So Iran is now a member of the nuclear club. What are the ramifications of this momentous news? I do not feel competent to discuss this subject in detail, but fortunately top nuclear experts met at a Council on Foreign Relations’ meeting in New York last week to discuss Iran’s nuclear development and production. Here is the
reproduced below. I worked closely with Poneman while in private practice and he most certainly is someone to take seriously on matters of nuclear proliferation. He currently is with the
, but formerly was the Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the NSC during the Clinton Administration. Poneman had this to say about Iran’s nuclear development:
“When we talk about creating facts on the ground, there are technical facts and there are political facts. And I will now engage in the speculation we’re all engaging in to say that if they are using this and it seems premature … perhaps they are using up that higher-quality material to create political facts on the ground, to inure the rest of the world to the fact that “We’re doing this now. You might as well get used to it. You got used to it with North Korea,” and to weaken the will of people who are trying to negotiate methods to stop them from doing any of this by saying, “Hey, sorry, we’re already past that post.”
At the same time, I do not know that whatever they’re doing in this small cascade with this relatively clean UF-6 disrupts the overall time line. And there, I do think that there’s a decent amount of consensus out there in the community, with one caveat, which I’ll come to in a second.
Whether Iran takes the pieces and parts of centrifuges they’ve already assembled and gets more and tries to build a clandestine facility outside of Natanz, beyond the view of any inspections that we have under either regular or additional protocol access, and, in fact, starts from scratch to create enough highly-enriched uranium to build a bomb, I think most people figure it would take them, from start to finish, building the centrifuges, encasing them in a plant, doing the cold test, running the hot test, running the cascades … it’s going to take about three years….
… I don’t think there’s that much disagreement anymore over those general time lines, but there is an earlier time line in which I believe, from a political perspective, the Iranians feel, in a relatively robust moment, they are witnessing a United States that is very much tied down in Iraq.
And it’s very difficult, I think, and it has been difficult … for us to muster the political will, in the U.N. Security Council or elsewhere, to truly confront the Iranians. And the test case, the first test case, was, in fact, the opening of this uranium conversion plant that we’re talking about that takes this material and turns it into the gas that you put into the centrifuge machines. And it is true that the world blinked when Iran took that step….
I think lurking in this whole proposal is a flawed premise … which is they have a right to this technology. They don’t. It distressed me that during the last presidential campaign, virtually the only issue on which the two candidates agreed was that there is this hole — this flaw — in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which gives some inalienable right to these technologies that you can use to build bombs. It is true that the Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantees the right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Those words are in the treaty: “for peaceful purposes.”
You will also note the name of the treaty is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the front end of the treaty, the Articles I and II, say you can’t have nuclear weapons. It cannot be that Article IV, with the peaceful access right, trumps the purpose of the treaty and the fundamental premises in the first two articles.
And therefore, I’d go to Iran and say, no, you do not have a right to these initial cascades. You don’t have a right to this pilot-level activity. Why not? Because you’ve had 18 years of a clandestine program, hidden from the eyes of the world. You have pursued — we’ve been talking all about enrichment technologies. You’ve pursued those. You are building a heavy-water reactor, which is a reactor which goes the other route by taking the uranium 238 and allowing the neutrons to bombard it and turn that 238 into 239 plutonium, which is the other bomb fuel. You’ve separated some of that plutonium. You’re doing the conversion. You’ve lied to the IAEA. You’re still not cooperating with the IAEA. The burden of proof is now on you to establish why — not withstanding what I think is overwhelming evidence they are going down a bomb track — that you believe that this is a so-called peaceful program and, therefore, entitles you under Article IV to this technology.”
I do not feel competent to discuss this question in detail either, and I have some doubts as to whether or not Iran is really intent on becoming a nuclear power, but I still wonder why Iran garners so much attention while non-signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (India, Pakistan and Israel) are virtually ignored (I’m not saying we should turn a blind eye to Iran’s behavior). Similarly, the Bush Administration’s attempt to by-pass the treaty and upgrade this country’s nuclear weapons arsenal has garnered comparatively little scrutiny. Where was all this concern, for example, when Israel developed nuclear weapons? When other countries look at our behavior in this matter (inconsistent, hypocritical, self-serving, etc.) it makes it that much more difficult to wed political power to the exigencies of international law.
I’m pasting material here I previously pasted below in Julian’s post if perchance some readers have missed it. In addition, one might look at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s website for interesting papers from a symposium held in February of this year in Santa Barbara, CA: ‘At the Nuclear Precipice: Nuclear Weapons and the Abandoment of International Law.’
U.S. Enters New Nuclear Age as Bush Seeks Funds for New Generation of Nukes
Thursday, March 2nd, 2006
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/02/148233
A new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. President Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country’s first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. As we broadcast from New Mexico – the center of the country’s nuclear weapons program – we speak with Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group
“We are on the verge of an exciting time.”
Those were the recent words of the nation’s top nuclear weapons executive, Linton Brooks. Here in New Mexico – the center of the country’s nuclear weapons program – a new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country’s first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. The money will be used to fund a competition between the Los Alamos and the Lawrence Livermore laboratories to find and design a new generation of nuclear bombs to replace the country’s entire nuclear arsenal.
Meanwhile in another major development in the country’s quest for new nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Britain conducted a joint underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site last week. Anti-nuclear activists including the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan denounced the test, the first in nearly two years. In Hiroshima, the peace watchtower at the Peace Memorial Museum — which displays the number of days since the last nuclear test –was reset to zero.
