Search: crossing lines

...state that could lay claim to using internal Palestinian district lines as the basis of its borders.” Again, Judge Sebutinde simply embraces this line of argument (paras. 62, 72), and all four link this to the principle of uti possidetis juris (see Part Two). The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (adopted 14 May 1948; hereinafter Declaration of Independence), referencing the termination of the mandate over Eretz Israel (encompassing Mandatory Palestine), does indeed appear to lay claim over the whole territory, invoking natural and historic right and...

...that it would harm Israeli security to reveal what is certainly an embarrassing policy but one that has little to do with weapons or specialized defense systems. The court ordered the Defense Ministry to undo its redaction identifying the officials in charge of the policy and to release the “Red Lines” document purportedly used to calculate how much food should be permitted to enter Gaza under the policy in place from June 2007 to June 2010. Yesterday, we at Gisha received the un-redacted documents showing that approval by the most...

...possidetis juris would require a return to the borders specified in the Partition Plan, and not just to those established later on as armistice lines (the Green Line) after the “violent struggle” (Shalev) between Israel and its Arab neighbours (note the claim by Peter Schuller, p. 284, that the critical date for determining title to territory in this case would be 1947). Even if many UN resolutions suggest an end to the conflict based on the Green Line and are thus predicated on a return to the pre-1967 borders, the...

Justice Scalia’s passing comes as a shock and is generating tributes across ideological lines. Indeed, whether you agreed with his opinions or not (and I was not a fan of his thinking on cases like Sosa or Bond), Justice Scalia’s opinions deserved to be read. Lines like “never-say-never jurisprudence” and “oh-so-close-to-relevant cases” are some of my personal favorites. Readers should feel free to add their own in the comment section. In the meantime, I wanted to pay tribute to a side of Justice Scalia that has garnered relatively little attention...

...canned coffee to refresh visitors in the heat and humidity. On its front, the memorial showcases four lines, in English, pulled from the very last line of Pal’s nearly 250,000 word dissent. These four lines are engraved on a silver plaque. These, however, are not Pal’s words. They are the words of another. Pal had placed them in quotes in his dissent but also refrained from attributing them to their actual source, namely, the original speaker. The source of these words may come as a surprise. It did to me,...

...same time – not only UBL [Usama Bin Laden]” (as discussed on p. 334-335 of The 9/11 Commission Report and in Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack). In addition, the documents confirm the contents of CBS News’ Sept. 4, 2002 report “Plans For Iraq Attack Began on 9/11,” which quoted Rumsfeld’s notes as stating: “Go massive . . . Sweep it all up. Things related and not.” These lines were not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report or Woodward’s Plan of Attack, and to my knowledge, have not been independently confirmed...

The wide-ranging responses to Oona’s work are a testament to its ambition and importance. In the interest of keeping the discussion manageable, I’d like to offer two additional comments on Oona’s piece even though I could easily pursue a half dozen other lines of inquiry. First, I wanted to comment on the subtitle of the article—“The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States.” I wonder about the use of the term “lawmaking” here. Is it true that when we talk about treaties we’re always talking about...

...documenting Israel’s violations as manifested in testimonies from people on the ground as well as publications circulated by UN agencies, international organisations, and media outlets. Instead, the Chief Justice stressed how the government ‘improved’ the crossings’ infrastructure (paras 59, 66), ‘increased’ the hours the crossings operated (para 60), established a new crossing to ‘ease’ the transfer of aid to northern Gaza (para 63), and ‘opened’ additional crossings in other locations (para 64). All of these are cast as signs of Israel’s goodwill instead of measures that had been put in...

...include non-state actors is appropriate. Sunday’s operation was another example of state practice undertaken with the belief that the boundaries of the battlefield are not determined by geopolitical lines but rather by the location of participants in an armed conflict, whether the participants are states or non-state actors. This continues to be the standard for determining where the law of armed conflict is properly applied. The second and third sentences of this statement are correct, but they in no way follow from the first sentence. IHL applies to the operation...

...most people figure it would take them, from start to finish, building the centrifuges, encasing them in a plant, doing the cold test, running the hot test, running the cascades … it’s going to take about three years…. … I don’t think there’s that much disagreement anymore over those general time lines, but there is an earlier time line in which I believe, from a political perspective, the Iranians feel, in a relatively robust moment, they are witnessing a United States that is very much tied down in Iraq. And...

...allows. So the litigating lines, such as they are, are drawn. And the question remains, what detention power does IHL contemplate? More specifically, what detention power does the IHL of non-international armed conflict contemplate – for if there is any armed conflict within the meaning of international law between the United States and Al Qaeda, it is perforce a non-international one. As I wrote here last week, I believe the IHL of NIAC is effectively silent on the question of detention authority, leaving the question of detention authority to applicable...

...ATS cases are limited by federal courts? Along the lines of that conjecture, I recently published an article with the Georgetown Law Journal regarding the next wave of transnational human rights litigation in state and federal courts under state and foreign law. The upshot of that article was that if federal courts begin to close their doors as a matter of substantive and procedural federal law to ATS claims, then what will happen if those human rights cases seek out other law (state/foreign) and other courts (state/foreign)? This idea was...