Can the ICC Prosecute Those Responsible for Darfur?

Can the ICC Prosecute Those Responsible for Darfur?

Two weeks ago, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the Security Council on the results of his investigation into the situation in Darfur. Not suprisingly, he found the widespread commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity:

The Office has so far documented (from public and non-public sources) thousands of alleged direct killings of civilians by parties to the conflict. The available information indicates that these killings include a significant number of large scale massacres, with hundreds of victims in each incident. The Office has selected several of these incidents for further investigation and analysis. A large number of victims and witnesses interviewed by the OTP have reported that men perceived to be from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa groups were deliberately targeted. In most of the incidents where the OTP has collected evidence there are eye-witness accounts that the perpetrators made statements reinforcing the targeted nature of the attacks, such as ‘we will kill all the black’ and ‘we will drive you out of this land.’

In addition to direct killings, there is a significant amount of information indicating that thousands of civilians have died since 2003 as a consequence of the conditions of life resulting from the conflict and the ensuing displacement. These include a lack of shelter and basic necessities for survival as a result of the destruction of homes, food stocks, and the looting of property and livestock, as well as obstacles to the provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance. This type of ‘slow death’ has particularly affected the most vulnerable groups, including children, the elderly and the sick.

The Office has also registered hundreds of alleged cases of rape. This is likely to be indicative of a practice that was endemic amongst some groups involved in the conflict and in relation to which there are indications of significant under-reporting…

Moreno-Ocampo also noted that his investigation will likely result in multiple ICC prosecutions of those responsible for the events in Darfur:

Identifying those individuals with greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes in Darfur is a key challenge to the investigation. The complexity of the conflict in Darfur exacerbates this challenge, given that it involves multiple parties, varying over time throughout the different states and localities, which are not easily distinguished by uniform or insignia. Given the scale of the alleged crimes in Darfur, and the complexities associated with the identification of those individuals bearing greatest responsibility for the crimes, the Office currently anticipates the investigation and prosecution of a sequence of cases, rather than a single case dealing with the situation in Darfur as a whole. The selection and progress of these cases will be based on the best possible evidence available to the Office at the relevant time. As soon as the Office gathers sufficient information to meet the evidential standards in the Statute, then that information will be presented to, and assessed by, the judges at that time.

Needless to say, the Sudanese government is unhappy with Moreno-Ocampo’s desire to prosecute its nationals. Indeed, the government believes that the ICC has no jurisdiction over Sudanese who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity in Darfur, because it is willing and able to prosecute them itself in its year-old Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur:

“If they are here to discuss the progress of trials or the role of national justice then we are ready to give them whatever information they are looking for,” said Sudan’s Justice Minister Mohamed al-Mardi. “But if the matter is about investigations, then they … don’t have the jurisdiction.”

The dispute between the ICC and the Sudanese government centers on Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which provides, in relevant part, that “the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where… [it] is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” Is the Sudanese government genuinely “willing and able” to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities in Darfur?

According to Human Rights Watch, the answer is a resounding “no”:

  • The procedure and laws to be applied by the Court are far from clear and the hybrid of Sudanese statutes, shari’a law, law by decree and references to international law which could be applied make the Court’s work opaque and arbitrary.
  • The absence of explicit definitions in Sudanese law of crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law makes it less likely that these crimes will actually be prosecuted in an appropriate manner.
  • No provisions exist for prosecuting leaders on the basis of command responsibility.
  • Reliance on ordinary criminal law means that local, state or national leaders are unlikely to be held accountable for the acts of their subordinates unless direct involvement of the leaders in the crimes can be demonstrated. Prosecution of leaders is essential to enforcing accountability in Darfur.
  • Broad immunity provisions in Sudan’s laws create obstacles to successfully prosecuting members of the armed forces (including the Popular Defense Forces and some Janjaweed), national security agencies and police, for their role in the events.
  • The high burden of proof for rape cases, as well as the threat of prosecution for adultery, makes it difficult for rape victims to bring their cases to the police.
  • Sudanese law raises serious concerns about the ability of the courts to conduct trials consistent with international fair trial standards. For example, Sudanese law does not provide an absolute prohibition on admission of statements obtained as a result of torture.
  • Demonstration of the lack of political will to take these cases begins at the lowest levels. Police often refuse to take complaints from victims and do not investigate cases brought to them.

