Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...control over territory. Furthermore, States must ensure their cyber capabilities and operations comply with existing international obligations, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and treaty commitments. The extraterritorial application of human rights obligations takes on new dimensions when State surveillance technologies can monitor individuals globally or when State cyber operations affect critical infrastructure providing essential services. In December 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the Eleven Norms of Responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. Although these norms are voluntary, they are based on international law obligations. However, it is concerning...

...long held (if, in my view, unfortunate) position that ICCPR doesn’t apply extraterritorially (which the report acknowledges), this seems a bit of a tough legal case to make. Beyond the trial situation (to which it seems CA3 would surely apply), as long as we’re choosing between legal regimes the United States officially rejects, why not pick APII, or API by analogy, as the more useful standard? Truly asking here. Responses to that question produced an interesting exchange on and off-line between Gabor Rona and Marty Lederman. With the relevant permission...

...aggression by Germany and Japan. Israel’s obligations in the law of occupation and international human rights law (applicable extraterritorially), which govern how it exercises its military authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, oblige it to secure public order and protect human rights. However, even if these obligations, especially those in occupation law (specifically, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, part of occupation law) can be understood as a general matter to encompass an obligation to use force in occupied territory to neutralize threats emanating from there to...

...world states violate human rights, rule-of-law-abiding weapons manufacturers in the first world respond to the conscience of humanity by adhering to their extraterritorial human rights obligations (see, EU Criterion Two). However, when benevolent and civilised states commit atrocities, these actions are often dismissed as the unfortunate consequences of war. The suspension of arms trade is not even considered until the scale of the atrocities becomes too significant to ignore. When it’s raining bombs, trade becomes a passive factor against carnages and barbarisms of weapon-yielding entities, states or non-state entities or...

...the point yet where there’s a sense that there’s anything that could replace that,” the second military official said of the drone attacks. From the legal side, however, I wonder if the Obama administration is cognizant of the kind of pushback that the soft-law community is gearing up to offer. The position of the human rights community continues to harden, in the sense of treating targeted killing as extrajudicial execution under human rights law, and to pushing that conclusion onto the United States through four legal premises: Extraterritorial application of...

...the plaintiffs. But the court isn’t buying it. It finds that the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) doesn’t protect foreign harms, including Mexican seepage wetlands just south of the border. Statutes don’t normally have extraterritorial application and there’s nothing in NEPA to suggest Congress wanted to protect these foreign environmental harms. Okay, that argument didn’t hold water, so the plaintiffs try for trans-boundary harm. Harms in Mexico will have trans-boundary harms in the United States. Like what? Well, the loss of seepage in Mexico will reduce crop importation to the...

...actors (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/16, paras. 50–51). At any rate, such extraterritorial operations may constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the State of sojourn. If this State – for example, Afghanistan (now represented by the Taliban) – did not consent to such an attack, the strike would constitute a violation of the principle of non-intervention derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States (Article 2(1) UN Charter) (cf. ICJ, Nicaragua Judg. 1986, para. 202); it could also amount to a violation of the prohibition of the use...

...for going after terrorists themselves. But even as the administration wants to expand the reach of the strategy, the legal space for it threatens to shrink. And it is not especially clear that the administration understands that acceptance of certain things that parts of its foreign policy advisors would like to do – accept extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, for example – would have potentially grave effects on the legal rationales it offers for its targeted killing strategies. I see it as a potential clash within the Obama administration’s foreign...

...The ICC has launched a new policy under which it will operate as a ‘justice hub’, supporting national authorities. At the same time, record numbers of states are pursuing domestic trials of international crimes on the basis of universal and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The vital role of inter-state assistance has never been more apparent: a robust legal framework which enables states to request and share information and evidence, access victims, witnesses and assets, and extradite suspects is essential if states are to effectively prosecute international crimes. The purpose of the Ljubljana-The...

...well, allowing for the possible interposition of procedural bars to the making of Alien Tort claims (as pushed by Sotomayor). He got in an effective IG Farben analogy and even a little human rights speechifying (see p. 55). Breyer gets the award for zinger of the day: “if Hitler isn’t a pirate, who is?” (Anyone want to do the legal math on that one?) So predictions of the ATS (extraterritorial) demise may be premature. On the other hand, recent experience demonstrates that predictions based on oral arguments are not especially...

...crime of torture. FF argued therefore that prosecution of Prince Nasser for torture committed in Bahrain would be possible in UK courts pursuant to the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. In January 2013 FF was granted judicial review permission. As mentioned above, the matter was due to be heard in the High Court of England and Wales on 7 October 2014, roughly one year and 10 months after permission for judicial review was granted. However shortly before, the DPP appears to have accepted...

...the possible destruction of North Korea’s army as permissible defensive action, coupled with the self-defense justifications advanced for the US’s wide-scale extraterritorial drone program since 2010, may reflect serious attempts to reinterpret and loosen the well-accepted rules on the principle of proportionality to the point of irrelevance. These expansive readings of self-defense, however, have never been endorsed by the rest of the international community or even the majority of them. On the contrary, the requirement of halting and repelling an armed attack still represents the only primary benchmark for the...