·
Greg Mello, director of the Los Alamos Study Group.
AMY GOODMAN: We are joined here in our Albuquerque studio at KNME by Greg Mello. He is Director of the Los Alamos Study Group. We welcome you to Democracy Now!
GREG MELLO: Good morning, Amy.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, a number of developments to ask you about. First, I want to start with President Bush in India right now and the latest news on this international nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan.
GREG MELLO: Right. President Bush would like to use nuclear technology as part of a geopolitical strategy and views India as a country we can do business with in nuclear technology, specifically, and more broadly, of course. This is part of a discriminatory approach to nuclear weapons that is undermining our attempts to roll back potential proliferation in Iran and North Korea. It’s hard for us to win friends while we are pumping up India’s nuclear program, allowing it to go forward, turning a blind eye, meanwhile out here in New Mexico, preparing to manufacture a new generation of nuclear weapons, and then coming down so hard on Iran, and which, you know, Iran can enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I don’t think there is any ambiguity about that. But the United States cannot make a new generation of nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
AMY GOODMAN: And yet, it is?
GREG MELLO: Yeah. We are planning on it. Yes.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about this new generation and what it means here for New Mexico?
GREG MELLO: Sure.
AMY GOODMAN: I mean, some have said that if New Mexico were to secede from the United States, it would be the world’s third greatest nuclear power.
GREG MELLO: Right. There is about 2,500 nuclear weapons just five miles from here, just a little south of the main runway.
AMY GOODMAN: Where?
GREG MELLO: At Kirtland Air Force Base at the Albuquerque Sun Port, the main airport there. And the $27 million that the administration is requesting for a new warhead program, which it calls the “Reliable Replacement Warhead,” is really just the tip of the iceberg. The acronym R.R.W. appears 60 times in the nuclear weapons budget, sprinkled around in different line items, and those line items can be redirected toward or to support the so-called R.R.W. or Reliable Replacement Warhead program. So, the actual budget is quite a bit more.
The intent is to redirect the Stockpile Stewardship program, or to say it another way, to use the fruits of the Stockpile Stewardship program to get ahead and upgrade the U.S. nuclear arsenal, not just directly in terms of the explosives, the nuclear explosives or warheads, but to initiate a broad pattern of innovation so that the warheads can keep pace with innovation in the delivery systems and with targeting and with, well, arming, firing, fusing, you know, so that — basically so that nuclear weapons can continue to evolve and remain a central part of the goal of so-called full spectrum dominance.
AMY GOODMAN: You are saying that the new generation of nuclear weapons that the Bush administration is pushing forward violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
GREG MELLO: Absolutely. And in that treaty, we are required to successfully negotiate complete nuclear disarmament. This has been a U.S. law since 1970. As recently as 2000, the United States — well, in a consensus statement at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, we agreed to proceed with nuclear disarmament in a series of 13 steps that would actually implement that disarmament requirement. The Bush administration has repudiated those 13 steps, and the subject of nuclear disarmament and our Article 6 requirement to do so under the N.P.T. is not something the Bush administration wants to talk about, especially in the context of Iran. And the — what we would like, we would like to hold Iran to a very high standard under the N.P.T. Ourselves, we would not want to talk about what we’re doing there.
AMY GOODMAN: Greg Mello, who runs Los Alamos? Who runs the national lab?
GREG MELLO: Right now, it’s the University of California, but a consortium of four companies — well, three companies and the University of California just won the contract, and so we are in a transition phase. I think it’s June 1, the transition is to be complete. So, soon, Bechtel, Washington Group International —
AMY GOODMAN: These are corporations?
GREG MELLO: These are corporations, yeah. BWXT and the University of California will run Los Alamos National Laboratory. They have what could be a 20-year no-bid contract. It’s about — right now, it’s about $2.2 billion per year, so it’s a $40 billion no-bid contract if they do what they are told.
AMY GOODMAN: And what’s the significance of this?
GREG MELLO: Well, we’ve never seen this kind of profit motive in the nuclear weapons business up to now. They can make more than — well more than $1 billion, more than $1.5 billion, in fees in management awards. Plus they get an entrée or leg up in the nuclear power business, which they expect to be growing. Los Alamos has for years, along with Sandia National Laboratory here, had a program to promote nuclear power worldwide. And it sounds quite similar to what was incorporated in the President’s State of the Union address.
AMY GOODMAN: U.S. and Britain, this nuclear test that they conducted at the Nevada test site, can you explain what they did? Was this a surprise?
GREG MELLO: No, it wasn’t a surprise. I can’t explain exactly what they did, because I’m not sure, but the basic idea is that Britain is poised to make a decision about upgrading its Trident warhead system, its submarine-launched missiles, which are the only kind it has. The United States is also involved in upgrading its Trident warheads. The two warheads are very close together. The two programs are intermeshed. Lockheed, which runs Sandia here, is a partner in running the British nuclear weapons program, as well, so they are institutionally enmeshed, and, of course, they’re politically enmeshed, as we know. So, what’s going on here is that the Brits’ and the United States’ nuclear weapons program don’t want to get out of synch. If we upgrade, they’ll upgrade. I think they don’t want to be left with — left behind technologically. So we have kind of an arms race going on.
AMY GOODMAN: We only have 30 seconds. But the significance of this, and, for example, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki speaking out?
