Climate Change: Germany’s Bundeswehr to Prioritise Warfighting

[Luke James is Defence Human Security Advisor interested in transitional justice and conflict transformation. He has previously worked for the International Criminal Court, OSCE ODIHR, The HALO Trust and the British Red Cross. Luke is a Deputy Director for an International Law NGO, a Reservist with Outreach Group.]

Germany’s 14 March 2024 Strategy on Defence and Climate Change illustrates a distinct traditional state security prioritisation for its military approach to climate change – a missed opportunity to incorporate a complementary Human Security approach. 

Future Thinking Warfighting 

Germany’s Strategy on Defence and Climate Change (SDCC) is future thinking with tangible military activities categorised under “eight fields of action”. The thinking is almost exclusively geared towards “credible deterrence and effective defence of Germany and its allies”, with “military contributions to the Federal Government’s international crisis management” and support to “civilian authorities at the national and international level” being a recognised yet “subsidiary” task, expanded upon only lightly throughout the document.

Weaponisation of Climate Change

Germany’s strategy states it responds to the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass which tasks the Member States with developing national strategies to prepare the armed forces for climate change by the end of 2023. 

The spirit of the EU’s Strategic Compass however is more aligned to Human Security thinking, rendering the Bundeswehr’s (Germany’s armed forces) SDCC interpretation more focused with the impacts on warfighting; more focused on weaponising climate change.

The SDCC’s tone is likely driven in part by lingering perceptions of German lethargy in defence, despite Germany providing more to Ukraine per GDP than both the UK and France and the Bundeswehr’s recent “bold” defence transformation efforts. Accordingly, an underlying motif of this heavily-focused state security document is likely attempting to rebut these perceptions. 

The SDCC states Germany’s primary response to climate change must be “warfighting-capable and resilient… adaptable and sustainable … ensure operational readiness”; language which clearly signals a priority approach to climate change through a traditional state security lens. 

Military Operationalisation: Key Takeaways 

The strategy has eight fields of action. Germany’s first two fields of action relate to intelligence gathering and foresight analysis; understanding the threats (and opportunities) from climate change to its military operations. Examples include: 

• Strengthening of the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service 
• Implications of climate change considered as part of early warning analysis
• Utilising Research and Technology (R&T) to prepare MOD for climate challenges 

The third, fourth, fifth and sixth fields of action broadly relate to force development, force capability and operational planning. The SDCC states “well-trained personnel as well as suitable material and infrastructure are necessary to ensure the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr under all possible climatic and environmental conditions in the future”. In terms of planning, the “topic ‘impacts of climate change’” has been embedded into the Integrated Planning Process, as it has been in “relevant training and qualification measures”. The sixth field considers the resilience of defence infrastructure, such as logistics, supply chains, harbour facilities, mobility corridors, energy grids or telecommunications infrastructure to ensure functioning “even in case of more frequent extreme weather situation”.

The final two fields of action outline Germany’s boundaries of civil-military cooperation; of which is generally restrained. The Bundeswehr recognises the likelihood of “increased requests” for assistance, but underscores that “the responsibility for this lies with civilian structures at all levels of administration as well as civilian relief organisations”. The strategy restrains itself to “administrative assistance in the event of natural disasters or particularly grave incidents in Germany and abroad”. It loosely adds that the MOD will “deepen … cooperation” with other German ministries, NATO, the OSCE, the UN and its agencies as the primary actors. Human Security Advisors (HSAs), humanitarians, development workers or peacebuilders reading this part of the document hoping to identify mutually aligned objectives will not find much in the way of detail beyond vague references to “exchange and cooperation”.

Not Factoring the Human Impacts of Climate Change

It is notable that the SDCC does not seem to focus nor clearly identify the magnitude of threats to the roughly 3.3 – 3.6 billion people that live in environments which are highly vulnerable to climate change.

Whilst the SDCC does recognise the impact on “the livelihoods of people” – once – language is used which does not signal a belief of conviction in the devastating impacts that climate change has on people; “possibly threatening … potentially exacerbate”. Academia in the security-climate canon is almost exclusively couched in the affirmative; climate change will threaten and will exacerbate. This may be a poor translation; the German version does not translate “possibly” or “potentially” but uses the modal verb “kann” (can), which may imply some doubt, and later revises to add certainty, “warden/ wird” (will). In the original German language this may be confusing, but the English translation from a Human Security perspective presents a whole new disappointing meaning. Reference to “conflict analyses” is also made once, yet feels a passing throwaway comment, and is not operationalised in any of the eight fields of action. No reference to the maturing security-climate body of academia is made.

One specified task includes energy and water independence to “help ensure the supply of the Bundeswehr, including in operations across the entire task spectrum”. It adds “this avoids unwanted competition with the local population and preserves resources”. Whilst this ostensibly aligns to the do no harm principle, the SDCC omits whether this resource independence could be shared by the military to populations in need  – “subsidiary support” – to enhance Human Security in emergency climate-induced or climate-amplified security, humanitarian or development situations.  

