Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...policy began with the Bush Administration’s [Bush Sr.] decision in 1991-92 to judicialize the Pan Am 103 matter rather than to use force, in effect treating this Libyan act of terror like a domestic murder case, rather than the political-military attack that it was. Ruth remarks in her article that the Lockerbie trial chamber was organized under pressure of Security Council resolutions (SC Resolution 731 (1992) deploring Libya’s lack of cooperation with investigators, and SC Resolution 748 (1992) imposing sanctions on Libya): In response to the bombing, the Americans mobilized...

...and liberal internationalists alike have appealed selectively to historical events and ideas as well as to legal decisions and standards to construct their case for the weakness and irrelevance (non-existence?) versus strength and importance of the international legal system in international affairs. One example is regularly countered by another. Mary Ellen claims that the existence of sanctions alone shows that actors who matter take international rules seriously. I suspect that Jack and Eric would retort that sanctions are yet another justification that the powerful clothe in some-time principle to further...

...current concern, whether on academic topics close to my heart like Jus Post Bellum or newsworthy international law developments, including a post here on the relationship between sanctions and the 2013 deal with Iran, a post here on Bashir’s interest in coming to the 2013 General Assembly, and the East China Sea dispute available here. Each type of blogging brings its own rewards, and puts one in contact with different networks of academics, practitioners, journalists, and observers, from around the world. Blogging has also prompted me to follow subjects I’m...

...either had to seek changes to the tax code or face sanctions through the WTO system. The President (and Congress) chose to change the tax code. The cost of non-compliance—trade sanctions with potentially significant economic effects—outweighed the cost of compliance—some companies being upset. These are the “hard cases” when it comes to compliance with international law because the mode of reasoning and decision-making is not primarily legal, but political (or diplomatic). In this form of decision making, the question of compliance is driven by an analysis of power: which is...

...pressuring governments and corporations to cease military collaborations. Advocate for Trade Sanctions: Advocate for trade sanctions against Israel and all businesses that support Israel’s occupation. Pressure governments to implement these sanctions and target companies complicit in violating Palestinian rights. Suspend Israel from International Events: Campaign for the suspension of Israel from international sports and cultural events. Encourage cultural institutions and workers to boycott collaborations with Israeli entities to undermine the normalisation of apartheid. Boycott Israeli Academic Institutions: Advocate for a comprehensive boycott of Israeli academic institutions. Support Palestinian educators and students...

...the problem of WMD proliferation can be appropriately addressed by targeted “emergency” sanctions based on IEEPA authorities, how best to “multilateralize” these targeted sanctions, and whether the U.S. asset blocking program under E.O. 13382 raises Due Process concerns. Rather than attempt a critique, I’d simply like to highlight some aspects of these topics that I think could benefit from further thought. Professor Guymon concludes her post by noting that the executive’s ”judicious use” of E.O. 13382 adequately addresses any concern that an IEEPA national emergency might continue indefinitely. I would...

Jordan John: interesting, but I do not agree that he has immunity from a criminal sanctions process that involves custody, transfer, and prosecution before the ICC, especially since there is absolutely no immunity under any international criminal treaty for a head of state (e.g., Genocide Convention, art. IV; Geneva Conventions; CAT, arts. 1, 5-7 -- and the customary international law reflected in each) and Article 27(1)-(2) (which mirrors customary international law with respect to sanctions processes of international criminal tribunals) expressly denies immunity with respect to the ICC sanctions process....

...arrival of Ansar Dine/AQIM in Timbuktu; it was, Judge Mindua states, therefore allowed (Separate Opinion [58]). Amputation and flogging were, however, more problematic. They had not really applied in Mali [56] and, as Judge Mindua acknowledges, they appear as torture to many international lawyers [64]. Nevertheless, Judge Mindua points out, they are legal sanctions in states which belong to the United Nations.  As such, Judge Mindua will not state that these sanctions are necessarily illegal, even though he notes their incongruency with human rights and international law. He remains equivocal...

...president to now “dismantle” the deal in its entirety, the most significant international sanctions having been lifted by a binding resolution of the UN Security Council, a resolution all other veto bearing members of the Council remain committed to supporting. The United States could of course re-impose some or all of the national sanctions it had suspended in support of the deal. But at this point it is hard to see how the sanctions of any individual state, however powerful, would succeed in persuading Iran to abandon its decades old...

Don’t worry, this post is not about President Bush’s authority to exercise “unreviewable statutory authority” in the war on terrorism. Rather, it is about how President Bush does get to exercise “unreviewable statutory authority” in the administration of U.S. trade laws. Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Motion Systems v. Bush, a case challenging President Bush’s decision not to impose import sanctions on certain Chinese products despite an International Trade Commission decision supporting such sanctions. (The S.G.’s Brief opposing cert is here and the lower Court of Appeals...

...understandings, and derive from the morality of international behavior. The international community becomes most animated when it understands that a state’s activities amount to annexation, that they constitute territorial acquisition. Consider the following example: when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council immediately imposed sanctions. While the delegates from Canada and Zaire referenced the illegality of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the ten states that sponsored Resolution 661 repeatedly held that sanctions were a direct response to Iraqi aggression and the use of force. When, days later, Iraq...

...Law Much of my reflection revolves around critical questions to consider when engaging with the topic of double standards in international law. I acknowledge that much of my thinking was shaped by the rich discussions we had. Do ‘Double Standards’ Exist in International Law?  Absolutely, and countless examples highlight this issue. Intervention in Conflicts: Western leaders have been quick to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The international community has rallied robust support for Ukraine, including economic sanctions against Russia and significant military aid. However, this stands in stark contrast to...