GREG MELLO: Yeah, the significance of this are basically that we are eroding the norms against nuclear weapons worldwide. The rest of the world knows all about this. And we can’t achieve a diplomatic consensus against nuclear weapons if we undermine international strong, the existing strong international norms against nuclear weapons, but if we insist on their legitimacy, we insist on being able to threaten them — threaten with them, then from the Bush administration’s perspective, all that’s left for them are military options to deal with proliferation, so our options are decreased.
AMY GOODMAN: Greg Mello, I want to thank you very much for joining us, of the Los Alamos Study Group based in New Mexico right here, where we are broadcasting.
http://www.democracynow.org
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is Failing: What Now?
by Richard Falk and David Krieger, March 2006
For several decades now the world has been living with the illusion that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) established a functioning treaty regime that has spared the world from nuclear danger. It is an illusion partly because three nuclear weapons aspirants (Israel, India, Pakistan) have kept clear of the treaty, and suffered no adverse consequences when they developed nuclear arsenals. On the contrary, President Bush’s proposed nuclear deal with India must be understood as a major diplomatic reward in spite of India’s crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. And Israel has been allowed to develop a formidable nuclear weapons arsenal while the West kept completely silent.But this is not the only concern. The NPT has generated a new set of pretexts for launching aggressive war. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was mainly justified, in public at least, because of Baghdad’s purported stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and covert nuclear weapons program. The reality that such a stockpile did not exist, nor the program, conveys the perverse message that a country hostile to the United States might be better off with the weapons than without. Iran and North Korea certainly heard this message! And now, shifting course, the United States is leading a second charge toward aggressive war, this time against Iran, and in so doing approaching the nuclear precipice. Rumors abound that the only sure way to disable Iran’s nuclear capabilities is by attacking and destroying protected underground facilities.And there is more to worry about. The NPT promises in Article IV as a matter of “inalienable right” full access to peaceful forms of nuclear technology for non-weapons states. Several countries, including Germany and Japan, parties to the NPT, have the technology and a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment phases, which make it possible for them to develop nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks or months. While the world is turning a blind eye to Brazil’s new uranium enrichment facility, Iran is being threatened with military attack and UN sanctions if it moves in a similar direction. This appears to be such a blatantly discriminatory application of a vital provision of the NPT as to give Iran grounds for regarding itself as free from any duty to comply. It is elementary treaty law that if an important provision is violated this constitutes a material breach that allows other parties to declare their unwillingness to remain bound by the treaty. In any event, the treaty allows for parties to withdraw, and North Korea has already exercised this option.If this were not trouble enough, there is another cluster of difficulties with the NPT. The nuclear weapons states, starting with the United States, have failed to uphold their obligations in Article VI to pursue in good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament and, beyond even this, to seek general and complete disarmament. In 1996, the World Court in The Hague unanimously called upon nuclear weapons states to fulfill their Article VI obligations for nuclear disarmament. Most non-nuclear weapons states have been upset for years about the failure of the nuclear weapons states to do so. It is time for a group of governments, as many as possible, to step up and say that we have waited long enough. It is time to say that the NPT was based on mutual commitments, and is failing as a result of the inaction of the nuclear powers. The nuclear weapons states appear to need shock therapy.This is not a plea for proliferation. It is an urgent plea for phased nuclear disarmament based on a negotiated agreement, reliable monitoring and verification, and a commitment to the total prohibition of the threat or use of these weapons. Only the United States has the stature and capacity to take such a momentous step toward safeguarding its own security and contributing to the realization of a nuclear weapons free world. It also bears the responsibility for doing so. It is absurd to believe that we can have an arrangement whereby some states acquire and continue to develop nuclear weapons while others are punished with war for doing the same thing on a miniscule scale. This logic of the NPT in practice is to endorse double standards of the worst possible sort. It would have been treated as absurd if such an approach had been taken with respect to the treaties renouncing the right to develop or possess chemical and biological weapons. Even though some states had huge stockpiles of these weapons, the treaties were based on the equality of obligations binding on all states. Why should nuclear weapons be treated differently?The approach of the NPT to nuclear power is also flawed. There is no way to allow this access to countries without giving them the status of being latent nuclear weapons states. The only solution at this stage is to impose a worldwide moratorium on the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials, and those materials already produced should be placed under strict international controls in all countries including our own. Additionally, an International Sustainable Energy Agency should be immediately established and generously funded to extend aid to poorer countries to develop various types of sustainable energy (solar, wind, geothermal, tidal). Such a step would both ease the prospects of a global energy crunch, and would contribute to environmental protection.In effect, we are calling for two new treaties: a Treaty to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons and a Treaty Establishing an International Sustainable Energy Agency. These are the only initiatives that have a reasonable chance of moving us back from the terrifying edge of the nuclear precipice.
Richard Falk is Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University, and Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).
© Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 1998 – 2006 |
For yet another perspective a bit different from that found among experts gathered at the Council on Foreign Relations, please see the following interview found at Z-NET:
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?itemid=10071
Foaad Khosmood: In the April 17 issue of New Yorker Magazine Seymour Hersh has an eye-opening piece that quotes Administration insiders who suggest nuclear war with Iran is a serious option. You had written back in October of 2005 that “The strategic decision by the United States to nuke Iran was probably made long ago.” What led you to that conclusion at that time? What do you think of the Hersh piece?
