More on Baltasar Garzon

More on Baltasar Garzon

Alas, I don’t agree with very much of KJH’s critique of Eric Posner’s Wall Street Journal opinion piece last week – Eric commenting on the suspension of Spain’s crusading universal jurisdictionalist judge, Baltasar Garzon.  However, rather than get back into that, I wanted to flag instead Financial Times columnist Christopher Caldwell’s comment on the subject.

Baltasar Garzón, the radical and ambitious investigative magistrate, made his name in Spain by revealing the tactics of Spanish counter-terrorism officials in the 1990s. In 1998, he ordered the arrest of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in a London hospital and in 2009 he proposed trying White House lawyers for the advice they gave George W. Bush on the legality of detaining prisoners at Guantánamo Bay. His agenda is consistently controversial. To some it looks like battling corruption on an ever bigger stage. To others it looks like corruption itself.

Last week’s proceedings concerned allegations brought by conservative activists that Mr Garzón collected big fees for university lectures in New York, and then dropped a case against a director of Banco Santander, which underwrote the lectures. Mr Garzón denies all wrongdoing. But it is a second case against Mr Garzón that has divided Spanish public opinion. In the autumn of 2008, he opened an investigation into the almost four decades of Francisco Franco’s rule, which ended with the dictator’s death in 1975. Mr Garzón called for opening more than a dozen mass graves, including the one in which the poet Federico García Lorca is thought to lie. Under the terms of a 1977 amnesty, enacted during the transition to democracy, political crimes committed under the dictatorship are not prosecutable. Mr Garzón carried on regardless, denying the law’s validity on human rights grounds. In so doing, magistrates argue, he overstepped his judicial mandate. He may soon be suspended from the bench. Mr Garzón’s supporters claim he is the victim of a rightwing put-up job. The claim has considerable plausibility. He has been investigating the so-called “Gürtel” case, a pattern of alleged political pay-offs that implicates two dozen members of the conservative Popular party. Mr Almodóvar has made the outlandish claim that Mr Garzón is being pursued by the Falange, a fascistic movement founded before the Spanish civil war, which is now senescent and marginalised.

The problem is not so much with the Spanish right in particular as with the Spanish judicial system in general. Judges are highly politicised. Mr Garzón is no exception. His justice is selective. He moved against Pinochet at a time when Fidel Castro was visiting Spain. Mr Garzón once told the magazine Mother Jones that he watched Costa Gavras movies when preparing for important hearings. You don’t get much more ideological than that.

So foreigners, those of us outside of Spain, might want to take a little care, as some of the OJ commenters have urged, and maintain a little distance on Garzon personally.  Kevin’s concern is the general question of amnesties; fair enough.  (Update: re-reading this, I realize that my complaint about non-Spaniards not aware of Garzon’s controversies in Spain looks like it is aimed at Kevin and his argument; that’s not my aim, and apologies to Kevin.  Kevin’s concerns are, first the general question of amnesties, which I discuss below, and, second, Chile.  I don’t intend to impute to Kevin naivete about Garzon’s relation to judicial politics in Spain.  I’ve cleaned up some of this below but not all.)  But in discussions surrounding Garzon, in Spain … it’s complicated.

Garzon is a much more complicated figure than he is often made out to be in the pasturelands of academic and activist human rights.  My time in Spain on sabbatical a couple of years ago echoed what Caldwell says, and more.  Garzon’s grandstanding in the horrific Atocha train station bombing in particular irritated many people in Spain, even across the party lines – Garzon’s arrival at the station and taking charge of the investigation ‘on no authority whatsoever other than his own ego’ (I quote an annoyed Zapatero supporter at the time).

There was also quite a lot of irritation that Garzon seemed to have unlimited capacities for pursuing universal jurisdiction claims and attendant international headlines abroad – but could not manage to find time, so the allegation went, for piled up, years dragged out, quotidian domestic cases on his docket.  Garzon is also not precisely the single-minded advocate of international human rights, at least not when the issue involves terrorism inside Spain – the conduct of his investigations into ETA terrorists might have raised eyebrows.  Then there are the allegations – I stress, allegations which might turn out to be untrue, or susceptible of a completely different and innocent characterization, flagged by Jose Guardia of Barcepundit (he writes in Spanish and does his own English translations, which are not quite perfect).  Guardia notes for the international audience what is an open discussion in Spain; Barcepundit is a conservative and hostile to Garzon, but again, at a minimum, aren’t there obvious issues of recusal that bear answering, at least?  Guardia (not Caldwell) writes:

But, as I said, there’s other cases against Garzón that are being investigated. One (link in Spanish), the year on leave he spent teaching in NYU, between March 2005 and June 2006. He failed to declare he was getting paid a grant for him, his assistant, and his daughter schooling, by NYU, so the Spanish judiciary kept paying him his regular salary as if he didn’t (that’s illegal). More damning, NYU paid him with funds provided by Banco Santander. Garzón asked personally in letters to Emilio Botín, the bank’s CEO and one of its main shareholders, to pay NYU in order for NYU to pay him. Worst of all, just as Garzón’s leave ended and after he came back to Spain and resumed his duties as a magistrate, he immediately acquitted Botín from a high-profile case around the illegal concession of loans.

(Just to be clear, as I’ve mixed up columnists a lot here, the above quote was Guardia.)  You might think that none of these are relevant or important issues of judicial conduct, and all of it might be perfectly okay – likewise the wiretapping allegations, etc. – but, well, if you haven’t actually heard of these controversies around Garzon inside Spain, some modest reservation of judgment might be a good idea.  But Caldwell’s column goes on to discuss amnesties generally; a subject on which, obviously, there is room for a general debate, not something particular to the facts of Spanish judicial politics.  Caldwell (this is updated to make clear who is being quoted) says:

However, it is Mr Garzón’s modus operandi, not his politics, that is on trial. His basic tactic has been to delegitimise the amnesties that often accompany (and make possible) transitions from dictatorship or civil war to democracy. In Mr Garzón’s view, the parliamentary arrangements by which Chile granted Pinochet a limited amnesty and a senatorship-for-life were, under international human rights law, null and void. Spaniards, who for the most part applauded when Mr Garzón inflicted this doctrine on the world, are having second thoughts on seeing it applied to their own history.

They should. Mr Garzón’s approach probably causes more harm than it prevents. Since nobody has legitimate authority to legislate for the world, to invalidate national laws in the name of international “norms” is to replace democratic rule with judicial fiat. It is also to falsify history, by promoting the myth that such amnesties are unnecessary accidents – that, but for the compromises of politics, any given democracy could have been brought into being through the political equivalent of immaculate conception. More pragmatically, although impunity for history’s malefactors is an upsetting thing to have to tolerate, it is sometimes the only means of ending a conflict. Amnesties are not negotiated only because a political class is corrupt or stupid. They are also negotiated because they help stop a cycle of belligerence that can continue indefinitely.

This is a general argument about amnesties, not particular to Garzon or Spain, with which can obviously agree or disagree.  It is closer to Eric Posner’s view than Kevin’s, I guess we could say with some understatement.   Caldwell’s reference to “unnecessary accidents” is a good way to put it.  I would add to what Caldwell says above that when later presidents either attack or defend amnesties, there is often necessarily a strategic political element to the statement – such a statement is made not solely with regards to its content, but with regards to the evolving winners and losers in current politics. Which is fine and as it should be for politicians seeking to navigate the present set against the troubles of the past – but then one cannot take it purely for its content, either.  But it’s worth noting that ‘no justice, no peace’ works better as a moral claim than an empirical historical one; or at a minimum, the authority of the former is not authority for the latter, unless your view of natural law is pretty darn strong.

However, I do not agree with Eric Posner’s analysis of where universal jurisdiction is likely to go, whatever happens in the Garzon case.  In particular, precisely because the allegations against Garzon are so particular to him and to Spain, I do not think they provide much prediction for what happens to the general political trend.  My political guess for the future, on the contrary, is that universal jurisdiction claims against the United States, whether in international tribunals or foreign courts, are dead only for so long as there is an Obama administration.  Things will shift again once there is a Republican administration; the bellweather to watch, of course, is targeted killing by the CIA using drones.

Other countries are moving to restrict access to claims by judges of universal jurisdiction, including in Spain, true.  But my read of those is that rather than plainly stripping out the category, instead the move – as in Spain – is to require highly discretionary political assent from someone, whether the Ministry of Justice or Attorney General or someone similar with political accountability.  (Bear in mind that the magistrate position that Garzon occupies is something between a judge and an investigating district attorney in the American system – it is not a judge in the sense of the arbiter who renders judgment on the case.)  In one fascinating conversation with a well-informed friend in Spain, the comment was that the shift in Spanish process was not on account of pressure from the US – and skepticism that there had been pressure – but instead, if not precisely pressure from China, the anticipatory fear of pressure from China.

