Search: crossing lines

As I write these lines, the United States is fighting for the very soul of its democracy. Under dispute is whether their government can forcibly transfer a lawful resident – in this case a Latino with a tattoo – to a forced labour camp in El Salvador without any due process. For now, the US Supreme Court’s answer seems to be “no”, provided the Latino with a tattoo in question files a Habeas Corpus petition before deportation. The debate is raging on as US commentators decry just how limited this...

This post is part of our symposium on Dean Schiff Berman’s book Global Legal Pluralism. Other posts can be found in Related Posts below. This is a great book, and I am almost completely on board with the orientation here. Paul is right on the money in navigating between the territorial sovereigntists on the one hand and the cosmopolitan universalists on the other. The critique of the universalists is especially key insofar as it persuasively rebuts a standard sovereigntist fallacy (along the lines of, the sovereign state may be imperfect,...

...that theory United States v. Lopez might have come out differently because it was not “really disputed” in the Lopez case that the gun in question had crossed state lines. In Lopez, however, the defendant made a facial rather than an as-applied challenge to the statute and, more to the point, the government did not try to prove that the gun had crossed state lines. Indeed, the court of appeals in that case noted that “[c]onceivably, a conviction” under the statute “might be sustained if the government alleged and proved...

...Presiding Judge Tarfusser stated: “For all these reasons, the Chamber, by majority, hereby: Decides that the Prosecutor has failed to satisfy the burden of proof to the requisite standard as foreseen in Article 66 of the Rome Statute.” (Acquittal ruling, p. 4, lines 14-16) This statement is curious, as the burden of proof contained in article 66 concerns the threshold relevant to proving guilt, not whether the accused has a “case to answer.” Article 66 reads: 2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused....

[Arpita Goswami currently serves as an Assistant Editor to China Oceans Law Review, and is a Graduate Assistant at the South China Sea Institute, Xiamen University, P.R. China. The views expressed here are her own and have no connection whatsoever to the above mentioned organizations.] The recently concluded Bay of Bengal Maritime Arbitration Case between India and Bangladesh offers interesting insights into the application of the judicial pronouncements to the factual situation contemporaneous with it for determining the boundary lines and the usage of cartographic evidence in the same. This...

...as translated by Lambert and Rhodes. As a norm endorsed by the Athenian people, its main purpose was to “decide that the Samians shall be Athenians living under whatever constitution they wish” (Σαμίος Ἀθηναίος ἐ͂ναι, / πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλωνται, lines 12-13), letting them “use their own laws, being autonomous” in accordance with previous agreements. It is clear that the inscription ultimately translates a unilateral decision, favouring Athens and its interests. The Samians are only allowed to perform their rights and duties as the result of an act of...

...ducks the bigger issues of how in such cases is the decision-maker—in order to decide whether the case is one of persecution—to draw lines in sexual orientation or religious orientation or political orientation cases in which the factual scenario presupposes that on return the individual concerned will conceal or avoid or abstain from manifesting such orientation more publicly? Tobin rightly seeks to address such issues more squarely than H and P do, particularly in the context of discussing same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption. On these two issues, he appears concerned...

...things along the lines of perceived credibility, which was supposed to be the dependent variable. With respect to “substance,” I thought two quite different concepts (normativity and precision) were crammed together, and that a two axis chart might have been better were they forced to share the space. As to “organization,” I found the ordering contestable: why commitments to future negotiations should be scaled higher than one-time commitments lost me at first, and tended to make sense only if it was shown varying with substance. As to “autonomy,” this was...

...two multi-stakeholder organizations), 40 Dutch companies, over 400 chief sustainability officers of French companies, and 10,000 German companies.  State of Play in EU Institutions and Politics The Omnibus proposal has exposed significant rifts along familiar lines: The European Parliament’s center-left Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and Green parties want to preserve the CSDDD’s original purpose and scope, while the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), which formerly supported the CSDDD, now argues that deregulation will lower costs and shore up European competitiveness.  In Parliament, rapporteur Jörgen Warborn (EPP and chief negotiator of...

...under Art. 42 of the Charter. When that fails, it is not that large of a leap to imagine states claiming a collective but unilateral right to threaten or use force against climate rogue states. Even just establishing the putative validity of such acition will be considered important as a means of shaping rogue state behavior. Force would be seldom if ever used, just as it has been rarely used against nuclear rogue states—and if used, it would be surgical strikes along the lines of the Israeli Osirak action in...

...Security Council is unlikely to authorize any use of force against climate rogue states, not least because many of the permanent members are among the worst contributors to climate change. There will be calls for other avenues of approval, such as through the General Assembly, along the lines of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. But we may also predict that there will be increasing pressure to expand the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in the jus ad bellum regime, either by relaxing the conditions for self-defense,...

...recurrence of conflict can be avoided. For instance, one of the major stumbling blocks in the implementation of the Minsk agreements, was parties’ competing interpretation of the sequencing of local elections, with the central government claiming that such steps can only be undertaken following a full withdrawal of foreign forces, while Russia maintained that elections ought to be held without delay. Such avenues ought to include a clear alternative pathway out of a deadlock created by an inability to adhere to settlement timelines (‘fall-back mechanism’). While such timelines are critical...