Jorge Hirsch: Of course the Hersh piece is extremely useful in bringing this issue to the forefront of public attention. However already several months ago an analysis of the facts led me to the conviction that a deliberate decision had been made to use nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the US pursuit over several years to get an IAEA resolution against Iran, no matter how weak, which it finally achieved in September 2005. It didn’t make any sense as a diplomatic move if the goal was to exert pressure on Iran, in view of the clear dissent by Russia and China. It had two purposes: one was to bring the issue eventually to the UN Security Council, even knowing that Russia and China would veto any action against Iran, so that, just as in the case of Iraq, the US could argue that other countries share its concern but not the resolve to act. But more importantly, the US issued a commitment to the UN in 1995 that it wouldn’t use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries signatories of the NPT, which however explicitly excluded countries that are in “non-compliance” with the NPT. So by securing the IAEA resolution of September 2005 of Iran’s “non-compliance” the US achieved that it can now use nuclear weapons against Iran “legally”, i.e. without violating its 1995 commitment. This explains why it was pushing for it so adamantly.
Furthermore the US has radically changed its nuclear weapons policies since 2001 to erase the sharp line that traditionally existed between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It now “integrates” both types of weapons in its military strategy, and envisions the use of nuclear weapons against underground facilities, preemptively against countries “intending” to use WMD’s against US forces, and “for rapid and favorable war termination on US terms”. Several scenarios like that, that apply specifically to the Iran scenario, were made public in 2005 in the Pentagon draft document “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”, to prepare the country for what was being planned.
Furthermore, the administration has been pushing Congress every year to fund new nuclear weapons, “more usable” nuclear weapons, and bunker busting nuclear weapons, to prepare the public mind for the attack. Many are under the mistaken impression that Congress has resisted these efforts, however they forget or don’t know that the B61-11, a bunker-buster that can be used against Iranian underground facilities, is in the US arsenal since 2001. Its yield (power) is classified but is likely to include very low yield, to cause “reduced collateral damage” and thus be more “acceptable”.
Furthermore, as I pointed out several months ago and is also mentioned by Hersh, the administration is stacked with nuclear weapons experts that are hawks and participated in the formulation of the new nuclear weapons policies: National Security advisor (Hadley), deputy national security advisor (Crouch II), undersecretary of defense for intelligence (Cambone), chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board (Schneider), undersecretary of state for arms control and international security (Joseph) and ambassador to the UN (Bolton). Bolton was appointed in the face of very strong bipartisan opposition. None of these positions require specific nuclear weapons expertise, however these “nuclear warriors” are in high positions for a reason: to advise President Bush to use nuclear weapons. And let’s not forget Cheney, who was the architect of new nuclear weapons policies back in 1992 to target non-nuclear-weapon countries, and Rumsfeld who advocates a smaller high tech military where nuclear weapons play an essential role.
It also became clear to me that there is a long-term advantage in the view of advocates of America’s “preeminent role in the world” (PNAC) to use nuclear weapons against Iran: to establish the credibility of the US nuclear “deterrent” against non-nuclear countries that pursue courses of action contrary to US interests. The Iran situation lends itself to a scenario where the US use of nuclear weapons will appear to be “inevitable”, under the conditions that have been created by the US carefully and methodically over the course of several years for that purpose. Finally, I believe President Bush has embraced the breaking of the 60-year old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons as his personal goal, to be his lasting “legacy” that will overshadow other “accomplishments” of his administration.
FKh: Is a war with Iran now inevitable? Is a nuclear war inevitable?
JH: If there is an aerial bombing of Iran, I believe it is inevitable it will go nuclear. The intention is there, the advisors are there, the nuclear policies and the weapons are there. The excuses to make it “acceptable” to the American public are there. The President has sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, Congress has no say. The chain of command doesn’t go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff that may oppose it as Hersh mentions: it goes directly from Bush and Rumsfeld to commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands such as Gen. Abizaid and Gen. Cartwright. Unless those individuals disobey orders, there is no way to stop it.
I believe there is a high probability of war with Iran because key people in the administration desperately want it, but I don’t believe it is inevitable. I hope there will be a sufficiently large public outburst of opposition, eg thanks to Hersh’s and other’s revelations, to make it impossible. The dire situation in Iraq of course is making it more difficult, and I hope there will be strong voices in the administration and influential republicans that will recognize the likely disastrous consequences and oppose it. Or perhaps influential old-timers like Bush Sr. and Scowcroft will be able to dissuade President Bush.
However I believe there is very little time: an attack may well happen within the next 2 weeks, while Congress is in recess. There is no advantage to those that want it to happen in waiting.
FKh: What is the rationale for America using nukes on Iran, given that even the CIA believes Iran is at least “10 years” from any nuclear weapon production?
JH: The use of nuclear weapons against Iran will be justified by “military necessity”. In theory, Iran could equip missile warheads with chemical or biological weapons and aim them at Israeli cities or US bases in the area. The declared US policy of “preemption” would “justify” using highly accurate earth penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy missile silos or suspected underground facilities housing WMD’s. The argument will be made that a few hundred or thousand Iranian “collateral damage” casualties of low yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons is preferable to potential tens of thousands of US or Israeli casualties from Iranian missiles equipped with WMD warheads.
The US accuses Iran of having clandestine chemical and biological weapons facilities, even though it doesn’t present proof of such assertions, and despite the fact that Iran is signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention treaties. Furthermore the US has worked very hard over the past 15 years to create the perception that nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are all similar “WMD”‘s, to prepare the ground for the US use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries. However the scientific fact is, nuclear weapons are million-fold more destructive than all other weapons and in contrast to chemical and biological weapons there is no protection against nuclear weapons.
FKh: What would be the likely impact on the EU3/IAEA/UN negotiation process for Iran? Some of theorized that the Bush Administration is hoping Iran would withdraw from the NPT, like North Korea did, creating an excuse for intervention. What is your view on this?
