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Search: extraterritorial sanctions

16 Dec

...and legitimise UNGA actions. Part 2 asks what action the UNGA should take in light of this report. Specifically, whether the UNGA has the legal authority and should recommend UN Member States to issue sanctions against Israel until it fully complies with the ceasefire agreement, and whether states following those recommendations can do so legally. Independent Commission of Inquiry Report 2025 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel (“the Commission”) was established on 27 May 2021 by the Human Rights Council....
16.12.25 | |

20 Nov

[Piet Eeckhout is a Professor at University College London and a leading authority in EU Law and international economic law. He notes that he has been involved in the Kadi litigation on the side of Sheikh Kadi.] Devika Hovell’s paper is an excellent attempt at conceptualising the relationship between the domestic judge and the UN Security Council (UNSC). That relationship has come about as a consequence of the UNSC’s smart sanctions policies, which intrude in the daily lives of those which are subject to them. Most of the significant case...
20.11.13 | |

31 Oct

...involvement of any State in this terrorist act would constitute a serious violation by that State of its obligations to work to prevent and refrain from supporting terrorism.” As CNN summarized: Last-minute diplomatic haggling deleted a direct reference to the threat of sanctions on the Syrian government, but the effect of Monday’s resolution is the same. The resolution is under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which holds open the ultimate possibility of the Security Council considering the use of force with failure to comply. Russia and China simply would...
31.10.05 | |

21 Feb

...far is refuse to appoint an arbitrator. Second, as any private international commercial arbitrator could tell you, consent to an arbitration does not in any way guarantee enforcement. Indeed, in private commercial arbitrations, judicial enforcement proceedings are common and necessary to force parties to comply with arbitral awards. To put this another way, if China had participated in the arbitration by appointing an arbitrator, I don’t think it would have affected its likelihood of complying with any arbitral award. UNCLOS does not have any sanctions regime akin to, say the...
21.02.13 | |

14 Jun

...what might satisfy this due diligence obligation. Dormann and Serralvo offer examples of states enforcing sanctions against other states not in compliance (an approach that might also arguably be applied to nonstate actors), or the panoply of regulations and restrictions attached to arms export. Domestic and international frameworks governing arms export, trade, and assistance tend to be at least partly motivated by the responsibilities invoked under Common article 1 as well as other treaty obligations to prevent weapons transfers that might contribute to serious violations of IHL or human rights...
14.06.21 | |

29 Sep

...the IAEA refused to recognize in 1982 the credentials of Israeli delegates in the aftermath of the raid on the Osiraq reactor; Myanmar was deprived of ILO technical cooperation in 1999 as a result of its practice of forced labor; the OAS suspended Cuba from membership in 1962; Egypt was suspended from the Organization from the Islamic Conference in 1979. (These examples are cited as the kind of countermeasures anticipated by the ILC’s articles by Frédéric Dopagne, “Sanctions and Countermeasures by International Organizations: diverging Lessons for the Idea of Autonomy,”...
29.09.10 | |

03 Apr

Justice Holmes famously argued that “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.” Holmes was articulating the contractual concept of an efficient breach. If the costs of performance exceed the benefits to all the parties, a breach of contract is...
03.04.06 | |

21 Mar

...a matter of intense bilateral concern. When President Barack Obama and Argentine President Christine Fernandez met for the first time in November 2011, the two heads of state spent the majority of their time discussing Argentina’s obligation to pay the arbitration awards, and the consequences that would flow from its failure to do so. The United States is clearly calculating that such trade sanctions will alter Argentina’s cost-benefit analysis. Buenos Aires is set to pay approximately $18 million annually in increased duties as a result of the GSP suspension, far...
21.03.14 | |

18 Apr

...dispute between China and the Philippines? And why exactly wouldn’t this cause a trade war with China and why wouldn’t it violate the WTO Agreement? And when exactly did the International Court of Justice get involved given that China has not consented to that court’s compulsory jurisdiction? Not only is this not a plausible mechanism for sanctions against China (the world’s second largest economy), but it is not a plausible mechanism for sanctions against almost any country in the world. It has never been done before outside of the trade...
18.04.16 | |

14 Jun

...joint report, “Regulating Irregular Actors: Can Due Diligence Checks Mitigate the Risks of Working with Nonstate and Substate Forces?” The study explores due diligence and risk mitigation mechanisms in seven US partnerships with nonstate or substate armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (from 2009 to the present), including provision of training, regular monitoring, establishing rules and standards, threatening or applying sanctions, and other mechanisms. There are a few important caveats to make up-front. Despite their legal-esque tenor, most of these measures were adopted by the US on a policy...
14.06.21 | |

20 Jan

...producing changes in state behavior. For example, states may not trust information produced by other states or international institutions. Epistemic institutions can take steps to increase the perceived legitimacy of information, but in some instances credible commitments may be more effective. Second, even with improved information, states may still lack an incentive to coordinate their behavior in the absence of the threat of sanctions. Certain public goods problems, like fisheries, raise this issue. Knowing what constitutes a sustainable fish catch does not by itself provide an incentive for a state...
20.01.15 | |

28 Sep

...of a regime of classified information that is at once far too sweeping but, for precisely that reason, largely incapable of having the teeth necessary to keep secrets. It is a classification regime that serves as nip for the cat, and a marker of access rather than a lockbox for necessary secrets. A better system – not likely in our lifetimes, presumably – would be far less ability to classify things, including a classification system clearly tied to a range of sanctions from loss of job to prison. But the...
28.09.10 | |