24 Apr Responsible Stakeholders and Revisionist States
The recent visit of Hu Jintao to the U.S. highlights an interesting game of mirrors being played by the U.S., China, the EU and others concerning the norms of good behavior of members of the international community. A few months ago, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Commentators have noted that this is perhaps the best single description we have of our current policy towards China: we want to manage their entrance into great power status so that they are a good citizen in the community of states as opposed to one trying to upset the world system and be a “revisionist state.”
Revisionist states can pose a big problem for states that are established, responsible stakeholders with much to gain from the status quo. Sparta was a revisionist state in relation to Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Napoleon’s France, Hitler’s Germany, and Saddam’s Iraq were all revisionist states. Iran may well be.
As is usual in the relation between established states to (potentially) revisionist, U.S. policy makers are concerned that China not pursue narrow self interest (making deals with Sudan, undercutting anti-corruption efforts in Africa, throwing up vast amounts of greenhouse gases, etc.) at the expense of systemic stability.
If that concern sounds familiar, it is because it is the same one voiced by Europeans (and Latin Americans, and many others) who see the United States as flouting international law to the point of becoming revisionist. In their eyes, the biggest challenge to international rules and systemic stability comes not from China, but from the U.S. as it sets aside established norms such as the Geneva Conventions, non-intervention, and the ABM treaty or refuses to follow-through on evolving norms to which it had previously shown at least some level of commitment (the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocols, for example).
Of course revisionism is in the eye of the beholder. Is the U.S. more revisionist than China? Does it really matter? After a certain point this become more like theology than diplomacy. What is important is that some of the chief concerns animating each of our foreign policies—American, European, Latin American, and Chinese—is an anxiety over how closely the other parties will abide by the rules that we think are important. Some would argue that this is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a zero-sum game where we cannot communicate with each other and thus must assume the worst. But the real question is: Do we want it to be?
The distinction between revisionist and non-revisionist, or status quo, states is meaningless if it is defined by policy choices. As you note, that makes every state a revisionist state in the eyes of each other and muddles the meaning in a swamp of relativism.
What separates status-quo states from revisionist ones is not the policies they pursue, but rather the means by which they pursue them. Status quo states seek to puruse their interests within the framework of the international community and in accordance with the rules set up and accepted by that community; revisionist states pursue their interests outside that framework.
Of course, even status-quo states occassionally will break the rules to do what they feel they must. So aren’t we back in the relatvistic vicious cycle Chris identifies above? No…because states have tools by which to determine the preferences of others: international institutions. By entering into a web of complementary institutions and complying with the attendent institutional obligations, states send signals of their preferences to adhere to the status-quo, and a one-time signal otherwise will not change that. Thus, status-quo states are connected by a web of meaningful (note: the UN is not a meaningful institution as it has no compliance or enforcement mechanism; the WTO is a meaningful one) institutions that allow them to discern credible signals of each others preferences. Revisionist states are outside that framework, making their preferences more difficult to read. The goal of US policy towards China is to enmesh China within that instutional web, making it more difficult for China to pursue its interests in opposition to the status quo.
Dear Professor Weinberger,
Please, pray tell, what are the sanctions that might be invoked by the Security Council if not ‘compliance-’ or ‘enforcement mechanisms’? How would you explain the following?
‘Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures range from economic and/or other sanctions not involving the use of armed force to international military action.
The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. The universal character of the United Nations makes it an especially appropriate body to establish and monitor such measures.
The Council has resorted to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool when peace has been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed (see below). The range of sanctions has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions.
At the same time, a great number of States and humanitarian organizations have expressed concerns at the possible adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of the population, such as women and children. Concerns have also been expressed at the negative impact sanctions can have on the economy of third countries.
In response to these concerns, relevant Security Council decisions have reflected a more refined approach to the design, application and implementation of mandatory sanctions. These refinements have included measures targeted at specific actors, as well as humanitarian exceptions embodied in Security Council resolutions. Targeted sanctions, for instance, can involve the freezing of assets and blocking the financial transactions of political elites or entities whose behaviour triggered sanctions in the first place. Recently, smart sanctions have been applied to conflict diamonds in African countries, where wars are funded in part by the trade of illicit diamonds for arms and related material.
On 17 April 2000, the members of the Security Council established, on a temporary basis, the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. The proposed outcome document remains under active consideration, with focus being placed on those issues where agreement has yet to be reached.’
Now let’s treat the attempt to use the criterion of compliance or enforcement mechanisms in the determination of whether or not the UN is a ‘meaningful institution.’ I find this deeply implausible for any number of reasons, some of which I’ll mention here. First, I suppose you would characterize such functions and practices undertaken by the UN as ‘meaningless:’ preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building, and peace enforcement. Second, I trust the ‘good offices’ role of the Secretary-General as it has emerged and evolved since WW II would not be deemed meaningful by your criterion. Presumably you’ve read Thomas Franck’s wonderful treatment of this ‘good offices’ role in his Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), for you’re the expert here and I’m simply someone with an ardent avocational interest in such matters. The presumption secured, I shudder to imagine what the world would be like had not the Secretary-General taken seriously and well-exercised this role (sure, there were failures and setbacks, but the final accounting as narrated by Franck is quite encouraging). Furthermore, I suppose the verifying of peace agreements, the monitoring of the implementation of human rights accords, the supervision and monitoring of democratic elections, the training and oversight of police forces, overseeing withdrawal and demilitarization arrangements, and assistance in de-mining operations, are all bereft of ‘meaning.’ And international tribunals and the International Criminal Court are likewise without meaning? And the International Court of Justice? And the organization of humanitarian aid or assistance? I suppose we might also cavalierly dismiss the role of the UN in the promotion, entrenchment, and protection of the ‘thicket of norms, processes, and institutions’ associated with human rights.
The ‘revisionist states’ terminology is as unhelpful as the prior appellation ‘rogue states.’ It is ‘essentialist’ in the worst way. No state can remain a state in any ‘meaningful’ sense without participating in some measure within the international web of institutions, the Westphalian system itself being an integral part of that web. Unbundling, with Stephen Krasner, the notion of sovereignty into various ideal-types (domestic, interdependence, international legal, and Westphalian, for example) instantiated by degree, together with the assessment of regime practices according to criteria derived from human rights discourse and democratic theory and practice, would far more meaningful, both descriptively and normatively speaking. Mention of the WTO brings to mind Edward Kwakwa’s distinction between ‘paradigm-setting States’ and ‘paradigm-receiving States’ with regard to determining ‘the content of the rules by which the international economy must operate,’ the former ‘exemplified by the United States and other highly industrialized economies.’ In Kwakwa’s words, ‘the WTO in fact presents the [latter States] with a reasonably good forum. The problem, however, is that the P-RSs simply do not have the means or the ability to influence the process’ (cf. Lori Wallach, Patrick Woodall, and Public Citizen [sic], Whose Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO, New York: New Press, 2004).
Finally, with respect to China, readers might begin any discussion of the US attempt to ‘enmesh China within that institutional web’ (the hallowed ‘status quo’) with the kind of background knowledge so ably provided by Randall Peerenboom, in particular, his China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Mr. O’Donnell:
I’d be happy to respond to you, but not here, as this is not my blog and I don’t want to hijack Chris’ post. If you’d like to discuss this more, come on over to my blog (securitydilemmas.blogspot.com), find one my posts about the UN, and repost your comment. I’ll respond to it there.
If anyone is interested, I’ve done as Seth has asked and posted my comment above at his blog for him to respond, although I suspect Chris might have enjoyed the exchange.