JH: Just like in the run-up to the Iraq war, I believe there was the hope that Iran would withdraw from the NPT to create conditions to “justify” an aerial attack. Iran would have been justified in withdrawing, since its right as an NPT signatory are clearly being violated. Wisely it has chosen not to do so. North Korea is in the fortunate situation of having a deterrent to US attack, a few nuclear weapons with which it could retaliate if attacked. Iran does not have that recourse.
FKh: Could the threat of using American nuclear weapons be overplayed in order to serve as a “limit” to any Iranian response to a conventional attack/strike? I distinctly recall in the first months of 2003, the Administration leaked that US is prepared to use nuclear weapons in “retaliation” if Saddam decided to use chemical weapons against advancing US troops.
JH: I don’t believe the threat of American nuclear weapons use is being overplayed. Iran will respond to a conventional attack with conventional weapons (eg missiles) and will not be deterred by a US nuclear threat from doing so. The US will use nuclear weapons against Iran because certain sectors of the American establishment, that are in power now, believe it is in the long term strategic interest of the US to do so.
FKh: Is Iran’s recent show of force in the Persian Gulf through military exercises involving high-speed torpedoes significant to the US establishment?
JH: I don’t believe it is. The US can use overwhelming force against Iran, including nuclear weapons, and Iranian military power is relatively insignificant. The US can destroy a large number of Iranian facilities with relatively little risk to US forces. As Gen. Abizaid recently remarked, “If you ever even contemplate our nuclear capability, it should give everybody the clear understanding that there is no power that can match the United States militarily.” However no US military power will be able to contain the chaos and asymmetrical warfare that will engulf the region after the US attacks Iran.
FKh: Is there any likelihood of UN Security Council approving any kind of force against Iran? What about Sanctions?
JH: I don’t think there is any likelihood the UN Security Council will approve any kind of force nor sanctions against Iran. Iran is well within its rights within the NPT to enrich uranium on an industrial scale. The US does not want Iran to do it even on a research scale, it doesn’t want Iran to have even the “knowledge” or “capability” to do so. President Bush openly acknowledged Iran’s right (in the March 16 NSS, and also earlier) when he said that this is a “loophole” of the NPT. Well, one party to a treaty cannot simply declare part of a mutually agreed treaty a “loophole”, and expect other parties to automatically submit to unilateral modifications of the treaty.
Russia and China recognize that it is Iran’s right to enrich uranium, so they will not agree to force or sanctions against Iran, and since both have veto power at the UN Security Council, neither of those courses of action will be approved by the Security Council.
FKh: Can Russia and China be persuaded to back the Bush regime the way IAEA member India was just weeks ago when it voted to report Iran to the UN? It is often mentioned that these countries have economic interests in Iran, but doesn’t that mean they could be “bribed” with bigger incentives from the US?
JH: Neither Russia nor China can be persuaded to back the US in this instance. There are no “bigger incentives” that the US could offer to Russia and China, they are backing a legitimate right of Iran, and it is not to their strategic advantage to allow for further expansion of US power in that region. India could indeed be bought off by US incentives like the nuclear deal, because its shortsighted leaders don’t recognize that they are committing national suicide by entering into this nuclear deal with the US.
FKh: Does the US Congress pose any barrier to this administration? Some say in an election year, where Republicans could lose control of Congress, risky actions like war -or even riskier “nuclear” war- will not be approved. What do you think?
JH: Congress is unfortunately not posing barriers to the administration in the Iran situation, on the contrary some democrats sound even more hawkish than the administration. This is likely to be in large part due to the very effective work of AIPAC, and the persistent US propaganda over the years that Iran is the “prime sponsor” of terrorism, developing weapons of mass destruction and even having ties with Al Qaeda. Those statements have as little proof as the propaganda against Iraq had, yet Congress has accepted them as facts.
I don’t believe the prospect of losing control of Congress plays a role in the thinking of the people in the administration that are intent in nuking Iran. They regard this action as being in the long term strategic interest of the United States, they have worked towards this goal for many years, so that short term setbacks like losing control of Congress are not likely to be a deterrent. The invasion of Iraq doesn’t make sense in isolation, since it would leave Iran in a much stronger position in the region. The intent was always to attack Iran after invading Iraq, to suppress Iran’s rise as a strong regional power that does not conform to US interests.
FKh: Some in Iran’s substantial exile community think it best to pressure Iran’s government to back off the confrontation. It seems Iranian leadership is backed into a political corner but If Iran suddenly decided to “give in” and stop nuclear production, will that pacify the Bush Administration?
JH: It will not, the nuclear issue is just an excuse. The US has built its case against Iran over many years, see for example the 1998 Rumsfeld report: ” Iran is placing extraordinary emphasis on its ballistic missile and WMD development programs.”, “Iran has acquired and is seeking major, advanced missile components that can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the United States.”; ” Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction. It has a nuclear energy and weapons program, which aims to design, develop, and as soon as possible produce nuclear weapons.” Those are just assertions, with no backing from reality. In 1993 the CIA estimated that Iran was 8-10 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons, the NIE estimate 12 years later is that it is still 10 years away.
If Iran declared it will stop nuclear production, the US would make other demands: that it opens up all its military facilities to inspections, destroys all its missiles, whatever it takes to get Iran to say “no”, and then use that as a reason to attack.
