Search: crossing lines

...and it is worth mentioning at the outset that it would have been very difficult to organise events in Turkish universities on certain ‘sensitive’ political issues. And yet, it is still worth asking what would happen if we tried to organise a two-day conference on the Question of Palestine in the UK, along the lines of the conference at Boğaziçi University, which addressed various topics including the occupation, resistance, apartheid, zionism, and the right of return. What institutional obstacles might arise, and could such an event even take place?  In...

In an excellent recent blog post at Just Security, Tom Dannenbaum identified four options for prosecuting Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine: [T]he International Criminal Court, an ad hoc international tribunal (whether along the lines proposed at Chatham House or pursuant to a General Assembly resolution), a domestic court exercising territorial jurisdiction (in Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine), or a domestic court exercising universal jurisdiction. All four options have their costs and benefits. The ICC would offer economy of scale, given that the Prosecutor has already initiated, at the request of 41...

...of aggression cannot be made valid by treaty. This agreement may draw lines on the map of de facto control, but it cannot make aggression legal. Under 41(2) of ARSIWA, “No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.” States cannot recognize Russian purported annexation without committing an internationally wrongful act themselves. It is too much to ask Russia to sign an agreement that has a full mea culpa clause, just...

...closure of cases) require further structural attention. Holding local hearings (e.g., Ntaganda) may facilitate visibility and access to victims, and foster the perception that ‘justice is seen to be done’. But it is not in itself sufficient to facilitate a structural dialogue locally. (ii) Challenging‘friend/enemy’ clusters Many trials suffer from the reproduction of binaries, and are perceived as obstacles to reconciliation, if they remain entrenched in ‘friend/enemy’ clusters, or associate crime or victimhood across pre-configured collective identities (e.g., ethnic lines). International criminal justice may reduce these frictions, if it pays...

...require UN Security Council authorisation, although at a minimum it will require UN or EU collaboration. With regards to the ICC and ad hoc tribunals, a suggested relational and jurisdictional structure would be to provide the ICC/ad hoc tribunal with jurisdiction over high-ranking military commanders and civilian superiors, with domestic courts supported to try lower-ranking perpetrators, along the lines of the relationship between the ICTY and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian courts, or the ICTR and Gacaca courts in Rwanda. Proceedings in human rights bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights or...

...20 of the concurring opinion of van den Wyngaert, J. The Prosecutor’s attempt to synthesize common principles from parallel lines of jurisprudence is therefore welcome; however, if it succeeds it will do so against the run of play. Nevertheless, such harmonization is arguably possible. The principles underlying perpetration by means were canvassed at the international level well before the ICC and ICTY existed, in the same body of sources that ground what is now termed JCE doctrine. Consider, for example, the first treaty provision on parties to offences, Article 6...

...application of Guyana to admit the case concerning the validity of the Arbitral Award of October 3rd, 1899 and the ensuing territorial dispute between itself and Venezuela over the Esequibo territory. How did the dispute arrive to the Court? This dispute dates back to the end of the 19th century when an arbitral tribunal decided that the demarcation between the British Guiana and Venezuela would be drawn along the lines of the Esequibo river. A few decades later, the personal correspondence of a diplomat who participated in the proceedings- as...

...to mount a global response to corruption. Symbols Posters, slogans, and other promotional material on International Anti-Corruption Day have featured a slogan or logo that takes up two lines. The first line reads “CORRUPTION” in capitalized red words, and underneath are the words “Your NO counts”. Most the second line is written in black text except for the word “NO” which is highlighted in red capital letters within a white speech bubble. The UN logo is also associated with promotions for this event. It features a projection of a world...

...Watts offers. However, I am not convinced that modifying the bright lines produced by the presumptions of the law of war in order to address the factual over-breath at the fringe is worth the cost of opening the door to altering the group based presumptions that define who may participate in hostilities. In my view, his argument is analogous to an argument that a police officer or a district attorney need not be advised of Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation because doing so is really just adherence to empty...

...‘[march] in lock step with the permanent members’. The most recent example of the Prosecutor and the ICC’s supporters’ cozy relationship with the Security Council, and its insidious effects, concerns the ongoing disputes regarding President Al-Bashir’s claim to Head of State immunity (debates that have become somewhat moot since his removal from office). Over the past decade academics have fiercely debated the status of President Al-Bashir’s immunity, and so when the issue finally came before the ICC Appeals Chamber in 2018 the Prosecutor was presented with a number of lines...

This morning the Supreme Court will hear Morse v. Frederick, a case about a high school student who held up a banner advocating “Bong Hits for Jesus” at a school function associated with the passing of the Olympic torch through Juneau, Alaska. The school principal, Deborah Morse, refused to allow Joseph Frederick to display the banner, and he was later disciplined for his conduct. Given that several of the justices are strongly committed to the principled use of comparative constitutionalism, I’m confident that something along the lines of the following...

...hatreds. Although the Ba’athist regime under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad presented itself as a guardian of minority rights, its consolidation of power was rooted in sectarian patronage, most notably through the advancement of the Alawite minority within Syria’s military and intelligence institutions. This approach sowed long-term mistrust and division, fracturing national identity along ethnic and religious lines. The last 13 years of revolution and civil war, along with atrocities committed by both the regime and non-state armed groups, have deepened sectarian divisions and exposed the fragile nature of Syrian national...