Search: crossing lines

...have to allow into your home in Germany, if asked?” I thought the Germans might have some practice under which “the postman” would enjoy entry at will, rather than the (correct answer) your landlord. So it looks pretty much a sham along the lines of the US naturalization exam, except that this one is multiple choice and requires a lower percentage of correct responses (50% v. 66% in the US). Obviously, you can pass the test without being German in any real sense. But easy as it seems to us,...

...and it is worth mentioning at the outset that it would have been very difficult to organise events in Turkish universities on certain ‘sensitive’ political issues. And yet, it is still worth asking what would happen if we tried to organise a two-day conference on the Question of Palestine in the UK, along the lines of the conference at Boğaziçi University, which addressed various topics including the occupation, resistance, apartheid, zionism, and the right of return. What institutional obstacles might arise, and could such an event even take place?  In...

...some observers that these deeper principles of criminal law are so embedded in domestic criminal law that domestic systems get them right, while the international law system runs the risk of ignoring them. True, I might have said something along these lines in Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, co-authored with George Fletcher back in 2005. However, one should not overstate the point. We are talking about deeper principles of criminal law – principles that ought to be deep and abstract enough to apply across all...

...the language of international law is used by both leaders. Putin’s argument plays on American fears and worries but it is framed in the rhetoric of international law. There are some scare lines, such as: “A strike would increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism.” There is a description of a “reeling” Afghanistan where “no one can say what will happen after international forces withdraw.” And, he adds, don’t forget the divisions in Iraq and Libya. It is not in “America’s long-term interest” to have U.S. military intervention...

...residents—as lawful self-defence against an armed attack, provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter and long established as a rule of customary international law. Blogposts have been written, Tweets have been published, and I suspect, a few insults have been exchanged.  Debate and disagreement are vital components of any academic discipline. As academics, we customarily position our own work in relation to the fault lines in existing scholarly debate, and we regularly ask our students to familiarise themselves with, and write about, key controversies in the subject area....

Here is the text of the speech by new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. There are a few good lines from the speech, such as the following: Member States need a dynamic and courageous Secretariat, not one that is passive and risk-averse. The time has come for a new day in relations between the Secretariat and Member States. The dark night of distrust and disrespect has lasted far too long. We can begin by saying what we mean, and meaning what we say. We cannot change everything at once. But we...

...evidence of the drones’ threat to bolster any attack it makes. On the other hand, is China overreacting to call those Japanese threats an “act of war”? I suppose that is technically true if one accepts that China’s drones are flying over Chinese airspace. Still, it is hard to imagine that downing a drone (where no one is hurt or killed) could have the same significance as downing a manned plane. I think Japan is trying to test China, and draw lines on matters that wouldn’t necessarily escalate into armed...

...time. This recent Appeals Chamber Judgment confirms that the Prosecutor must reconsider her decision on the Comoros’ referral, by 2 December 2019. These proceedings have exposed some troubling internal fault-lines within the ICC system, and tested the very rationale of the Rome-Statute as well as the limits of judicial over-reach.It is in this context that this post identifies three problematic aspects of the Appeal Chamber’s recent decision. 1. Internal Tug of War? Despite the questionable basis for enabling repeated re-litigation of the matter in light of the terms of the...

...1979 for the top-secret test of a new missile system. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army took South African Defense Force chief Constand Viljoen and his colleagues to the front lines, and Viljoen routinely flew visiting Israeli military advisors and embassy attachés to the battlefield in Angola where his troops were battling Angolan and Cuban forces. There was nuclear cooperation, too: South Africa provided Israel with yellowcake uranium while dozens of Israelis came to South Africa in 1984 with code names and cover stories to work on...

...aide, is now director general of the somewhat scary sounding World Nuclear Association). Bad idea? Maybe we’ve come around to a world in which Tom Franck’s then-daring proposition (elaborated here and in the memorable 1991 N.Y. Times op-ed, “Declare War? Congress Can’t”) doesn’t seem so outlandish any more. (Some hint here also along the lines of the Concert of Democracies.) I doubt we’ll hear too much from the Democratic ticket during the campaign about deferring to Turtle Bay, but perhaps we might see possibilities in this direction after inauguration day....

...sequester them and do not condemn them as prizes–is a wrong to those states.” Almost three decades later, Philip Jessup argued along the same lines that, even under the League of Nations system ostensibly requiring states to sanction aggressors, “While each member [of the League] may decide for itself regarding the necessity for its own action [in a particular case], it cannot object to other members exercising a like freedom of judgment[.]” Nor did the UN Charter, which assigns sanctioning authority to the UN Security Council but does not ex...

...status quo that pushes all belligerents back into compliance with the principle of non-use of force in international relations, particularly in settling territorial disputes, as expressed in Articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the UN Charter and Principle I, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV). The 2020 ceasefire agreement which put an end to the so-called Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in Azerbaijan recovering roughly seventy five percent of the territory previously detained by Armenia and the so-called Republic of Artsakh, saw the attribution of a Russian military contingent to guard the armistice lines laid out...