The best assurance that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons is to allow it to have a full civilian nuclear program under IAEA supervision, as allowed by the NPT, including uranium enrichment to 3%, well below weapons-grade uranium at 90%, as many other non-nuclear-weapon countries do. Bombing Iran will drive its nuclear program underground and ensure it will do the utmost to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
FKh: Will the American people really stand for another “Iraq” only 3 years after the previous one?
JH: Unfortunately the American people will not be asked, and neither will Congress. In signing into law the congressional authorization to use force against Iraq in October 2002, the President explicitly stated that even though he appreciated receiving that support he didn’t need it, since he has the authority to initiate military action under the War Powers Resolution, and he can also invoke the 2001 Senate Joint Resolution 23 alleging that Iran supports terrorism against the US. First the bombing will start, then the President will address Congress and the public to “explain” the action and ask for support.
FKh: Just last week you wrote in AntiWar.com: “People in the know have to come forward with information that brings the impending attack to the forefront of attention of Congress and the American public and thwarts it.” Is the Hersh article what you had in mind?
JH: Yes, the Hersh article is an example of what I had in mind, but it is not enough. People in the know have to come out and reveal detailed plans, for example whether tactical nuclear weapons are already deployed in the Persian Gulf region. This is very likely to be so, and American people have a right to know. Of course revealing classified information is punishable under US law. However it should be remember that the Nuremberg principles (crafted by the US and its allies) established that international law supersedes internal law. The use of nuclear weapons against Iran, and any preparations to that effect, would be illegal and immoral under international law (eg 1996 International Court of Justice opinion, that the US is bound to). General Pace repeatedly warned Iraqis during the 2003 invasion that any use by them of WMD would be “illegal and immoral”, and he very recently advised the US military that “It is the absolute responsibility of everybody in uniform to disobey an order that is either illegal or immoral”.
I am convinced the American people will stand behind and support anybody that has the courage to “break the law” and reveal that the US is about to break the 60-year-old taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, since such an action by the US will cause long term grave damage to America. And I am convinced that if the administration goes through with this plan, those responsible will eventually be brought to justice.
FKh: You have mentioned a threat of Iranian chemical and biological weapons as a justification for invasion. You’ve even theorized that such an argument may be framed in the context of the Avian Flu pandemic threat to Europe and America. Is the administration really that desperate for a context? And does this not betray that there is no real danger from Iran?
JH: By now there is an international consensus that there is no “imminent threat” from Iranian nuclear weapons. Even those that argue that Iran is intent in developing nuclear weapons acknowledge that Iran would need several years to do so. The Israeli “point of no return argument” has been at times adopted by administration officials (eg Robert Joseph) but is not very convincing. To justify a US attack, that is likely to escalate into large scale military action, an “imminent threat” is needed. The US accuses Iran of having chemical and biological weapons and programs as well as of sponsoring terrorism, and it is natural to expect that some combination of those allegations will be used. E.g. that Iran is about to launch missiles with chemical or biological warheads against US troops in Iraq, or is about to give terrorist groups chemical or biological weapons to be used against America. It is important to note that Executive Order 13292 of 2003 made information on “weapons of mass destruction” and on “defense against international terrorism” classified. The reason for that is so that such allegations would not be subject to public scrutiny prior to the attack.
There are however several reasons that point to the Avian flu pandemic threat as a convenient excuse: 1) It has a natural time element that cannot be postponed, the yearly bird migration season; 2) The bird flu “danger” has been played up by administration officials far beyond what is scientifically justified; 3) Administration officials emphasize the danger of bird flu transmission over long distances by wild birds, even though this is scientifically in doubt; 4) Iran has an advanced biotechnology and biomedical effort, and the US accuses Iran of having a bioweapons program embedded in it. It is natural that Iran would be studying the H5N1 avian flu virus, even the US is deliberately trying to develop dangerous mutations of the virus to learn how to combat them. 5) There are scientists in the US administration and in the US military that have warned about the danger of influenza as a bioweapon.
Of course what I discuss above answers the last part of your question: there is no real danger from Iran, it is all fabricated.
FKh: What will be the likely Iranian response to a conventional air strike? What about a nuclear strike?
JH: Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether Iran would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities, as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers.
Finally I would like to discuss the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced after these events. And terrorist’s attempts to get hold of “loose nukes” and use them against Americans will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran.
Second, it will destroy America’s position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state.
Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.
Jorge Hirsch is a professor of Physics at the University of California at San Diego. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and an organizer of a recent petition, circulated among leading physicists, opposing the new nuclear weapons policies adopted by the US in the past 5 years. He is a frequent commentator on Iran and nuclear weapons.
>>I still wonder why Iran garners so much attention while non-signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treat (India, Pakistan and Israel) are virtually ignored << Come again? You can’t be that obtuse. Perhaps the rantings of Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be wiped off the map or claiming a halo surrounded him while he spoke at the U.N. are valid reasons for the attention and concern of someone commanding nuclear weapons. Nothing similar has spouted forth from Israel, India or Pakistan. The State Department on March 8, 2006, listed the reasons why a “nuclear-armed Iran is intolerable.” Weblink here: http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/63121.htm
And let’s not forget that the U.S. embassy, U.S. sovereign soil, in Iran is effectively still “captured territory” that has not been returned nearly 27 years later.
Finally, Seymour Hersh has a disquieting habit of playing hard and loose with the actual facts. He’s essentially now a partisan shill, having abdicating any pretense to objective journalism long ago. I have no doubt that unfortunately the West will unfortunately suffer one or two nuclear explosions on its soil before the one-worlders are steam-rolled into obscurity.
