Search: battlefield robots

...of self-defense would likely succeed in scenario two, but fail in scenario three. While this is a technical argument that would have little significance in an actual criminal case, it is important to note because it illustrates why individual self-defense on the battlefield is a limited authority. It will generally apply in only two situations – against someone trying to harm a person for motives not connected to the ongoing armed conflict or in non-international armed conflicts against members of organized armed groups or civilians taking a direct part in...

[Dr Chiara Redaelli is a research fellow at the University of Geneva, IHL and ICL expert with the International Development Law Organization Ukraine Office and co-editor in chief of the on the Use of Force and International Law] From Drug Boats to Battlefields? The United States’ Case for Using Force against Cartels Since early September 2025, the United States has carried out a series of lethal strikes against suspected drug-smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, publicly framed as a campaign against so-called “narco-terrorists.” The operations, announced by the Trump...

...artificial distinction that simply does not exist on the battlefield. Analytically, on the one hand, far from a civil war between a government and nonstate actors within the territory of a state, the Afghanistan war is the invasion of the territory of a state by another state – the cuts against calling it an armed conflict “not of an international character.” On the other hand, if you conceive of the war against Al Qaeda as a conflict separate from the conflict against Afghanistan, then because Al Qaeda is a nonstate...

[Dr Chiara Redaelli is a research fellow at the University of Geneva, IHL and ICL expert with the International Development Law Organization Ukraine Office and co-editor in chief of the on the Use of Force and International Law] From Drug Boats to Battlefields? The United States’ Classification of the “War on Drugs” In September 2025, the Trump administration began describing U.S. counter-narcotics operations in explicitly military terms. Lethal strikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific were framed as defensive actions against organized cartels posing an ongoing threat...

...soldiers in the field here, as they operate far away from civilians and under time pressure. But note the contrast with modifying several thousand pagers into explosive devices: instead of being prepared ad hoc, on the battlefield and under time pressure, the pager operation was geographically and temporally far removed from the actual fighting, with ample time to consider what objects to use, how they would be spread and the potential impact on civilians. It thus much more closely resembles mass production akin to what the Soviets supposedly did in...

...application on the battlefield than is generally understood. First, self-defence does not apply when a person is responding to a lawful act (eg, I cannot claim self-defence as a legal basis of for my use of force against a police officer who is exercising a lawful arrest). Second, and as a corollary to the first point, self-defence does not arise when military members are otherwise authorised by law to use force against another person. Where a State is engaged in an international armed conflict, a combatant is entitled to the...

...him for murder committed on the battlefield. All of this suggests that the modern classification scheme has lost the richness of these older conceptual categories. And we might have been too hasty in concluding that rebels can never enjoy the privilege of combatancy. In some situations it may be logically coherent to extend the privilege of combatancy to them during some non-international armed conflicts – and at the same time prosecute them for treason and other loyalty-based offenses if they have violated a pertinent duty or oath to their sovereign....

...could use to advance pacification and Vietnamization. Partially offsetting these gains were the allies’ own need to extend their forces over a new battlefield and the political damage the Nixon administration had suffered in the United States. Nevertheless, the advantages appeared to American officials in Saigon and Washington to outweigh the disadvantages. As 1970 ended, they were making plans for additional, even more ambitious, cross-border offensives. And now the Australian narrative, produced by the Australian War Memorial: At the end of April 1970 US and South Vietnamese troops were ordered...

[Michael Lewis is a Professor at Ohio Northern University’s Petit College of Law and a former F-14 pilot for the US Navy.] Peter Margulies’s recent posts here at Opinio Juris and over at Lawfare broadly covered the issues raised and discussed at the Boundaries of the Battlefield symposium recently hosted by the Asser Institute at the Hague. I just wanted to briefly discuss two issues raised at the conference that may warrant further discussion. The first involved complaints that the term “imminence” has been stretched beyond recognition by the Obama...

...to ease the pressure on the monopoly on the use of force and, subsequently, sovereignty. This is, unfortunately, highly unlikely as previously discussed and stated by key host states of PMCs. Sisyphean Task All in all, PMSCs and their patrons have the distinct advantage of being already established. At present, PMSCs seem to be a permanent fixture, making regaining sole state authority on all outsourced services unrealistic. Regulators have to fight against the status quo of quasi-unlimited freedom in the use of PMCs in and around the battlefield, a steep...

...robot soldiers and the ethical and legal questions posed by the (slowly) developing technology of battlefield robotics! It probably won’t take too long for people to notice that I am (roughly speaking) a conservative, in American terms and at least within academia, on many of these issues – a democratic sovereigntist is more accurate.  My skepticism about significant chunks of the international law program of liberal international global governance is more than just realist skepticism about ideals outstripping real world possibilities; I am interesting in defending and articulating a normative...

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning tools are already in use to help identify targets on the battlefield and they might soon power new types of cyber and autonomous weapons. These technologies could have profound implications for the role of humans in armed conflict and there will be important choices ahead. Among the most pressing – for compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and to retain a measure of humanity in warfare – will be to ensure human control and judgement in AI-enabled tasks and decisions that pose risks to...