Search: self-defense

absolutely necessary”. With all their legal uncertainty, the words ‘imminent danger’ and ‘preemptive strike’ would suggest towards the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. India seemed to stop short of suggesting that. It must have been because if the target is a non-state actor, in this case, JeM, it becomes necessary for India to attribute its actions to the State, in this case, Pakistan. While there is a general feeling among the Indian establishment that some level of State support, arguably, exists in the case...

...concept of self-defense based on its use in the Caroline standard. Since the adoption of the UN Charter there has been debate about whether the “inherent right” of self-defense contained in Article 51 is broader or narrower than the Caroline standard. While that question has not been definitively settled, it is fair to say that if Israel’s action in the 1967 war was justified by Article 51 (something that most states, if not most scholars, seem to agree with), then Article 51 “imminence” is broader than Caroline “imminence”. If for...

...to trigger an Article 51 right of self-defense. Although I’d always understood that simply because something constituted a use of force, that didn’t mean that it rose to the level of an armed attack for self-defense purposes. In other words, there is a gap between armed attack and force. But at least one US government lawyer suggested at this conference that there is no such gap in cyberspace, and that this may even be the official US Government position for cyberspace. I’d be interested in what readers make of this...

“has led to some positive developments for the defense.” She does not cite to any statements by defense attorneys here, and for good reason: I doubt that any of the attorneys she surveyed share her opinion. Trimmed indictments, (a bit) less cumulative evidence, and speedier trials only marginally benefit the defense, and those benefits are vastly outweighed by the costs that Jenia mentions, particularly limits on the defendant’s right to confront witnesses and to prepare an effective defense. Moreover, Jenia fails to mention the Completion Strategy’s most significant cost: the...

The latter would trigger self-defense, while the former only peaceful settlement mechanisms. This way, the US would not be able to invoke self-defense to unilaterally intervene in Latin America. The US opposed to this so much that its State Secretary himself decided to go straight to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister’s hotel room and try to change his mind. Venezuelan Minister Morales told him that a distinction was necessary because it is not as easy to determine who is the aggressor in intra-continental conflicts as it is in extra-continental ones. In...

the rescue of migrants at sea, the prohibition of Nazi symbols, or international prosecution of German ISIS affiliates. The opinion starts with emphasizing the similarities between “Operation Peace Spring” and Turkey’s previous invasion in Afrin (the research services also issued numerous opinions on this subject-matter). On this basis, it (again) addresses the validity of self-defense against non-state actors and Turkey’s reference to the 1998 Adana agreement with Syria.  Self-defense against quasi-de-facto-regimes permissible The PYD/YPG has successfully consolidated itself in what they call Rojava already in the early phase of the Syria war. Their autonomy...

reason to believe there will be someone left alive to fight the ensuing war, the War Powers Act explicitly grants the President the power to use military force in self defense for a limited period of time. Then he must consult with Congress and get further approval. However, in the quoted paraphrase of the Koh remarks, there is nothing to suggest the paper was endorsing an independent power of the President. "Self defense" is a justification for the use of military force by the entire US government and not one...

...could only target military objects or soldiers already threatening the lives of others but not those about to be deployed to the battlefield at a later stage. Excluding the very first shot from the application of international humanitarian law becomes even more problematic in situations of pre-emptive self-defense. After all, one would have to extend the restrictive imminence-standard under human rights law to the right to self-defense. Only then it would be ensured that action taken in self-defense also conforms to human rights law et vice versa. Otherwise, the defending...

...act of self-defense should be proportional to the attack and that some skirmishes are of such a minimal security threat as to not require any response beyond the fighting of the skirmish itself. I am curious to see if this is a point on which other commentators will focus. (The Commission also noted that Eritrea never invoked Article 51 or notified the Security Council of its acts as self-defense until the Commission hearing.) The Commission then walked through the facts leading up to the Eritrean incursion into Ethiopia and reiterated...

...self-defense in more recent years and somewhat significantly in law enforcement. In this vision, the SEAL in the room would be principally trained and operating in a law of war or self-defense vision which would make this a lawful kill while the actual mission that the CIA was putting them into would be construed as a law enforcement mission with its more restrictive rules. In other words, the CIA plays the Defense department types in this game by having the people doing the kill come from a legal training tradition...

the subsidiary question: what must Israel do (or refrain from doing) as a result of self-determination, a peremptory norm which all States have a duty to promote? Whether or not the General Assembly specifically meant for the Court to address the obligations arising from the erga omnes nature of the right to self-determination, it is a reasonable reading of the question. Failure to address self-determination in the opinion The Court’s Advisory Opinion fails meaningfully to address the issue of self-determination. The eight operative conclusions make no mention of self-determination whatsoever...

one hand, the SFRC seems to accept the Supreme Court’s preference for clear statements of the treaty-makers’ intent as to the treaty’s self- or non-self-executing status (whereas previously, I believe the SFRC and the Executive often assumed a treaty was self-executing unless they as the treaty-makers expressed a contrary intent). Thus, the inclusion of declarations of self-execution and non-self-execution mark a new Senate practice. And it may actually prove helpful going forward if it means that the Senate (and by extension the Executive) think through and express views on the...