Somewhat tangential to this discussion is the relationship between Iran and Israel. UC Hastings recently had a panel discussion on the topic which can be found here: http://www.iraniantruth.com/?p=160
Dear H. Tuttle,
Perhaps I am ‘that obtuse.’ Consider the following (in addition to the other material I provided above):
Did you read William Langewiesche’s article, ‘The Wrath of Khan: How A.Q. Khan make Pakistan a nuclear power–and showed that the spread of atomic weapons can’t be stopped,’ in The Atlantic Monthly, November 2005?
When was the last time Iran invaded anyone?
The crisis over Kashmiri Muslim demands for autonomy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has not been resolved (although there’s been some hopeful signs on the horizon).
Recall that ‘Zionism grounded its preemptive right to establish a Jewish state in Palestine—a right that, allegedly, superseded the aspirations of the indigenous population—in the Jewish people’s supposedly unique claim to that land’ [….] Zionism’s claim to the whole of Palestine not only precluded a modus vivendi based on partition with the indigenous Arab population, it called into question any Arab presence in Palestine. This was especially so, given that, in practice, the Zionist discourse on Palestine merged with a Zionist discourse on a Jewish polity. Both these discourses posited that (1) to “normalize” their conditions, Jews needed to relocate to a state (polity/territorial unit) that “belonged” to them, and (2) non-Jewish inhabitants, even citizens and long-term residents, of the Jews’ state (polity/territorial unit) were not intrinsically “of” it. The political and topographic discourses in Zionism thus run parallel; they are mutually reinforcing and validating. The result is a radically exclusivist ideology which renders non-Jews at best a redundant presence and easily lends itself to schemes favoring population transfer—and expulsion.’ [….] (Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict, 2001, ed.)
‘Today, some of Israel’s more chauvinistic leaders and public figures have explicitly adopted the idea of an ethnic cleansing policy, waiting only for the proper time to implement it, while most of the other rightwing politicians, including Sharon, remain silent and never express reservations about it.’ (Baruch Kimmerling)
An Historical Sampler
1948 War: Israeli ethnic-cleansing policy
Who destroyed the Egyptian air force in a preemptive strike in June 1967?
Who bombed the USS Liberty in international waters in June 1967?
1967 War.
Who pressed into Syria after a ceasefire, gaining control of the Golan Heights?
Who annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank?
In 1968, who destroyed the Jordanian village of Karameh and proceeded to drive about 100,000 inhabitants out of the Jordan Valley?
Was it not Golda Meir (1969) who proclaimed that, before Zionism, the Palestinians did not exist?
Was it not Israel that launched, on May 12th, 1970, land and air raids on PLO bases in South Lebanon?
Who, in July 1972, stepped up its campaign to assassinate Palestinian leadership?
Who shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai on Feb. 21st, 1973, killing 106 people?
1973: Arab (Egypt and Syria)/Israeli War
On Nov. 9th, 1977, Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre, South Lebanon, killing 78 (in response to rocket attack).
In July and August of 1979, repeated Israeli bombardment of South Lebanon.
June 7th, 1981, Israel bombs the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear plant near Baghdad.
In June and July of 1981, beginning of ‘Iron Fist’ policies (under Begin) in the Occupied Territories
In July 1981 Israel engages in extensive bombardment of Lebanon.
June 6th, 1982, Israel, in ‘Operation Peace for Galilee,’ invades Lebanon. Israelis evidence their adroitness at using car bombs, white phosphorus artillery shells, napalm, and cluster bombs.
In September of 1982, Israel orchestrates (Sharon later acknowledged ‘indirect’ responsibility) the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.
On Oct. 1st, 1985, Israeli F-16 bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing 56 Palestinians and 15 Tunisians.
On Feb. 2nd, 1998, General Lee Butler (head of the Strategic Command) remarks that ‘It is dangerous in the extreme that in the cauldron of animosities that we call the Middle East, one nation [Israel] has armed itself, ostensibly, with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, and that inspires other nations to do so.’
June 1999 Israeli military attacks Lebanese civil infrastructure, targeting power stations
September 2000, Israel bombs South Lebanon.
2001: repeated assassination of Palestinian leaders; Israel launches air strikes on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Etc., Etc., Etc. Please see the chronology documented here: http://middleeastreference.org.uk/Chronology3.html (compiled by Dr. Glen Rangwala, Dept. of Politics, Trinity College, University of Cambridge).
After you’ve read the books in this bibliography, you can then remind me why one should not be concerned with the fact that Israel is armed with nuclear weapons:
Some Sources Relevant to an Understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The Jewish public’s assent to official propaganda, myth and self-righteousness results from a willing identification—not fear of arbitrary punishment, commissars or secret police. Many topics are known and not-known at the same time. Israel is a country full of ‘open secrets.’ Even those known to the whole world, like the existence of Israel’s nuclear capacity, are protected with a bizarre tenacity. Official lies are uttered with a straight face, and received with a knowing wink. [….] During the decade of the intifada from 1987, no one believed official denials about specific allegations, such as torture, undercover death squads and killing unarmed demonstrators. But they went on living ‘within the lie’…. [….] There are, of course, good historical reasons why Israeli Jews should have a defensive self-image and a character armour of insecurity and permanent victimhood. The result is a xenophobia that would be called ‘racism’ anywhere else, an exclusion of Palestinians from a shared moral universe and an obsessional self-absorption: what we do to them is less important than what this does to us. From Stanley Cohen’s States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001)
Aruri, Naseer H. The Obstruction of Peace: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995).
