo, where displacement is acknowledged as a crisis but lacks formal resolution mechanisms, transforms forced evacuations into de facto exile.

This legal vacuum is not new. Lebanon has faced repeated waves of internal displacement, including during the 2006 war, yet no national legal framework has been established to address the rights and restitution of IDPs. While post-2006 reconstruction efforts, largely led by Hezbollah, facilitated some return, the absence of state-led restitution policies has meant that displaced Lebanese remain legally invisible—neither protected under international conventions nor integrated into a national policy for return and reintegration.

Ongoing ceasefire violations further complicate this landscape, as many civilians who wish to return face not only destroyed infrastructure but also continued Israeli military presence and the risk of violence. As the likes of Carling and de Haas have theorized, forced displacement and return cannot be fully understood without examining involuntary immobility. While displacement is often defined as movement, many displaced populations are also immobilized—trapped in limbo due to factors beyond their control, including border restrictions, economic constraints, and security concerns. The case of South Lebanon exemplifies this condition of “displacement in place,” where civilians remain stranded, unable to return and unable to integrate elsewhere.

The Politics of Return and the Erosion of Rights

For those displaced from South Lebanon, return is not just a logistical challenge—it is a deeply political issue shaped by military dynamics, selective reconstruction, and legal uncertainties. While the initial ceasefire agreement mandated an Israeli withdrawal by January 26, 2025, this deadline was extended to February 18, and Israeli forces remain stationed in multiple areas, citing security concerns and Hezbollah’s alleged failure to withdraw north of the Litani River. The Lebanese government has lodged formal complaints with the United Nations, arguing that these actions constitute a de facto occupation of Lebanese territory post-ceasefire. Yet, without enforceable international mechanisms, Israeli violations persist, complicating prospects for long-term stability.

Reports from Naqoura and other southern villages indicate that civilians attempting to return have faced live fire from Israeli troops, further delaying return and reintegration efforts. Israeli officials frame these as “precautionary measures,” but the ongoing military presence in designated return areas raises serious concerns about the feasibility of safe return. For many displaced residents, returning home is not only dangerous but also fraught with political obstacles that render return functionally impossible.

In parallel, Lebanon’s weak institutional response has compounded the crisis. The government has yet to formalize a return strategy, leaving thousands in prolonged displacement. Unlike Syrian and Palestinian refugees, who fall under distinct governance frameworks, displaced Lebanese lack structured pathways for assistance, restitution, or reintegration. This structural neglect, rather than explicit policy, serves as the primary barrier to return.

At the same time, reconstruction remains fragmented and politically charged. Hezbollah has historically played a key role in post-conflict rebuilding, particularly after the 2006 war, when it leveraged foreign funding to compensate displaced residents and reconstruct entire neighborhoods. However, in 2025, reconstruction efforts have been slower and less cohesive. Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked financial institutions, reduced regional support, and a deteriorating economic climate have delayed large-scale rebuilding efforts. While Hezbollah continues to be a central actor in post-displacement recovery, its ability to restore housing and livelihoods is no longer as rapid or comprehensive as in previous conflicts.

The delayed reconstruction process is not just an economic problem—it carries significant political ramifications. Many displaced individuals fear that prolonged absence will result in permanent dispossession, particularly in contested areas where sectarian and political shifts could influence property restitution. The longer displacement lasts, the weaker displaced communities’ claims become, particularly in the absence of state-led restitution policies or legal guarantees of return.

Ultimately, displacement in South Lebanon has evolved into a protracted condition rather than a temporary wartime measure. The intersection of Israeli military activity, Lebanese government inaction, and slowed reconstruction efforts has eroded displaced persons’ ability to return, not through direct policies preventing return, but through the structural failures that make it unfeasible. Without a political commitment to legal restitution and security guarantees, return will remain non-viable.

Conclusion

Forced displacement in South Lebanon is not a temporary wartime measure—it is the result of a system of structural barriers that prevent return. While international law guarantees the right to return, restitution, and security, the ongoing Israeli military presence, lack of Lebanese state action, and weak enforcement mechanisms have transformed this right into an unattainable promise. The international community’s failure to enforce these rights through legal accountability mechanisms has left thousands in prolonged displacement without pathways to justice.

Beyond the immediate obstacles, Lebanon’s lack of a formalized IDP framework further entrenches displacement. Displaced Lebanese remain legally unrecognized, with no institutional support for restitution or reintegration. The absence of a structured claims process for land, property, and compensation risks turning forced displacement into permanent dispossession. While forced displacement is prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention and other legal frameworks, these protections remain ineffective in the absence of international enforcement mechanisms that hold responsible parties accountable.

The international response has largely been limited to humanitarian aid, rather than legal or political pressure for accountability. Without independent monitoring, reparations mechanisms, and legally binding commitments to uphold displaced persons’ rights, return will remain a contingent and politicized process rather than an enforceable legal obligation. Ensuring accountability requires more than rhetorical commitments—it demands concrete legal instruments that safeguard property rights and penalize actors who obstruct return through military occupation or political inaction.

Photo attribution: “Mleeta, South Lebanon” by Hussein Abdallah is licensed under CC BY 2.0