Search: battlefield robots

...of Artificial Intelligence systems for targeting operations in Gaza by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has shocked many and reignited fears of a dystopian future of AI warfare. As the Guardian wrote on December 1, 2023, the IDF’s likely deployment of an AI platform in the current conflict, evocatively named the ‘Gospel’, “has significantly accelerated a lethal production line of targets that officials have compared to a target production ‘factory’”. The volume and character of such violence raises important questions about Israel’s increasingly criticized approach to battlefield targeting. It should also,...

...interpretations, and value judgments into their hardware, software, and user interfaces.” These embedded decisions shape how a tool will operate under battlefield conditions—and, more troublingly, whether it can be audited or constrained when it veers off course. If, as Rebecca Crootof and BJ Ard have suggested, technology “regulates through its ‘architecture’,” then the Code must shift upstream. It should impose obligations not merely on how technologies are used, but how they are conceived, developed, and trained throughout the lifecycle of a product or service. The existing text already offers a...

...this sense, possible interferences with privacy rights should also be part of the “legal review” Article 36 AP I requires for the introduction of new weapons, means, or methods of warfare. ERT could be considered as an equipment/system ‘used to facilitate military operations’ – i.e. a means of warfare, whose compatibility with ‘any […] rule of international law’ has to be verified. However, leaving aside these issues for a moment, other reasons could instead justify the deployment of ERT on the battlefield. As suggested by cinematographic advertising videos on advanced...

...version of this Hoover Institution article on the evolution of the debate over whether there is a “legal geography of war.” I extended it a bit to cover the latest twist in the debate, noted by Charlie Savage in his New York Times coverage. This is the internal debate between State and Defense lawyers over whether there is a legal notion of a “hot battlefield,” outside of which not even members of “associated forces,” such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that are belligerent with respect to the United...

...stake (say, protecting the interest of regional stability), and so long as the strikes were limited in scope and duration (i.e. less than “war”), all of these actions could be said to fall within the scope of Article II, whether defense of battlefield allies was among the expressly named interests or not. Yet there are at least three ways in which this ‘third party defense’ notion may be said to go beyond even the broad 2011 OLC conception of presidential power: (1) I am not aware of any previous practice...

...crafting and implementing AI strategies for battlefield use and beyond, and the ICRC is right to include AI and machine learning for use in armed conflict as a key challenge in our contemporary landscape. Those states that have published specific military AI strategies, such as France or the US, typically stress two aspects from the outset: first, that AI is set to change the way wars are fought in a significant manner, and second, that AI will yield tremendous benefits to military organisations across a range of domains, such that...

...as they are for local, tactical, battlefield use to shred opposing infantry) at villages with large concentrations of the wrong ethnicity, in order to drive them out. On the Abkhaz side, the Russians had supplied plenty of clandestine fighters. We met some of them staying in the Abhaz capital – they described themselves as ex-KGB, which is to say, they had gone out of formal government service and were being paid as private contractors, in dollars into foreign bank accounts. They called themselves defenders of the ethnic-Russian villages in Abkhazia,...

...the use of a missile fired from a drone in battle significantly different from a missile fired from a manned aircraft, or a helicopter, or some other place. Critics who call the practice extrajudicial execution, however, are frequently focused upon another scenario. The version of it analytically furthest from the hot battlefield scenario is a CIA directed drone missile strike upon a target in a compound far away from any theatre of active fighting, such as AfPak — someone in Yemen or Somalia, to take the obvious examples. From the...

...the legal basis for the use of force, rules of engagement, capitulation, parole and local cease fire agreements, civilians on the battlefield, war crimes investigation, negotiations with armed groups, the wearing of non-standard uniforms, and child soldiers on the battlefield. Judge advocates are critical and much relied upon members of the military commander’s staff, and move when and where their units move…. The enforcement of the Solomon Amendment is essential to supporting and maintaining the military, especially considering the “increasingly challenging recruiting environment” brought about by the Global War on...

...Europe’s strategic attention in recent history, the war in Ukraine is in danger of becoming a secondary concern. In this hour of volatility, it is essential that Western resolve does not waiver. Russia’s Renewed Assault on Ukraine On June 23rd, Russian forces launched drone and missile strikes on Kyiv, claiming at least ten lives and revealing plots to assassinate Zelensky. These developments underscore the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign of destabilization targeting Ukraine’s government and infrastructure. These attacks are not just battlefield maneuvers by Russia, they are strategic escalations designed to erode...

...“Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots,” the same weekend that the Defense Department issued a DOD Directive, “Autonomy in Weapons Systems.” We’ve talked about the HRW report here at OJ some – it is both a report and a set of recommendations calling for a multilateral treaty that would prohibit the “development, production, and use” of autonomous weapons systems. To judge by its reception in the international NGO community, it seems to be a call for the landmines ban campaign of the 1990s, redux. The DOD Directive, for its...

...security and counterterrorism, articulated the notion of a global NIAC when he stated “[t]here is nothing in international law that…prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.” When we look at this statement from the perspective of the consenting State rather than from the perspective of the attacking State, two things become obvious. The first is that the attacking State’s claims to IHL targeting authorities are...