Search: extraterritorial sanctions

– may well cause Canadians to rethink their reluctance to extraterritorially apply their own laws. But to my mind, extraterritorial lawsuits (i.e. transnational litigations) are problematic. In some ways, recent international legal scholarship has encouraged these suits. Sovereigntist/revisionist scholars have pushed internationalists to turn domestically with their sustained attack against international, multilateral instruments as a threat to American democratic sovereignty. On the other hand, internationalists have also turned away from traditional sources of international law and multilateralism, believing the traditional view that international lawmaking should be the sole business of...

only, committed in violation of the law of nations.” If the ATS does not sufficiently indicate extraterritorial application, certainly neither does § 78aa. And if the district court in Morrison “had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa” over claims involving extraterritorial activity—as the Supreme Court explicitly said it did—then the district court in Kiobel also should have “had jurisdiction under [the ATS]” over claims involving extraterritorial activity. Having decided, correctly in my view, that the conduct-regulating rule under the ATS comes from international law, the Court essentially painted itself into...

...a significant development in the interpretation and application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in rescue operations on the high seas. For the first time, a human rights body has affirmed that the relationship of dependency between persons in distress and States receiving calls for assistance is sufficient to trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction and consequent application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In this note, we will examine the claims of the complainant, the findings of the HRC, and will close by addressing the ramifications of the decision on human...

United States. “Extraterritorial Territory.” In some ATS cases, it is alleged that the unlawful conduct occurs abroad, but there is nonetheless a territorial nexus to the United States. Examples include conduct that occurs on U.S. territories, within U.S. embassies and consulates, on U.S. military bases located overseas, or on U.S.-flagged vessels or airlines. Obviously, not all of these activities will touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. But these are the kinds of questions that will be the subject of future litigation....

...essential to the federal courts having a constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over it. The court then held, The norms being applied under the ATS are international, not domestic, ones, derived from international law. As a result, the primary considerations underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality—the foreign relations difficulties and intrusions into the sovereignty of other nations likely to arise if we claim the authority to require persons in other countries to obey our laws—do not come into play. This is because, Judge Kleinfeld’s contention notwithstanding, we are not asserting an...

...very problem that Kiobel addressed, i.e., the extraterritorial reach of domestic law. While international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction is still only permissive and not mandatory. The duty, if there is one, for states to punish all international crimes (e.g., as suggested in the preamble to the ICC Statute) is a very weak one; the only clear duties are those in specific treaties like the Torture or Disappearances Conventions. So why assume that states will pass criminal statutes (even covering obvious international crimes) covering conduct by their...

...by the reviewer. Characterizing Murphy’s analysis of the evolution from blanket to smart sanctions as brilliant, Popovski fully agrees with the author’s conclusions and provides another argument in addition to his earlier proposal on the veto power elimination: the Security Council, liberated from veto, should impose mandatory sanctions upon states violators of international peace, security and human rights, to be implemented by the entire world, and to be robustly enforced by them. Again, this argument strikes us as a very logical and clear proposal, albeit implementing it in reality –...

...Evidence of our acceptance is the legal sanction. The community sanctions violations of law with coercive measures—unlike the way communities deal with social or moral violations. International law has and always had sanctions for law violation, which provide evidence of what the international community understands to be law. The Power and Purpose of International Law takes on this central myth about international law today: that it is not really law because it has no means of enforcement. The three chapters of Part I present the very real enforcement means of...

...in the CITES Handbook as doing (Bodansky 2010). They may bring disputes before international tribunals in an effort to develop a jurisprudence on a relevant issue. Treaties do still constrain states, contestation notwithstanding. Some actions are so far beyond what any state would consider compliant that sanctions (at least of the reputational variety) are predictable enough to provide a deterrent. Moreover, as states’ expectations as to what constitutes compliance coalesce around particular understandings, the instrumental sanctions that von Stein describes (pp. 479-483) will likely become relatively more effective at generating...

...of legitimacy and power are crucial: not as an ideal concept, not as a strict and defined notion, but rather, as the thermometer of how States consider their status, obligations and capacities in international law and their willingness to work alongside international organisations, especially in order to address security issues. This post examines State sovereignty in the context of post-9/11 counterterrorism and focuses both on the ability of international organisations to adopt and enforce counterterrorism measures and on the practical example of terrorist asset freezing sanctions. Terrorism challenges the sovereignty...

...economic and travel sanctions against the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and Phakiso Mochochoko, the Head of the Court’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division. The administration justified the sanctions on the basis that Bensouda and Mochochoko were engaging in the ‘politically motivated’ targeting of American soldiers who served in Afghanistan. The sanctions order called the investigation ‘unjust and illegitimate’ without elaborating as to either claim. However, an earlier Executive Order issued by Trump authorising the use of sanctions against ICC employees linked them to the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction over possible criminality...

...of the States in those countries where they apply? As a global company, we have binding legal obligations in the countries where we’re incorporated. That’s part of the fundamental reality of the internet – it’s a reality that, by and large, has served human rights well–although it’s a reality that’s also under great stress. For example, one particularly difficult example is our obligation, as a U.S. company, to comply with U.S. sanctions regulations (which vary by circumstance) in all the jurisdictions where we operate. Sanctions regulations applicable to Facebook, include...