Search: extraterritorial sanctions

As the Court put it in Bowman, “Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.” Here’s a brief excerpt of my Chapter 8 addressing the “government purpose” test that presumes the extraterritorial application of U.S. law: The Bowman Court concluded that “the same rule of interpretation [against extraterritoriality] should not be applied to criminal statutes which are … not logically dependent on...

...and requests rejected by the Commission (and its gargantuan workload) by sheer virtue of more readily available knowledge and less room for educated guesswork among its users. A few weeks ago, a scholar and practitioner I greatly admire (and whose knowledge of international law is exceptional) expressed their doubts as to the reasons why a petition against the US at the IACHR had being rejected. The petition itself -from what was disclosed- had to do with claimed responsibility for extraterritorial violation of human rights as a consequence of military/law-enforcement activities...

...to substantive criminal law. Contrast what it says about the principal/accessory distinction with what it says about extraterritoriality as an aggravating factor, which the defence (correctly) alleged in its appeal brief lacks any foundation whatsoever in customary international law (and has never been applied by any international tribunal): The Appeals Chamber considers that it was unnecessary for the Trial Chamber to refer to public international law in order to take into consideration the extraterritorial nature and consequences of Taylor‘s acts and conduct. The Appeals Chamber accepts the Trial Chamber‘s finding...

...and seek justice. However, to open the Cause, Argentina had to resolve several preliminary issues: the characterization of the crimes, the prevalence of Spanish courts’ jurisdiction, and the possibility to prosecute the crimes according to domestic law. In this regard, Argentina stated that the facts constituted international crimes covered by the principle of universal jurisdiction. It established that no investigation was being carried out in Spain for the same facts or crimes; thus, other countries could prosecute those responsible. It explained the need for extraterritorial jurisdiction, referring to the obligations...

[Tomas Hamilton is an Assistant Professor in International Criminal Law at the University of Amsterdam. Marina Aksenova is an Assistant Professor in International and Comparative Criminal Law at IE University in Madrid.] In the ongoing civil suits in Mexico v Smith & Wesson & others and Mexico v Diamondback Shooting Sports Inc. et al, the Mexican government has brought claims against US gun manufacturers in Massachusetts and gun dealers in Arizona for extraterritorial harms suffered by the Mexican State in the context of cartel violence. The US district court judge...

...breakaway region of South Ossetia in August 2008 (More on the facts here). Even though the Court found numerous violations of human rights committed by Russia after the cessation of active hostilities and signing of a ceasefire agreement on 12 August (the right to life, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to property and housing rights, the right to liberty and the freedom of movement), the judgment has been criticised (e.g. here and here) due to the Court’s determination that Russian Federation did not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction during...

...for example, the difficulty in stretching the meaning of the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 1 to cover an extraterritorial State obligation to react to all war crimes, including those not derived from the Conventions. It exposes the issue with resorting to Article 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which lacks formal legal standing, to try to establish a State responsibility to react to atrocity crimes as violations of jus cogens norms. And it demonstrates the glaring absence of a multilateral convention on crimes against humanity, creating enormous gaps in...

...public ethic of that community. As Howse and Langille put it, “public morals” may be justified either as “instrumental regulation designed to counter certain social ills, or as expressive regulation designed to express or give force to intrinsic moral intuitions or shared values.” The fact that there is not universal concern for seal welfare, or that Canada and Norway do not share EU’s concerns, is irrelevant for WTO purposes. Second, the public moral concerns may derive from conduct that is wholly extraterritorial to the Member State. Under this reasoning, a...

...rule prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the rules on territorial integrity banning extraterritorial enforcement action, international human rights law (and its extraterritorial application, as required), among others. By contrast, the finding of a violation of the prohibition to use force seems much more likely to create the expectation of a harsher response, than the violation of any other international rule. When all we see is nails, we are likely to only use a hammer.  In sum, I suggest that the complex framework advocated in Prohibited Force...

...which it is not really dead-on, however, though sometimes referenced in relation to it. Reid is the question of the extraterritorial application of the US Constitution, and whether a civilian US citizen lawfully present on a US military base in time of peace, with a SOFA in operation (ie, 1950s Germany), is entitled to a regular US civilian trial with all Constitutional protections in a capital murder case rather than trial in military court under the UCMJ – answer, yes. But, if that’s Reid, what about a US citizen who...

...is the most obvious: pursuing criminal prosecutions or civil tort suits against contractors who commit abuses. With regard to criminal prosecution, our current system of enforcement is seriously flawed in a number of respects. To begin with, there are gaps in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), the primary law that gives U.S. courts the power to try contractors when they are accused of committing serious abuses. That statute does not clearly govern contractors who work for agencies other than the Defense Department, such as the State Department contractors involved...

...States.” The most important consequence of pure sovereignty is that it prohibits states from engaging in extraterritorial cyber-espionage. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 claims that because international law does not regulate such espionage in the physical realm, it does not regulate it in the cyber one. Most scholars take the same position. Russell Buchan and I, however, have argued precisely the opposite — that international law prohibits extraterritorial espionage in both the physical and cyber realms. We now have 55 more states that agree with us. The African Union’s communique is...