Human Rights Watch thus concludes that “[w]ithout a reversal of policy on the part of the Sudanese government and political will to punish past atrocities and prevent further crimes, the Sudanese government cannot be said to have demonstrated ability and willingness to establish accountability for the crimes in Darfur.”

In cases involving high-ranking government officials, military commanders, and members of the pro-government Janjaweed militias, Human Rights Watch is clearly correct, for all the reasons its report mentions. The situation is more complicated, however, in cases involving defendants whom the Sudanese government doesn’t want to protect, such as scapegoated low-level government officials and soldiers and members of rebel groups like the SLA and JEM. Sudan is more than willing and able to investigate and prosecute those nationals (and has recently issued a special decree making international humanitarian law applicable in its criminal courts) – it simply has no intention of protecting their rights while doing so. Indeed, as Human Rights Watch notes elsewhere in its report, not only do Sudan’s criminal courts allow confessions obtained through torture, trials are often held in secret, defendants are regularly denied the right to counsel completely or are required to be represented by “friends” instead of lawyers, and the presumption of innocence is regularly ignored.

The question regarding rebels and scapegoats, then, is whether the absence of due process in Sudan’s criminal courts permits the ICC to assume jurisdiction over their cases. Human Rights Watch seems to believe that it does.

I respectfully disagree. As I explain at length in my article “The Shadow Side of Complementarity,” which will appear later this year in Criminal Law Forum, nothing in the text, context, object, or drafting history of Article 17 supports the idea — almost universally embraced by international criminal law scholars — that the absence of due process protections for a defendant renders a State “unwilling or unable” to genuinely prosecute. On the contrary: as long as a State denies a defendant due process in order to make him easier to convict, the ICC must defer to the national prosecution no matter how unfair it might be.

The entire argument is too lengthy to recount here. For those interested in the topic, my article — which concludes by arguing that the Rome Statute should be amended to make the absence of national due process a ground for admissibility — is available on SSRN here.

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Tobias Thienel
20 years ago

I should say that my friend Nicki has already posted on this at our blog. He argues inter alia that, because the Security Council has referred the case to the ICC, the answer to the question of complementarity under Article 17 may be a foregone conclusion: if Sudan’s court system was ‘willing and able’ to prosecute, it would be very difficult to see where the ‘threat to the peace’ (Article 39 of the UN Charter) could be. Accordingly, the action by the Security practically certifies that the ICC is competent under Article 17.

Nicki also considers whether the Security Council has even given the ICC exclsive jurisdiction, turning it into some kind of ICTY/ICTR pro tempore. He finds little support for this.

I hope I have fairly described his views, which can be read here.

Kevin Heller
Kevin Heller
20 years ago

Tobias’ comment raises an interesting question: does Article 17’s complementarity regime apply to Security Council referrals? The authors of the ICC-commissioned Informal Expert Paper on complementarity unanimously concluded that it does — but divided over the related question of whether the Security Council has the power to order member States not to assert their primary jurisdiction over a case or set of cases. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:

68. Complementarity regime applies: As a matter of principle, the complementarity regime applies even in the event of a Security Council referral. Articles 17 and 19 do not indicate any exception for Security Council referrals. Although the Security Council has enforcement powers under the UN Charter when acting under Chapter VII (Articles 25, 41, 103), these powers relate primarily to States, and not directly to international institutions such as the ICC. Moreover, the Statute explicitly contemplates and addresses the interaction of ICC procedures and Security Council actions, including the extent to which procedures are affected by a Security Council action (Article 13, 16, 18). For example, the Statute specifies that the Article 18 notification procedure does not apply for Security Council referrals, whereas no such suspension is stipulated for Articles 17 and 19, raising a clear e contrario inference.

