The Ever-Expanding “Provisional Measures” Authority of the ICJ

by Julian Ku

The International Court of Justice issued a “provisional measures” order today in a dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over a World Heritage temple located near or on the boundary between the two nations.  The request for provisional measures was brought by Cambodia, which sought the withdrawal of Thai troops from around the temple.  The ICJ granted this request, but went much farther.  In a somewhat remarkable order, the ICJ drew a “demilitarized zone” around the temple which excludes both Thai and Cambodian military forces.

61. Whereas the area of the Temple of Preah Vihear has been the scene of armed clashes between the Parties and whereas the Court has already found that such clashes may reoccur; whereas it is for the Court to ensure, in the context of these proceedings, that no irreparable damage is caused to persons or property in that area pending the delivery of its Judgment on the request for interpretation; whereas, moreover, in order to prevent irreparable damage from occurring, all armed forces should be provisionally excluded from a zone around the area of the Temple, without prejudice to the judgment which the Court will render on the request for interpretation submitted by Cambodia; and whereas, therefore, the Court considers it necessary, in order to protect the rights which are at issue in these proceedings, to define a zone which shall be kept provisionally free of all military personnel, without prejudice to normal administration, including the presence of non-military personnel necessary to ensure the security of persons and property;

63. Whereas both Parties, in order to comply with this Order, shall withdraw all military personnel currently present in the zone as thus defined; whereas both Parties shall refrain not only from any military presence within that provisional demilitarized zone, but also from any armed activity directed at the said zone;

As a practical matter, a provisional DMZ seems a sensible way to proceed.  But as a legal matter, there are grave doubts about the ICJ’s authority to make such an order.  The ICJ was quite seriously divided, with the ICJ’s President and its two newest members providing perhaps the most serious criticisms of the scope of the ICJ’s authority under its “provisional measures” power.  Judge Xue of China and Judge Donoghue of the United States, along with President Owada of Japan, all criticized the “DMZ” power (see here for links to all of the opinions).  What troubles all of these dissenters is the fact that the provisional DMZ actually goes beyond the disputed territories and, in essence, orders each nation to withdraw military forces from their own undisputed sovereign territory (check out the cool “sketch map” on p. 17).

I won’t go into any further depth at this point. It all turns on analysis of the ICJ’s authority to issue provisional measures that I have little expertise on. I will only note that since the ICJ only decided in 1999 that provisional measures were binding, it is somewhat remarkable that this same doubtfully binding provision also gives the ICJ the power to order states to withdraw military forces from their own territories.

Whale Wars: Is the Threatened Australia ICJ Lawsuit Just Politics?

by Julian Ku

Two different but interesting views of Australia’s threat to bring Japan to the ICJ over whaling.

Over at The Jurist, Don Rothwell of Australian National University provides some background and legal context for Australia’s lawsuit. As I understand it, Australia could claim that Japan is actually violating Australia’s 200 mile exclusive economic zone (assuming certain Australian Antarctic claims were accepted).  But it seems more likely that Australia will try to make a claim under the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. As I’ve suggested, this seems a very tough case to make, and Japan may get the IWC to alter its rules anyway.

Over at the Australian, Greg Sheridan points out that the Japanese government is not taking Australia very seriously on this issue, and sees it as essentially a domestic political matter for Australians.  And he goes on:

As well, observers of all stripes are dumbfounded at the Rudd government’s decision to blindside Japan’s Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada just before his visit to Australia. Canberra did this by announcing, on the eve of Okada’s arrival in Australia and without any warning to the Japanese, that it had decided to take Japan to the International Court of Justice over whaling. There is not the slightest chance of this court action succeeding. To insult Okada, the most pro-Australian member of Tokyo’s core leadership, in this manner was extremely foolish.

Emphasis added. I think Sheridan is not far wrong. Unless Australia is going to make the EEZ argument, it doesn’t seem like it has a very strong case.  And even if they somehow win, there is very little chance of Japan complying with the ICJ order.

Whale Wars: Australia Gives Japan One More Chance to Settle

by Julian Ku

I had almost forgotten about this ongoing dispute between Australia and Japan over whaling, which has been going on for years (and which I first noted on this blog way back in 2005).  The Australian Prime Minister warned Japan yesterday that if whaling doesn’t stop by November, Australia will take Japan to court, either the ICJ or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  Australia seems ready to go. It has its evidence lined up and appears to have James Crawford on board to argue its case before either the ITLOS or the ICJ.  I wouldn’t hold my breath on a quick decision on this, but it would be an interesting case nonetheless. As far as I know, Japan has never faced a case in the ICJ. I wonder what its reaction would be.