Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...the UN Charter. Given the clear conclusion in the 6 October 2006 Security Council Presidential Statement, expect the Council to at the very least impose some form of economic sanctions on North Korea. (The NYT reports that the Security Council will meet this morning to evaluate responses to the situation, and notes that the United States and Japan are already at work drafting a Chapter VII Security Council resolution.) North Korea has previously announced that the imposition of sanctions would be considered an “act of war” against the North, thus...

...waiver, Russia, China, and Cuba shared their COVID-19 vaccines with those who needed them. Last, Third World states deplore the grave human rights costs of economic sanctions (that special rapporteurs bemoan before the Human Rights Council). Half a million Iraqi children killed by sanctions may have been a price Madeleine Albright was willing to pay, but Third Worlders resent being repeatedly sacrificed at the alter of Pax Americana. Opposition to the sanctions regime is layered, nuanced, and principled; it is not a teenage grudge. Both past and ongoing brutalities are...

...the terms of, or practice, under the Charter. Perhaps most striking is the assertion that Chapter VII sanctions have never been applied to a non-proliferation crisis(p. 21), since most observers would likely view Security Council Resolution 687 (imposing economic sanctions on Iraq pending the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of WMD) as just that. And though the organization and writing of the paper are fairly clear, some parts are hard to follow, such as: “Key findings failures and breaches will oblige the board triggering sending the matter referral to the...

Peggy and I have both noted a subtle erosion in the Bush adminstration’s opposition to the ICC. See, for example, here and here. That erosion continued today, as President Bush announced that he was using his authority under Section 2007 of the American Servicemembers Protection Act to permit the U.S. to resume military aid to 21 countries who have refused to sign Article 98 agreements. The countries include Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Kenya, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Niger, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Serbia, South Africa, St....

...of the sanctions these individuals are likely to face – death, life imprisonment, and torture – is also likely to be higher than those imposed by an ICT. Thus, prosecution by an ICT will often serve as a weaker substitute, rather than a complement, to pre-existing sanctions. In one situation, however, the threat of ICT prosecution is likely to complement other possible sanctions and serve as a deterrent – where the perpetrator is unlikely to be subject to other sanctions because he is considered to be politically indispensable. But in...

Opinion here in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting . The Court green-lights state use of licensing laws as a tool of immigration enforcement, consistent with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. It also upheld Arizona’s imposition of the e-Verify system as a mandatory requirement on employers, where Congress had deemed the system voluntary. The decision is important in its own right: business licensing is a pretty significant tool with which to advance a restrictionist agenda. It will no doubt embolden anti-immigration activists to ramp up their efforts...

...14 October 2020, I filed final submissions to the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in the long-running Baltasar Garzón v. Spain case, which challenges the prosecution of a judge for his judicial decisions. As the Garzón case epitomizes a number of rule of law challenges of current global concern, including those in the Special Rapporteur’s report, this piece offers a few reflections on the correlation between the case and the report. The UN Special Rapporteur’s report makes clear that sanctions against judges take many forms. They may be civil, criminal...

...are now left with a situation where the big sanctions, oil and gas, are still on the table but because of the level of dependency, there is real hesitation, in, for example, Berlin, doing anything about this. Why? Because of, simply, worry that the German economy will take too much of a further hit. Of course, sanctions always hurt the other side, but they also hurt the sanctioning side. What I see in Berlin at the moment is a very weak Coalition, a three-party coalition, and an extraordinarily weak Chancellor....

...or terminate sanctions on Iran while Congress “reviews” the agreement. Congress may vote a resolution of disapproval, which would prevent the President from lifting or waiving sanctions, but it doesn’t say he can’t enter into the Agreement. But Congress may also simply do nothing (which is what it has done), which would also allow the President to lift the sanctions after 90 days. Nothing in the Act says the President can’t enter into the Agreement. It just says, once he does so, he has to disclose that agreement to Congress...

...balance between the maintenance of (i) international peace and (ii) international security (para.131), suggesting that Courts will play a role in the collective security going forward, particularly where fundamental rights are at stake. Despite the improvements in the listing / delisting process represented by the creation of the UN Office of the Ombudsperson, the Court decides that UN processes do not “provide to the person whose name is listed on the Sanctions Committee Consolidated List … [with] the guarantee of effective judicial protection.” (133) This decision may set a new...

...Syrian state, and called on Turkey to cease its unilateral military action and to withdraw its forces from Syrian territory. Additionally, they proposed or enacted a series of sanctions and restrictions. But these sanctions proved to be merely temporary as the international community reacted non-committally and the language used towards the perpetrator was not as severe as it might have been, e.g., to merely call on Turkey rather than demand as a matter of legal obligation. But the seriousness of rights violation is no less than what has been seen so far...

...the use of economic sanctions against states accused of human rights violations. But there are instances in which it is quite predictable—for example, the use of trade sanctions for violations of the GATT. It is not outcasting that makes the legal system unpredictable per se; it is the willingness or unwillingness of states to use the available sanctions to enforce the law. That, in turn, depends on a variety of factors—factors that can sometimes be at least partially addressed by better designed outcasting sanctions (in ways we begin to discuss...