Bearding a Republican administration is one thing.  Bearding the New Strong Horse – that is quite another.  The suggestion was that countries wanted political flexibility, to use the category for domestic political benefits of pleasing one or another constituency, particularly when it came to the US – but not to run any risks of offending China.  I do not think Eric is likely to be proven right that the age of enchantment with universal jurisdiction is over.  As for Garzon, I foresee that he steps down from the bench, forced or otherwise, and gets hired with a prominent professorship at NYU.

(Conflict of interest and personal pleading watch!:  I should note, however, that Christopher is an old and good friend.  He has been a journalist long specialized in Western Europe, back when it was considered really, really boring, and the author of an important and controversial book on Muslim immigration in Western Europe.  For that matter, he was regularly cited to me by journalist friends in France, Germany, and Spain as one of the few American journalists who took a serious interest in the economic performance of France and Germany.  Rather than, as one irritated French journalist friend once called (after a series of particularly vapid American news stories around the time of the Sarkozy-Royal election battle) the ‘NYT view of France’, as evidenced by its long choice of Paris correspondents, viz., that all of France consisted of the ‘Disneyland of American imagination in central Paris – food and fashion’.  I said, you don’t mind that he is also a senior editor of the Weekly Standard?  To which I was told, Caldwell is serious.)

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Kevin Jon Heller
Admin
16 years ago

“Since nobody has legitimate authority to legislate for the world, to invalidate national laws in the name of international ‘norms’ is to replace democratic rule with judicial fiat.”

I guess we’re lucky that Mr. Caldwell wasn’t around after World War II.  That is, of course, precisely the argument that Nazi defendants made in their defense.

As for amnesties, it is Mr. Caldwell who, with his uncritical valorization of amnesties, is the ahistorical one.  I don’t know a single critic of amnesties who believes that they are always and everywhere counterproductive.  As much as I think the South African TRC/amnesty regime was a sham from a social reconciliation standpoint, for example, I think it was necessary for political reconciliation in the country and thus defensible on those terms.

And note, of course, that Mr. Caldwell– like Posner — implies that Garzon’s view of Pinochet and the amnesty law is somehow an “outsider’s” view.  As I indicated in my post, Garzon’s view has been shared by every Chilean government since… Pinochet.  People like Posner and Caldwell can distort Chilean history all they want, but defending that particular amnesty, at least on “democratization” grounds, is foolish.

Kevin Jon Heller
Admin
16 years ago

Ken,

I’ve amended my comment.  And I didn’t think you were targeting me, which is why I responded to Guardia/Caldwell, not you!

Patrick S. O'Donnell
16 years ago

Here’s the relevant Chilean history that confirms Kevin’s statement that “defending that particular amnesty, at least on ‘democratization’ grounds, is foolish”:

In 1978, the junta enacted a self-amnesty law covering all criminal acts committed during the state of siege (from the 1973 coup to 1978). In 1980 it promulgated a constitution that was intended to cement the basic features of the authoritarian regime for the indefinite future [see Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution, 2002]. Through an extraordinary set of interlocking appointment mechanisms, an institutional bloc consisting of the Senate, the National Security Council, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Supreme Court has been able to obstruct democratic reforms as well as transitional justice [as late as 1990 the Supreme Court consisted mainly of Pinochet appointees]. When a 1988 plebiscite failed to confirm General Pinochet in power and a presidential election in 1989 voted the democratic candidate Aylwin into office, the Supreme Court systematically blocked his attempts to investigate crimes from the period not covered by the amnesty law.
As a substitute measure, Aylwin created a truth commission that documented three thousand human rights violations and recommended extensive reparations. [….] At the same time, judges pursued the ‘Aylwin doctrine’ that allowed courts to engage in fact-finding about past crimes similar to the Argentinian truth trials), even though prosecutions were blocked by the 1978 amnesty. (From Jon Elster’s Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, 2004: 64-65)

And the following is a perspective on the question of anmesty in general from the vantage point of a “meta-theory” international criminal procedure I find persuasive:

[….] Our meta-theory of international criminal procedure also provides a new understanding of what makes amnesties so problematic for international criminal law. Traditionally, public international lawyers and diplomats have issued cautious support for amnesties, whether contained in bilateral or multilateral peace treaties or codified simply by domestic legislation. Such amnesties are often the only avenue of getting a repressive regime to relinquish power. Few in a position of power will voluntarily give up power when doing so directly results in a criminal trial for their conduct. Supporting and encouraging these amnesties has obvious advantages: stopping civil wars faster by encouraging government forces to relinquish power. In turn, human rights abuses and violations of international criminal law will end sooner. And it goes without saying that the twin aims of U.N. Charter system—restoring international peace and security—may also be advanced.
Criminal lawyers, and international lawyers with a criminal bent, have traditionally been skeptical of such arrangements. On one level, the problem stems from a suspicious case of utilitarian balancing: forego the demands of individual justice against one defendant in order to increase overall social stability, perhaps even promote nation- building (or rebuilding, as it were). The suspicion is usually grounded by some variant of the anti-impunity norm. The anti-impunity norm in these contexts is usually given one of two glosses. On the first version, there is an inherent wrong involved in letting perpetrators go free; on the second version, promoting impunity will only damage the very utilitarian considerations (peace and stability, nation-building, stopping human rights violations) in the long run, by giving future perpetrators hope that they might escape the consequences of their actions by negotiating amnesties.
 
Our meta-theory of international criminal procedure provides an alternative account for skepticism about amnesties. Defendants not only escape punishment but, more importantly, defendants escape the rigors of the criminal process, irrespective of whether they will face punishment or not. It violates our conception of the Rule of Law to exempt individuals from the procedural process that will evaluate their conduct. This is not to say that failure to punish might not also violate the Rule of Law. It arguably does. But failure to punish is arguably secondary to failure to adjudicate. Although the two usually coincide in most amnesties, they are conceptually distinct.
 
A thought experiment might be useful. Although it is rare, consider a strongman who gives up political power in exchange for an amnesty that only gives him immunity from punishment. For example, perhaps the immunity agreement states that an incoming executive official promises that, in the event of the defendant’s conviction, his sentence will be commuted or he will be pardoned. In contrast, consider the individual whose immunity agreement provides protection from arrest, prosecution, and punishment for crimes enumerated in the agreement. Such agreements short circuit the entire criminal process. It is clear that the protection-from-punishment agreement is deeply problematic and threatens every ideal that a criminal lawyer holds dear. But the blanket protection-from-trial is offensive to a greater degree, and the problems stem from more than just the failure to punish. A blanket exemption from all criminal process violates the Rule of
Law and is only marginally better than the lawlessness that international criminal law seeks to replace. [….]
 
From Jens David Ohlin’s article, “A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 14: 77-120.
 

 

Patrick S. O'Donnell
16 years ago

Sorry about the formatting above: problems with cut and paste. And the Ohlin article is from 2009, available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582418 

Elizabeth
Elizabeth
16 years ago

I am a human rights researcher currently living in Madrid and have been following this case closely.  I have a few comments, primarily about the Franco-era case.

First, I wanted to address the quote from Caldwell about the Falange.  Pedro Almodóvar’s claim that the Falange is pursuing Garzón is simply not outlandish, and to me shows that Caldwell has not closely looked at the situation.  The Falange Española de la JONS is one of the complainants in the case.  (The other is Manos Limpias (“Clean Hands”), a union of former Franco functionaries.)  Because of the structure of the Spanish judicial system, lawyers representing these two groups will essentially act as prosecutors against Garzón. 

Second, I am concerned that you are putting forth the argument that personal distaste for Garzón in some sectors of Spanish society is reason enough to believe that he did not carry out his perceived duties in the case in good faith.  And that is what the allegation of prevarication turns upon.  Even those of us in the human rights pasture lands would agree that Garzón is indeed a complicated figure. I would argue, however, that that should have little to do with how we–and, more importantly, the judges of the Spanish Supreme Court investigating the allegations– consider his conduct, specifically as a judge and specifically in this case.  The El País newspaper this past weekend ran an article full of worrying quotes from Supreme Court judges, who have been on the record for years expressing their dislike for Garzón.  Objectivity and a fair hearing may be hard to come by in this case, which is not good for the strength of the rule of law in Spain and also the way in which the Spanish public views the judicial system, which Caldwell is right to call highly politicized.

Finally, regarding amnesties, there is so much that can be said and I won’t pretend to be an expert.  I would only agree with Kevin that, like in Chile, Garzón’s read of amnesties in this instance is not really an outsider’s view.  The victims of Franco’s regime came to the Courts urging an investigation, setting the chain of events in motion that have culminated in Garzón being investigated.  Spanish civil society has also mobilized around the repeal of the amnesty with increasing strength since the filing of this case.

Kevin Jon Heller
Admin
16 years ago

Thanks, Elizabeth, for the very helpful comment.

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