69. Order to States to facilitate admissibility: While the Security Council may not be able to alter the principles of the Statute, it clearly can issue binding orders to States. All members of the Group agreed that the Security Council has the power to issue orders to States to comply with requests from the ICC. The Group also discussed whether the Security Council could go further and, in a given case, acting under Chapter VII, order all or some UN Member States to yield to the Court, by declining to exercise their primary jurisdiction with respect to crimes investigated and prosecuted by the ICC. Under such an approach, the complementarity principle would still apply, but admissibility would be upheld by the Court, given the resulting absence of competing national proceedings as a result of compliance with the order of the Council. As an autonomous body, the ICC would remain free to make an independent and final determination of issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. It is important not to overstate the powers of the Council, and in particular it was emphasized that the Council would not be ordering non-action with a view to enabling impunity, but rather non-action in order to facilitate prosecution by the ICC. It was also emphasized that the Council is bound by the UN Charter and may only act in accordance with it.

70. Assessment: The Group was divided in its assessment of the proposition that the Council could issue such orders to facilitate admissibility. On the one hand, some members believed that it was legally sound and offered significant benefits. On the other hand, some members did not believe that the Security Council had the power to issue such orders, and some members had policy concerns about the wisdom of exercising such a power.

The Informal Expert Paper is available here.

Tobias Thienel
20 years ago

I would agree with the Informal Expert Paper there. And so would Nicki, I assume. It is indeed clear from the fact that Security Council action and complementarity are based on two unrelated articles of the Statute that the complementarity regime will in principle apply to referrals of the Council.

As I read it, Nicki’s argument goes to a different question. If the Security Couuncil has, expressly or otherwise, found that impunity in a given situation constitutes a threat to international peace, can it really be open to the ICC to say that there never was a risk of impunity because domestic courts are doing their job properly (which would mean that the ICC would be without jurisdiction under Article 17)? Probably not.

Still, this can only apply to the situation as it existed when the Security Council decided to make the referral, and serve as a somewhat powerful indicator (barring dramatic changes) of the situation at a later point in time.

As to how this applies to Sudan’s case, I’m not quite sure. If it is their argument that the Sudanese system has been willing and able to genuinely prosecute all along, then this would appear to have been rejected by the Council, and therefore doomed to fail in the ICC as well. If their case is that they have redoubled their efforts since the resolution was passed, then they might just have a point. But, of course, this is not for them to say, but for the Court to decide.

Seamus
Seamus
20 years ago

Professor Heller,

Is it fair to say, and with all due respect, that this would not have been an issue (at least in this particular instance) had your paper not raised it? In other words, have you provided the Sudanese government with a legal argument it might not otherwise had recourse to? And who has the final word here? The Prosecutor? Which is to say, I suppose, what if the ICC proceeds as if it does not have to defer to the national courts, acting (perhaps with the SC’s blessing) as if it simply understands the lack of due process as indeed providing a ground for admissibility, citing, perhaps, the vast majority of international criminal law scholars who believe the absence of due process is indicative of a State’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute.

This is not to say your argument is not compelling, only that it might, at least for now, be set aside or ignored (an argument from necessity, as it were). The incarnation of the virtues of textual/legal determinacy may have to wait another day, as it is not unheard of that legal processes proceed in spite of some measuere of linguistic ambiguity, vagueness and indeterminacy. While this may not be a precise characterization, let us assume the statutory language in question here is, at best, vague. Could we not therefore conclude (if I’m not mistaken, with Joseph Raz) that a vague legal statement is ‘neither true nor false,’ and thus the Prosecutor for the ICC acts so as to decide the matter. Here vagueness licenses our trust in the discretionary judgment of the Prosecutor (after Timothy Endicott, using the law as a guide rather than understanding it as absolutely determinative, as invariably dictating an outcome in every possible case). Again, this does not rule out the desirability of amending the Rome Statute.

