Search: self-defense

...defense, much to their concern: Saddam’s defense team complained on Wednesday that despite “repeated requests” it had not received a copy of the verdict so that it could begin work on an appeal and lodge it with the court within the 30-day deadline after the November 5 verdict. Chief counsel Khalil al-Dulaimi accused the Iraqi High Tribunal, the court that tried Saddam and seven others for crimes against humanity, of “pursuing its continued efforts to obstruct the efforts of the defense to submit a legal … appeal against the unjust...

The Australian is reporting that Tanzanian police have arrested Callixte Gakwaya, a defence attorney at the ICTR, on suspicion of involvement in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. “He was arrested yesterday. He is now in custody,” regional police commander Basilio Matei said. According to the arrest warrant, Gakwaya – who leads the defence team of a genocide suspect whose case comes up before the ICTR in January – supervised road blocks and massacred Tutsis as they tried to flee the Rwandan capital. “Several Tutsis were killed,” according to the warrant....

...that Israel believed necessary to neutralize the Hezbollah threat. Eye-for-an-eye is an accurate description of the French/Kofi Annan interpretation of the proportionality doctrine, and of the Heller-HRW caricature of Israeli strategy, not of Israeli strategy itself. Is it proper for Israel to use that force necessary to neutralize the threat? I believe it is and that is the way all states engage in warfare and that France, Russia etc. misinterpret the doctrine of proportionality. Perhaps Heller-HRW believe otherwise; if they do, I would much prefer that they have the intellectual...

[Jennifer Trahan is Associate Clinical Professor, at The Center for Global Affairs, NYU-SPS, and Chair of the American Branch of the International Law Association’s International Criminal Court Committee. The views expressed are those of the author.] Postings on Opinio Juris seem fairly squarely against the legality of the U.S. missile strike last week into Syria. Let me join Jens David Ohlin (blogging on Opinio Juris) and Harold Koh (blogging on Just Security) in making the contrary case. When NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, member states did not...

[Sari Bashi is Executive Director at Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement.] This is the second post of our Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Law of Occupation. Earlier posts can be found in the Related Links at the end of this post. I am grateful to Opinio Juris for hosting this symposium in its best tradition of fostering robust debate on cutting-edge issues in international law and to Aeyal Gross for providing the theoretical framework for understanding Israel’s obligations in Gaza. As the director...

the Rwandan prosecutors regarding the link between the alleged genocide denial and Erlinder’s pleadings as a defense counsel in the Military I case. For example, according to one statement, “during the Military I Trial at the ICTR, Carl Peter Erlinder denied and downplayed genocide. He managed to prove that genocide had not been planned nor executed by the military officials he was representing.” The Court itself concluded that Erlinder should “answer for his acts at the ICTR.” To be clear, although it is unconscionable to persecute a defense attorney for...

...Trial Chamber and Registry to address defense concerns in the lead-up to the trial may have encouraged smoother proceedings. Taylor’s first defense team left the case due to concerns over inadequate resources and time to prepare, leading to the appointment of a second team and a hiatus in proceedings. These challenges underscore the value of previous complex criminal trial experience among judges who adjudicate these cases. The three judges of Trial Chamber II, while experienced jurists, did not generally join the Special Court with such extensive experience. Finally, the provision...

...self-governance from partisan politics. Rather, I argue, self-governance mechanisms that are representative of the judiciary as a whole – not exclusively judges from the highest courts – are an understudied but important feature of institutional design in post-authoritarian transitions. More specifically, I argue that the concept of judicial “independence” should include independence from elite capture when transitioning from the rule of the few to the rule of the many. When mechanisms of judicial self-governance – such as judicial councils that govern appointments, promotions and discipline of judges – are dominated...

...grant protected person status even to its own nationals if they have differing allegiance. Kubo claims that this interpretation is both in line with the spirit of humanization and also practical (or at least not completely unpractical), while attempting to refute a number of disagreeing authors, including myself (which probably explains why I chose this somewhat arcane topic). In the post I will first summarize the Tribunal’s position, then the arguments defending the ICTY jurisprudence, and I will try to demonstrate why I don’t find them particularly convincing. Needless to...

...perhaps arrive at a similar, yet broader, conclusion, through different means. When discussing the British position in the Chagos Islands case, Prof. Wheatley points out that the UK’s B-Series position rests in the conviction that the International Court of Justice “should decide the case in the same way it would have done in the late 1960s, a time when the legal status of the self-determination norm divided states”. For him, this is incorrect due to the inherent limitations with B-Series thinking. International law is not a “brute fact” static in...

...that the right to self-determination leads to secession outside of the colonial paradigm, or outside cases of extreme oppression.  Instead, most authorities on self-determination would agree that the right needs to be exercised internally, through an autonomy regime within the confines of the existing parent state.  Thus, the international community’s stance that Nagorno-Karabakh ought to remain a part of Azerbaijan, with some type of autonomous status, appears consistent with international law and most other precedents (except for Kosovo).  Although the international community’s attitude vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh appears rooted in international law,...

states self-referring is mostly pre-occupied with motives of these states that scholars often miss the value of this developing state practice. As it is incontestable that states self-referral of cases amplifies the aims of the Rome Statute, to end impunity and activates the complementarity provisions under the statue as a cohesive unity of purpose between the ICC and its member states (Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui and Prosecutor v. Lubanga). A weakness of the book, if any, is that while Ba focuses on the motives of Uganda’s Museveni, there is...