SDCC in Deutsche Context 

It is unclear whether the Bundeswehr’s SDCC purposefully separated its activities responding to the effects of climate change from activities aimed at environmental protection, and where, for example, the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence) responsibilities end and activities by the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) begin. Although there are overlaps in goals and interconnected issues, it would have been useful for the SDCC to identify the distinction between these activities and implementing agencies, not least for resource allocation, targeted solutions, policy development, public engagement, and international cooperation. This would minimize fragmentation of effort, enhance cross-governmental and international collaboration, and cohere policy and resource allocation.

The SDCC seems to deviate in tone from last year’s Sustainability and Climate Protection Strategy (SCPS) which unlike the SDCC was not translated into English. In that document, greater focus is on mitigation (for example, reducing greenhouse gas emissions) rather than adaptation (dealing with the impacts of climate change), stating that adaptation measures will not be covered in that strategy; it is possible, though not communicated, that this SDCC is meant to be the adaptation document. In any case, the SCPS takes a clearer Human Security approach, focusing more on sustainability, development, aligning with broader societal and environmental goals – the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) are a key strategic reference point, with MOD Chief Boris Pistorius quoted in the foreword that the UNSDGs “serve as a guiding principle for the policies of the Federal Government”. The UNSDGs are not mentioned in in the SDCC. 

In 2023, following the Zeitenwende (the turning point following Russia’s war which “fundamentally changed the role of Germany”) the Federal Government released its National Security Document, the MOD released its first general strategic policy in 12 years, the Defence Policy Guidelines, and one month later in December the Foreign Office released its first Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy. Whilst the former two of these documents adopt an focus on “defence and deterrence” state security primary objectives, they both still include objectives and tasks which typically promote Human Security as “significant” priorities. Examples include crisis-management, post-crisis rehabilitation, stabilisation operations, conflict prevention, arms-control, confidence-building, promoting human rights as well as relevantly for this article, limiting the climate crisis and managing its impacts. 

The Climate Foreign Policy states it is a “whole-of-government strategy” and that its principles will be based on “peace, freedom, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, social and gender equality as well as sustainability, the protection of our country, the EU and our allies and the promotion of prosperity and social cohesion” – signalling a promotion of Human Security lens to the effects of climate change. 

In context with Germany’s plethora of recent strategic documents, the SDCC does appear to be an outlier and at times not aligned to the whole-of-government strategy approach promoted in Foreign Office’s Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy. 

Comparison to the UK

The UK MOD’s three strand approach to climate change; fight and win in ever more hostile and unforgiving physical environments; a global leader for defence and climate change, and; achieving net zero by 2050, as laid out in the UK MOD’s 2021 Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach positions the UK MOD ahead of the Bundeswehr when it comes to adopting a complimentary Human Security approach. The second and third strand promotes on Human Security principles, complimenting the first strand’s state security focus. This is supported by the Integrated Review’s continued priority commitment to tackling climate change and biodiversity loss through all levers of government. The UK’s November 2023 International Development Strategy, ‘International development in a contested world: ending extreme poverty and tackling climate change’, reveals its priorities in the title. It details activities such as developing a cross-governmental approach to global water strategy and the “linkages between water, health, energy and food”. The UK MOD’s forthcoming JSP985’s rewrite on Human Security in Military Operations, deepens its linkages to of Human Security to climate change, referencing its experiences and observations in Mali. 

Individuals in Defence circles in the UK and think-tanks such as RUSI have long recognised the potential for military taskings to protect the environment and respond to the effects of climate change, with the Royal Navy’s HMS Spey and Tamar in the Indo-Pacific supporting Pacific Island nations operations to protect fishing stocks from illegal fishing – which is often a direct consequence of climate change.

Whereas the Bundeswehr seems to imply it may only provide “administrative assistance” in incidents of climate change, leaving humanitarian assistance to “civilian relief organisations”, the UK Secretary of State told the UK House of Commons Defence Committee that “Defence will play an increased role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations in a climate change world”.

Conclusion

Germany’s SDCC is the latest in what Berlin likely wants to promote as a maturing, forward looking and responsible military actor with a core mission – credible deterrence and effective defence of Germany and its allies – within the NATO Alliance. 

Pushing out policy statements such as this is useful, and in Germany’s case is likely influenced by domestic considerations. This may explain why Germany prioritises climate change through the traditional military state security lens, rather than expanding on the “subsidiary” task of military contributions to international crisis management, which would more clearly align to the complementary Human Security approach. 

It may well be that Germany will push out another standalone policy document which relates to these subsidiary tasks, but language of this SDCC misses the opportunity to both integrate with its government’s cross-government Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy and incorporate a complementary military Human Security approach when dealing with the consequences of climate change.