Aruri, Naseer H. Dishonest Broker: The Role of the United States in Palestine and Israel (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003).
Boyle, Francis A. Palestine, Palestinians, and International Law (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2003).
Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
Chomsky, Noam. The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999 ed.).
Chomsky, Noam. Middle East Illusions (Lanham, MD: Rowman &Littlefield, 2003).
Enderlin, Charles. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003).
Farsoun, Samih K. (with Christian E. Zacharia). Palestine and the Palestinians. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
Finkelstein, Norman. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Verso, 1995).
Flapan, Simha. The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon, 1987).
Gerner, Deborah J. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2nd ed., 1994).
Ghanem, As’ad. The Palestinian Regime: A “Partial Democracy” (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001).
Hadawi, Sami. Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1989).
Hiltemann, Joost R. Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians (London: Verso, 2003).
Lockman, Zacharay and Joel Beinin, eds. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (Boston, MA: South End Press/A MERIP Book, 1989).
Lustik, Ian. Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980).
Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Morris, Benny. Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-1956 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
Pappé, Ilan. The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).
Pappé, Ilan. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003 ed.).
Porath, Yehoshua. The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 2 Vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1974 and 1977).
Rodinson, Maxime. Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Anchor Foundation/Pathfinder, 1973).
Rogan, Eugene L. and Avi Shlaim, eds. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Rose, John. The Myths of Zionism. (London: Pluto Press, 2004).
Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
Said, Edward W. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Vintage Books, 2001 ed.).
Said, Edward W. and Christopher Hitchens, eds. Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (London: Verso, 1988).
Slater, Jerome. ‘What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 171-199.
Sayigh, Yezid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Younis, Mona N. Liberation and Democratization: The South African and Palestinian National Movements (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
Zunes, Stephen. Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Monroe. ME: Common Courage Press, 2002).
[The above was rather hastily put together, so I would not be surprised if here and there one finds an error.]
Dear Nema,
I don’t think it is tangential to the discussion. Thanks so much for your link. Very interesting.
Mr. O’Donnell, your list of articles and discussion of Khan’s network is impressive. I have neither time, nor inclination to read every one of the articles, track down their original sources, and weigh the morass in some sort of existential scale. While you ask “[w]hen was the last time Iran invaded anyone?” That isn’t the question on the table. I did notice, however, that you completely ignored the point that Iran’s current president has called directly for the total destruction of another nearby country and that Iran is an active sponsor of terrorist organizations, and a direct backer of several such groups, including Hezbollah, who would have little compunction against using such weapons against Israel, the U.S. or the West.
Your long tangent regarding Israel is essentially diversionary and immaterial — does any reputable world leader believe it will supply a nuke to terrorists? That’s the ony question on the table in my mind with regards to Iran’s current and future pursuit of nuclearized weapons, not Israel’s past actions. While Pakistan’s proliferation via Khan remains deeply troubling, as does North Korean’s actions, to posit that stopping Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons should be anything less than a top priority on the diplomatic stage cannot be taken seriously.
Dear H. Tuttle,
Iran does not have nuclear weapons. This nation’s response and thinly veiled threats are disproportionate to the threat, now or in the near future, assuming, that is, that Iran really wants nuclear weapons (the evidence here is thin to non-existent). It does no good for me to express my abhorrence at Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad’s anti-Israel statements. I do believe, however, his views are not shared by a majority of Iranians and that such deplorable rhetoric arises as a direct reaction to the perception that the country is being bullied by Anglo-European powers (I trust you’re well-versed in Iranian history and politics). Russia is rightly concerned that ‘excessive pressure on Iran may impel it to opt out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether, and end even the much-reduced access that inspectors now have to Iranian site’ (Christopher de Bellaigue in NYRB; I suggest you read his article in the April 27th issue for why the U.S. has a dangerously skewed perception of this Islamic Republic).
Our primary concern should be the behavior of nations currently armed with nuclear weapons, as well as with North Korea, given its withdrawal from the treaty and the possibility it possesses a nuclear device. The Bush Administration’s rather cavalier attitude and approach to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in its own case makes it that much more difficult to conduct negotiations and diplomacy with Iran. Iran is not known for adventurist militarism, and I can’t imagine any plausible scenario in which the regime would supply anyone else with nuclear weapons (especially ones it’s yet to possess!). I can imagine, on the other hand, a scenario in which the U.S. would resort to the use of nuclear weapons, because the current administration has not (absolutely) ruled that possibility out, and in fact, has contingency plans along those lines. The Bush Administration’s understanding and practice of the art of diplomacy does not encourage any confidence in its ability to properly deal with Iran (at least in this domain, I trust the Chinese and especially the Russians to be a bit more adroit).
I will not get into a discussion of the alleged sponsorship of terrorist oganizations, as this country has a sorry record on that score and has furthermore been known to exemplify the attributes of ‘State-sponsored terrorism.’ Discussions of terrorism are notable for their lack intellectual inconsistency, historical myopia, and debilitating emotionalism (on Hizbu’llah, see Saad-Ghorayeb above). Your comments here suggest to me that you’re no less liable to same.
The material on Israel is not ‘diversionary and immaterial’ insofar as it is indicative of the behavior of a State that also happens to be well-armed with nuclear weapons. I doubt any of the Arab nations in the Middle East are comfortable with the lack of parity here. Is Iran assured Israel will never resort to the use of nuclear weapons? Why should they be? Israel did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
But given my obtuseness, and the likelihood my argument will not be taken seriously, I may be pissin’ in the wind.