Search: extraterritorial sanctions

...would make a difference given these circumstances. Can prosecutors avoid these constitutional protections by trying him in a foreign court? And then on the other side of the coin, why is a court in Montenegro prosecuting someone for a single murder that occurred in New York? I can hardly imagine that it is an international law violation, and if not, then on what grounds does a Montenegran criminal court have jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes of this sort? I’m not a criminal law expert, so perhaps others can help me out....

...Rights accepted that such extraterritorial control was established, both de jure and de facto, when the Italian authorities intercepted a boat on high seas, transferred the passengers to their own vessels, and returned them to Libya. The UN Human Rights Committee has further held that extraterritorial jurisdiction also exists when the vessel in distress is located within the SAR zone, for which a State has formally assumed responsibility to coordinate rescue operations (AS and others v. Malta). Extraterritorial jurisdiction can also arise when a State, without having formal competence, is...

...does not demand anything like the blanket rule in Hape. This is why prescriptive jurisdiction does not play a significant role in the U.S. and U.K. cases. The extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights is primarily an internal question, to be resolved by interpreting the relevant national instruments rather than by reference to international law. Of course, this is where the real problems begin. As Marko points out, there are many reasons why national courts are hesitant to extend rights extraterritorially. These reasons, however, are not external to the constitutional interpretation...

Raustiala’s book is about the scope of constitutional protections applied abroad. I did not find much in the book addressing whether the Constitution imposes limits on the extraterritorial exercise of federal power. Why is that? We have a robust and well-developed Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but we have precious little guidance as to the scope or even theory of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Can we say that there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative authority outside of our borders based on the Foreign Commerce Clause? I would think...

...assumption that “states cannot effectively ensure respect for their human rights obligations abroad unless constitutional rights also extend extraterritorially.” He questions this assumption, and suggests that some extraterritorial regulation of state agent conduct could be done for example by statute, rather than through constitutional means. This raises important and interesting questions of institutional competence and, as Pierre-Hugues indicates, “self-compliance” by states (which I consider briefly, e.g., p. 111). To a large extent, delineating the extraterritorial reach of domestic rights also defines the role of domestic courts in enforcing those rights...

is intended to apply extraterritorially unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise. Thus, on its face, the presumption appears to limit the reach of U.S. law abroad by setting a high threshold for applying statutes extraterritorially. Yet, the presumption does not categorically prohibit extraterritorial application. Rather, it acts as a procedural gatekeeping mechanism. Courts first determine whether the statutory text contains a “clear, affirmative indication” of extraterritorial intent. If no such language exists, the inquiry ends with the statute being confined to domestic application. However, if courts find that there is sufficient...

...if it is affirmed in the section on extraterritorial NIACs, the ICRC seems to include all kind of NIACs. It says "both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC". Don't you think that otherwise it would have said "...a legal basis for internment in extraterritorial NIAC"? Kevin Jon Heller No, because that statement comes in the section on extraterritorial NIAC -- and the section on traditional NIAC says nothing remotely similar....

...those risks—like the risks entailed in the very similar terrorism-related sanctions regime—are minimal. Professor Guymon argues that rather than dismissing nonproliferation sanctions based on their perceived lack of effect in achieving the desired change in behavior by proliferators, the United States and the international community must maintain nonproliferation sanctions because these sanctions protect the integrity of the national and global systems and actors within the jurisdictions imposing them. By distancing themselves from proliferators and their supporters, the United States, other countries, as well as voluntary private actors, seek to avoid...

in agreement that it’s “too early to impose sanctions on Iran.” AFP reports that Kofi Annan, meanwhile, has arrived in Iran to let the Iranians know that notwithstanding the clear language of resolution 1696, the UN Secretary General opposes sanctions and believes “patience is more effective.” Sadly, the Security Council’s inaction was rather predictable. Some days ago, the United States already began maneuvering to create an ad hoc coalition of countries that will impose economic sanctions on Iran. However, it’s difficult to believe these efforts will meet substantial success. Iran...

...final, full lifting of all multilateral and unilateral sanctions is set to occur on “Transition Day,” which is defined as 8 years from “Adoption Day,” or when the IAEA reports that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use, whichever is earlier. So the JCPOA envisions a full lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran within the next eight years at a maximum, with significant sanctions lifting to occur hopefully within the coming year. There are a number of important legal observations to make about the JCPOA text. I’ll...

of the challenges to UN lawmaking that became very apparent to me during my recent sabbatical study of UN sanctions is that the UN system doesn’t offer many ways to resolve ambiguities in interpretation and implementation. UN sanctions on North Korea, for example, ban luxury goods, but the resolution did not contain a definition of what a luxury good is. Some clarification was provided in a later Security Council resolution issues in March of 2013, some six years later, see this resolution, but this followed a long period of debate...

...court judge and law professor Winfried Hassemer: our response to deviation in society must be a humane one, so that the state’s manner of interacting with its citizens will stand as a beacon for citizens’ interactions among themselves and encourage humane public discourse. At any rate, demanding tougher sanctions does not answer the question of enforcement of those sanctions. The threat of a sanction alone is not enough; what is needed are officials who register infringements and pass them on to the competent authorities, who then punish them. It is...