Search: extraterritorial sanctions

only, committed in violation of the law of nations.” If the ATS does not sufficiently indicate extraterritorial application, certainly neither does § 78aa. And if the district court in Morrison “had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa” over claims involving extraterritorial activity—as the Supreme Court explicitly said it did—then the district court in Kiobel also should have “had jurisdiction under [the ATS]” over claims involving extraterritorial activity. Having decided, correctly in my view, that the conduct-regulating rule under the ATS comes from international law, the Court essentially painted itself into...

...now widely regarded as obsolete, as extraterritorial jurisdiction appears antinomic within a Westphalian international order essentially built on territorial sovereignty. The upshot, for present purposes, is that directly regulating production practices within Mercosur territory would expose the EU to significant legal and diplomatic friction. Notwithstanding international law’s prohibitive tendencies toward extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Union has developed alternative means of influencing actors operating overseas, colloquially known as the “Brussels Effect.” The term, coined by Prof. Anu Bradford, describes the EU’s capacity to externalise its regulatory standards beyond its borders through market-access...

– may well cause Canadians to rethink their reluctance to extraterritorially apply their own laws. But to my mind, extraterritorial lawsuits (i.e. transnational litigations) are problematic. In some ways, recent international legal scholarship has encouraged these suits. Sovereigntist/revisionist scholars have pushed internationalists to turn domestically with their sustained attack against international, multilateral instruments as a threat to American democratic sovereignty. On the other hand, internationalists have also turned away from traditional sources of international law and multilateralism, believing the traditional view that international lawmaking should be the sole business of...

...essential to the federal courts having a constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over it. The court then held, The norms being applied under the ATS are international, not domestic, ones, derived from international law. As a result, the primary considerations underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality—the foreign relations difficulties and intrusions into the sovereignty of other nations likely to arise if we claim the authority to require persons in other countries to obey our laws—do not come into play. This is because, Judge Kleinfeld’s contention notwithstanding, we are not asserting an...

United States. “Extraterritorial Territory.” In some ATS cases, it is alleged that the unlawful conduct occurs abroad, but there is nonetheless a territorial nexus to the United States. Examples include conduct that occurs on U.S. territories, within U.S. embassies and consulates, on U.S. military bases located overseas, or on U.S.-flagged vessels or airlines. Obviously, not all of these activities will touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. But these are the kinds of questions that will be the subject of future litigation....

...very problem that Kiobel addressed, i.e., the extraterritorial reach of domestic law. While international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction is still only permissive and not mandatory. The duty, if there is one, for states to punish all international crimes (e.g., as suggested in the preamble to the ICC Statute) is a very weak one; the only clear duties are those in specific treaties like the Torture or Disappearances Conventions. So why assume that states will pass criminal statutes (even covering obvious international crimes) covering conduct by their...

...principled deviation from peacetime standards. A final reflection on the scope of jus post bellum comes from a related body of work I am engaged in on UN sanctions. In assessing the Security Council’s peacebuilding activities through the guise of sanctions, I have been struck by the extent to which the Security Council is an important player in the jus post bellum field. Although the Council’s actions are discretionary, sometimes inconsistent, and are not applied in a regular way to like-cases, the Council has, nonetheless, been involved in some way,...

...a 2025 World Bank report, Syria’s economy has been severely damaged by 14 years of conflict and international sanctions, with GDP shrinking by more than 50 percent since 2010. Around 16.5 million Syrians need humanitarian assistance, and nearly 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, while about 60 percent suffers from food insecurity. Reconstruction costs are estimated at approximately $216 billion, nearly ten times Syria’s current annual GDP.  The most notable positive impact on economic prospects was the gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions. In May 2025, Donald...

...has monitored Malta’s investigation and is threatening more action if Malta’s investigation is compromised. In regards to Saudi Arabia and Russia, there have been mixed actions. For Saudi Arabia, the US enacted sanctions in response to the murder of Khashoggi and has threatened further action if Saudi Arabia does not pursue proper justice. There has been some concern whether Trump is doing enough, because many feel Trump has not taken a harsh enough tone against Saudi Arabia. The EU has called for more transparency and is threatening sanctions. Regarding the...

...and vague on modalities. In parallel, the UK‑France‑Germany trio (the E3) have triggered the UN “snapback” process to restore sanctions, with signals they could pause it if Iran restores full inspection access and re‑engages in U.S. nuclear talks. Meanwhile, Washington now characterizes the U.S. strikes as having degraded Iran’s capacity but likely only for “months,” even as it publicly presses for complete dismantlement of enrichment and reprocessing in Iran. Regionally, Iran’s retaliatory missile launch toward the U.S. Al Udeid base in Qatar (intercepted with no casualities) underscored the ease with...

The U.S. government announced a tough new set of economic sanctions on North Korea today, banning luxury goods believed to be favored by Kim Il Jung and his personal supporters. According to the AP, the banned goods include: “ipods, cognac, Rolex watches, cigarettes, artwork, expensive cars, Harley Davidson motorcycles or even personal watercraft, such as Jet Skis.” These new sanctions are actually imposed pursuant to a particular provision in the October U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing new sanctions after North Korea’s nuclear test. In theory, these sanctions are aimed at...

...such a resolution only holds political weight, and is not legally binding.  The US, UK, EU, Japan and Switzerland have resorted to imposing unilateral sanctions on a number of Russian oligarchs and Russian banks (removing them from SWIFT), as well as on the Russian Head of State, Vladimir Putin, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, however, not all states have imposed the same sanctions (with the UK’s imposition being particularly slow), the legality of such autonomous sanctions is debatable under international law, and also their effectiveness is not fully...