Search: battlefield robots

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning tools are already in use to help identify targets on the battlefield and they might soon power new types of cyber and autonomous weapons. These technologies could have profound implications for the role of humans in armed conflict and there will be important choices ahead. Among the most pressing – for compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and to retain a measure of humanity in warfare – will be to ensure human control and judgement in AI-enabled tasks and decisions that pose risks to...

...this regard, it serves as a timely reminder that the Assad regime cannot be readmitted into the international community simply because it prevailed on the battlefield with the help of its allies, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. On the contrary, it should be held accountable for the atrocities that enabled its military triumph. This symbolism is important in light of recent moves by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Egypt to reintegrate the Assad regime into the Arab world (see here, here and here). Even the US recently...

...time, the Georgians have inflicted a wound on their own credibility if they indiscriminately shelled. In particular, this can be used as evidence (rightly or wrongly) that South Ossetians are likely to suffer human rights abuses at Russian hands and that a peaceful reunification is not politically possible. The current phase of the conflict over South Ossetia is not on the battlefield but in the arena of public opinion, in trying to shape perceptions that will in turn frame what will be viewed as a reasonable or unreasonable final settlement....

...demonisation of defence attorneys in the US who had the temerity to represent individuals accused of terrorism. Marc Thiessen, for example, (in)famously claimed that “[t]he habeas lawyers were not doing their constitutional duty to defend unpopular criminal defendants. They were using the federal courts as a tool to undermine our military’s ability to keep dangerous enemy combatants off the battlefield in a time of war.” Such despicable claims led to significant pushback from both progressives and (to their credit) many conservatives — and rightfully so. Yet now we witness the...

...to a $1.7 billion savings. So domestic detention is not only safe, it’s cheaper too. Obama also announced that although military commissions would remain an option for detainees who are captured on the battlefield in active theaters, for all others, Article III courts are the preferred option for terrorism prosecutions. There was little discussion of how to clear the political log jam that remains over the fate of Guantanamo, though the President said that he was “clear-eyed” about the challenges of achieving the result he wanted: “The politics of this...

...predicted by critics of the ICRC’s issuing of the “interpretive guidance”) of believing that if you repeat it often enough, you make it so, again that is not the US government’s view. State practice still matters.) Where? Does it matter that he was in Yemen, and not an “active battlefield” in a conventional hostilities sense?The US government does not accept the idea that the armed conflict with Al Qaeda — or armed conflict generally — is confined as a legal matter to some notion of “theatres of conflict” or “active...

...infamous meetings with Saddam took place here.) During the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. provided Iraq with billions of dollars of credit, helped it arrange to purchase the arms it needed for the war, and gave the Iraqi armed forces critical battlefield intelligence. The U.S. worked to prevent the U.N. from censoring Iraq for its use of chemical weapons against Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war, U.S. officials encouraged its allies — including Israel, which was willing — to provide Iraq with arms. After the Gulf War, the U.S. allowed Saddam to...

[Michael Lewis is a Professor at Ohio Northern University’s Petit College of Law and a former F-14 pilot for the US Navy.] Peter Margulies’s recent posts here at Opinio Juris and over at Lawfare broadly covered the issues raised and discussed at the Boundaries of the Battlefield symposium recently hosted by the Asser Institute at the Hague. I just wanted to briefly discuss two issues raised at the conference that may warrant further discussion. The first involved complaints that the term “imminence” has been stretched beyond recognition by the Obama...

...referendum which, the Kremlin has asserted until now, prompted the region’s annexation from Ukraine. The head of Germany’s military intelligence says he fears its armed forces could be infiltrated by Islamist militants to obtain weapons training for use in fighting in Syria and Iraq for insurgent groups like Islamic State. Americas Colombia’s government and the leftist rebel movement have announced an agreement to remove landmines from the battlefield in a sign of progress in their two-year-old peace talks being held in Cuba. The United States has withdrawn a $3 million...

...of self-defense would likely succeed in scenario two, but fail in scenario three. While this is a technical argument that would have little significance in an actual criminal case, it is important to note because it illustrates why individual self-defense on the battlefield is a limited authority. It will generally apply in only two situations – against someone trying to harm a person for motives not connected to the ongoing armed conflict or in non-international armed conflicts against members of organized armed groups or civilians taking a direct part in...

...militants for elimination, how Gospel generated building targets, and how “Where’s Daddy?” tracked individuals through phone surveillance to cue strikes on their homes. In parallel, the IDF has acknowledged the use of facial recognition tools from private vendors such as Google Photos and Corsight to identify suspects from low-quality feeds, acknowledging high error rates and misidentifications, including during hostage searches. These systems depend on continuous inflows of personal data. If humanitarian-site data collected by GHF feeds into the same targeting pipelines, the boundary between aid distribution and battlefield intelligence effectively...

...foreign policy costs of the legal policy (the legal case was made by Taft in a separate memo ) quite well. In the section addressing the costs of determining that the GC did not apply to combatants captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan he noted: It will reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general. It has a high cost in terms of negative...