Search: battlefield robots

[Michael Lewis is a Professor at Ohio Northern University’s Petit College of Law and a former F-14 pilot for the US Navy.] Peter Margulies’s recent posts here at Opinio Juris and over at Lawfare broadly covered the issues raised and discussed at the Boundaries of the Battlefield symposium recently hosted by the Asser Institute at the Hague. I just wanted to briefly discuss two issues raised at the conference that may warrant further discussion. The first involved complaints that the term “imminence” has been stretched beyond recognition by the Obama...

...referendum which, the Kremlin has asserted until now, prompted the region’s annexation from Ukraine. The head of Germany’s military intelligence says he fears its armed forces could be infiltrated by Islamist militants to obtain weapons training for use in fighting in Syria and Iraq for insurgent groups like Islamic State. Americas Colombia’s government and the leftist rebel movement have announced an agreement to remove landmines from the battlefield in a sign of progress in their two-year-old peace talks being held in Cuba. The United States has withdrawn a $3 million...

...Sufficiently Grave Over the past year, the world has witnessed a barrage of Russian cyber-attacks aimed at civilian targets, deployed at an unrelenting pace, and posing a persistent threat to civilians and critical infrastructure in Ukraine. As Russia fails to achieve its desired outcomes on the battlefield, the number and severity of cyber-attacks will continue to escalate. The ICC Prosecutor has a unique opportunity to bring a case that could set meaningful legal precedent and take an essential first step towards protecting civilians against 21st century threats during armed conflicts....

...the Rome Statute defines them as acts which “took place in the context of and were associated with an international armed conflict”. Associated suggests that the conduct is in relation to the conflict but not necessarily in the middle of the battlefield. As stated by the ICTY in the Kunarac case, “a violation of the laws or customs of war may therefore occur at a time when and in a place where no fighting is actually taking place”.  Some of the widely known elements to define the nexus requirement in Kunarac...

...war fighting justly. But suppose it isn’t possible. That’s what moral philosophers partly do – worry. What follows if it is not possible, or not a real possibility? What then? Well, the rules would have to be changed. We would have to reconsider the content of the rules jus in bello if we could not live within jus in bello and still have the just side win on the battlefield. ps. One general observation about the tenor of Professor Walzer’s (paraphrased) remark here. Just and Unjust Wars is taken in...

...rule over Gaza.”  As reflected in that statement, other statements made by the Israeli government, as well as Israel’s actions on the battlefield, the Israeli government’s desired destruction of Hamas includes the annihilation of its civilian political and administrative leadership. Expert legal commentary suggests that this goal—alongside the destruction of Hamas’s military personnel and law enforcement—can help demonstrate that Israel’s actions satisfy the intent requirement for genocide. While some have rightly argued that annihilating Hamas may be an impermissible defensive objective violating international law on the use of force, few...

...two decades, the United States has dramatically changed the way in which it projects its power overseas by outsourcing foreign affairs functions to an arguably unprecedented degree. At the high point of the combined conflicts Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Government had hired roughly 260,000 contractors—more contractors than troops—to do everything from support tasks, such as delivering meals to soldiers, cleaning their latrines, and maintaining battlefield weapons systems, to more combat-related functions, such as guarding bases, diplomats, and convoys. At times, contractors even conducted interrogations. And contractors continue to play...

...to self-defense. Despite or perhaps because of the minimal jurisprudence or guidance on the scope of individual or unit self-defense (hereinafter generically referred to as ‘self-defense’), it expanded to become an almost default use of force paradigm in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and also spread to cover significant uses of force “far from a hot battlefield.” According to military scholar Geoffrey Corn self-defense now accounts for “much of the force applied in current military operations” (p. 193). This has already presented a number of consequences. It has created significant...

...laws, for example. Secondly, we need international cooperation on the standards of regulation. We need a UN body – an international telecommunications union for AI or a body similar to that. We need a global standard setting body. Otherwise, what will happen is that in the commercial battlefield, the US and China will get involved in a battle to become the world market leader in AI. If we don’t have international standards, governments will develop the standard that is most beneficial to their industry sector and not most beneficial to...

...civil war in recent weeks, capturing one rebel stronghold after another and triumphantly planting the two-starred Syrian government flag amid shattered buildings and rubble-strewn streets. Despite global outrage over the use of chemical weapons, Assad’s government is successfully exploiting divisions among the opposition, dwindling foreign help for the rebel cause and significant local support, all linked to the same thing: discomfort with the Islamic extremists who have become a major part of the rebellion. The battlefield gains would strengthen the government’s hand in peace talks sought by the world community....

Noam Lubell and Nathan Derejko, both at the University of Essex, have posted “A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict” on SSRN. The essay will appear in the same Journal of International Criminal Justice symposium as my essay on signature strikes. Their abstract is all of one sentence, so here are the first couple of paragraphs: Defining the geographical scope of an armed conflict is a matter that carries weight in more ways than one. Outside the legal sphere the question might seem like one that...

...The Agency has about 40 unmanned aerial vehicles in its worldwide arsenal, about 30 of which are deployed in the Middle East and Africa. Most of these thingies are equipped with sophisticated surveillance gear. A few of them are modified to launch missiles. The Air Force owns many more “lethal” RPVs, but it uses them in the contiguous battlefield of Afghanistan. Wells points out at Lawfare that “if Ambinder is correct, then it is military personnel who do the drone-flying and the button-pushing, and military personnel can invoke a public...