Nonliquet
Nonliquet
20 years ago

Seamus, I don’t think I would let the Prosecutor decide alone the ambiguity but rather the judges of the court over their own competency and whether to abstain from/decline jurisdiction under Article 17. Then the question is what does the treaty mean by a “genuine prosecution” or whether the denial of due process rights (or maybe better termed ICC-like process rights) creates a sham prosecution.

And that determination must utilize Article 17(2) which mentions internationally recognized standards of due process and then creates a list of due process standards which tend to indicate a sham prosecution (undue delay, shielding, lack of independence or impartiality of the adjudicator). “Rounding up the usual suspects,” to borrow a phrase, granting them few rights, and then calling it a prosecution would seem to run afoul of those provisions.

I think what process rights are due to a defendant on the sham/genuine continuum is an interesting question and whether you might get eventually into a Rwanda-ICTR situation where it’s better to kill a million than to kill a 100.

Jay McGinley
20 years ago

CALL TO BATTLE: LAUNCH ALL-OUT NONVIOLENT WAR IN JULY TO RESCUE DARFUR. Fast Day #8; Vigil Day #59 – A CONCRETE PROPOSAL

http://www.standwithdarfurwhitehouseii.blogspot.com

We are years, YEARS behind in stopping this Genocide; a tragic, inexcusable failure of will and humanity on our part. We must bring this to an end. Bashir’s Genocide is exterminating 500 people per day, more than one 9/11 per week. We are giving crystal clear signals to Bashir that he has the time to exterminate, NOW, the remaining 3,000,000 people. Oxfam is pulling out, and the other aid groups are on the verge of following – too hostile on the ground. We are training ourselves to the “gradualism” that was Dr. King’s greatest enemy and horror. We are fast depleting the energy that was so valiantly raised by so many of you by April 30th.

Nonviolent wars are not started with tricks and manipulation, emails, four hour demonstrations, letters or phone calls (although, brilliantly, the efforts by many of you thus far have set the stage). We can now win the war if we unleash the masses. Now. ALL-OUT NONVIOLENT WARS OF THE MASSES are ALWAYS STARTED by a small group of NONVIOLENT “MARINES”, fully acting out their anguish, agony and horror at the suffering of others (In APPENDIX below: Gandhi in India, Civil Rights Movement…). When these “Marines” do so and sufficiently pay an honest price, it is an irresistible media spectacle. The radical self-sacrifice of these “Marines” ignites the hearts of the masses – possessing less vision, imagination and information. Here is the idea:

STAGE #1. IGNITE THE ALL-OUT NONVIOLENT WAR – DEPLOY THE NONVIOLENT “MARINES” to Rescue and Restore Darfur. Nonviolent campaigns need to be started by the few on the nonviolent side.

I pray that anyone that passionately wants to join will emulate the Gandhi/India campaign (APPENDIX) as follows:

We will begin a long, drawn out series of rolling arrests. Where? The White House. Alternate targets could be the Sudan Embassy, Chinese Embassy, Russian Embassy, United Nations in NYC, or one of the network headquarters for their profound non-coverage of Darfur. If it is the White House, this is not a protest aginst the White House, or President Bush. Why?

WE THE PEOPLE ARE THE PROBLEM AND THE ONLY SOLUTION. WE MUST DELIVER A MANDATE THAT 20-30,000 PEACEKEEPERS (preferably African Union and non-Western UN) BE ON THE GROUND IN DARFUR, BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, with sufficient empowerment/funding/support. With an unmistakable outcry from the masses, the administration and congress have given every sign that they will happily comply. They need a “win.”

PHASE A: A minimum of 20 people are required for us to enter this phase. We need to dramatically demonstrate and HONESTLY EXPRESS the despair we feel over the agony of our Darfur family.

Every 3 hours (so it stretches over days) one of us nonviolently violates the rules at the White House President’s Park so as to get arrested. The law is that for the first arrest there is likely to be a 12 hour or less holding period, a $50 fine, and then release.

Phase B. If by the end of this cycle of arrests (3 days elapsed?) we do NOT see the beginning-of-the-end of Hell for Darfur in sight the same group immediately goes through the process a 2nd time, knowing full well that 6 MONTHS IN PRISON may well be the price. This phase goes on until 1. all of us are in prison, OR, 2. the end of Hell for Darfur is assured.

Obviously numbers count for this initial action. If instead of the example of 20, it is 200 or 2,000 people, the impact goes up astronomically. Maybe “prison” will be avoided, but this CANNOT be our goal.

Those involved must fully accept responsibility for staying the course and make certain over the months and years ahead that US Imperialist Tendencies do not come to bear, and that we Rescue, AND Restore Darfur.

STAGE #2. THE MASSES OF NONVIOLENT WARRIORS BECOME ENGAGED, ORGANIZED AND DEPLOYED IN THE FIGHTING.

For every one of the initial “Marines” (just one riding alone across the battlefield in “Dances with Wolves”/100’s walking into swinging clubs in Gandhi’s India/100’s facing the fire hoses down South – APPENDIX) the numbers multiply: 1,000, 10,000, 100,000. The masses become warriors too. National organizations (Africa Action, Save Darfur Coalition, STAND, Genocide Intervention) and other vehicles exist to register this 2nd tier of 100,000’s, 1,000,000’s of nonviolent fighters and to effectively utilize and deploy them; radically for the Save Darfur Coalition 9/17 event at the United Nations for example.

HOW TO ORGANIZE THE INITIAL STAND? Some thoughts:

Let’s not care whose idea or what idea we implement. Instead, let us care that it is the best possible shot at raising the mass army THAT FIGHTS TO WIN, immediately. We must “be” the Truth Force that Gandhi so powerfully weilded. We must be the Truth of Darfur’s desperate need at the White House, at the United Nations, and wherever we go.

Got any ideas you think are good? Better? AWESOME! Contact me or tell me how to contact YOU! Want me to come and talk with you or your group? Want me to join and follow your group? Let’s do it. Contact your friends, associates, acquaintances who might be interested.

Let’s make this happen. We’re killing time. Lets stop the Genocide This Summer, while there is life in Darfur to save.

Sincerely, Jay McGinley

email: jymcginley@cs.com

phone: 484 356 6243

………………………………….

Appendix: ADDITIONAL RATIONALE AND PERSPECTIVE

EXAMPLE: Do you remember the scene from “Gandhi” when for days, man after man after man walked headlong into swinging British clubs? Well, so did the millions of India, and the entire civilized world watch and remember, and ACT.

EXAMPLE: Do you remember the beginning scene from the movie “Dances With Wolves,” when, impossibly, the hero rode across a Civil War field raging with gunfire, both sides behind stone walls, totally in stalemate? His insane ride miraculously shocked his side out of passivity and denial to follow him across the field and rout the opposition. (Yes, this was a violent war but it still illustrates the dynamic that radically committed leaders cause the masses to fight; no other way does it as well. Ever.)

EXAMPLE: Do you remember the TV images of the Civil Rights marchers getting fire-hosed, beaten, and attacked by Police Dogs then doing it all again? And how only then did the MILLIONS of US Citizens go to war? And, on, and on….

Harvard’s Samantha Power’s Pulitzer Prize winning Genocide study of the last 100 years presents a clear conclusion: “the battle to stop genocide has thus been repeatedly lost… [because] Americans outside the executive branch were largely mute….” From “Problem from Hell.”

Isn’t God/Goodness/Justice/Humanity/History asking us: “WHY DON’T YOU GO TO ALL-OUT NONVIOLENT WAR FOR YOUR FAMILY IN DARFUR?” We must start BEING THE ANSWER to this question by July’s end.

I am open to any appropriate way to go to nonviolent war as long as it equates to fighting to win and doing the very best that we can do.

The Irascible Misanthropist

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