Search: UNCLOS

...has nothing to gain from accession since the most of the Convention reflects customary international law; James Kraska argued that UNCLOS is a force multiplier for American power; and John Noyes defended the Convention’s regimes on fisheries, oil and gas, and seabed minerals, as promoting US interests. On the second day of our debate, introduced here by Julian, Jeremy Rabkin cautioned against accession because of the risk that compulsory arbitration might interpret treaty rules in ways contrary to US interests. Steven Groves partially agreed with the arguments in favor of...

This week on Opinio Juris, Julian Ku discussed how the announcement by two US Senators of their position against ratification of the UNCLOS, has effectively sunk ratification for this year, and argued that the next administration should seek out bilateral agreements to protect commercial exploitation of the seabed on the high seas. Deborah Pearlstein argued why the US, even if it is not at war with Yemen, is at war in Yemen, and discussed the legal consequences thereof. Kevin Jon Heller gave four reasons why the ICC should not get...

...In other posts, Kevin posted a must-see link to a report visualizing international criminal justice and recommended an article by one of his students on the Kapo trials . We also revisited our discussion of Samantar, with Ingrid Wuerth’s guest post on foreign official immunity, and of the Philippines-China UNCLOS arbitration, with a post by Julian who wasn’t convinced by Professor Stefan Talmon’s argument that all of the Philippines’ claims against China fall outside of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Julian also asked whether we should care about the upcoming hearings by...

...alleged crimes in Darfur, troubled by the seemingly politically laden relationship between the Court and the UN Security Council. Julian also called attention to China’s “position paper” released ahead of its December 15th filing deadline in the situation between China and the Philippines before the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal. He also pointed to his more in-depth analysis of why the Philippines arbitration is doomed to fail (spoiler alert: it’s due to a mistake by the Philippines in employing a “lawfare strategy” forcing China before the arbitral tribunal), notwithstanding Vietnam’s support of...

...of others under the pretext of ‘rule of law.’” With regard to the South China Sea issue, China reaffirms in the white paper its commitment to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but states that disputes over territories and maritime rights should be resolved through “respect[ing] historical facts and seek[ing] a peaceful solution through negotiation and consultation”. Interestingly, the document makes no reference to the infamous nine-dash line, though it does state that China has “indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and their adjacent waters”....

...the legality of the Chinese “nine-dash line”. I think this filing has much more political than legal significance. As a legal matter, I don’t think there is any procedure in the UNCLOS dispute settlement system for third-party interventions, so I think this is really just like sending a letter to the arbitral tribunal. It has no legal significance, and the tribunal has no obligation to consider it. But of course, it has the right to do so if it believes it is relevant to the dispute before it. On the...

...disputes. And since it has now spent months denouncing the Philippines arbitration as illegal and illegitimate in its domestic press and internationally, it will be even harder to accept any form of international dispute resolution in the future. This is why the Philippines’ effort to force China to accept arbitration now is doomed to fail and will probably backfire. The Philippines will be in no stronger position vis-à-vis China than it was before the arbitration, even if it wins an award. Meanwhile, the overall credibility and effectiveness of the UNCLOS...

...Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the SAR Convention. French and British authorities, therefore, have a duty to cooperate to prevent loss of life at sea and ensure completion of a search and rescue mission. While seeking accountability for failure to rescue or to cooperate under the Law of Sea is possible in theory, the regime remains fundamentally a State-centred one – with individuals generally deprived of locus standi before the dispute resolution measures under UNCLOS including the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Accountability gaps in such...

...of land-based mining are linked to the marine environment, too. The obligations under Part XII of the UNCLOS concerning the protection of the marine environment also become relevant. In this regard, article 194 directs states to take all measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from any source and ensure that such pollution arising from activities under their jurisdiction and control does not spread beyond areas over which states exercise sovereign rights. This is closely linked to the obligation of states under article 207 to adopt...

...to moderate Taiwan’s expansive South China Sea claims. In fact, her statement was usefully trumpeted by the Chinese government and media as a sign of cross-strait Chinese solidarity. I have never understood the Taiwanese government’s obsession with maintaining its expansive claims in the South China Sea. It is a waste of government resources to protect a fishing industry that doesn’t really deserve so much protection. I am particularly surprised that the current Taiwan president is acting so aggressively to protect Taiping Island’s status as an “island” under UNCLOS entitled to...

...to be an effective counter to China here for at least two reasons (one legal, one policy-based): 1) China has opted out of any “compulsory” system of international dispute resolution that would rule on its territorial claims in the South China Sea (or anywhere, for that matter). This “opt-out” is perfectly legal and may very well prevent the Philippines from even making their full case to the UNCLOS arbitration tribunal. There are no other legal institutions that have jurisdiction. So the only way “lawfare” can work here is if China...

This week on Opinio Juris, Kristen Boon followed up on her discussion last week about changes towards more transparency and fairness in the UN’s Al Qaida sanctions regime. Craig Allen contributed a guest post on the ITLOS’ interim order for the release by Ghana of Argentina’s ARA Libertad. UNCLOS was also central to Duncan Hollis’ post on China’s submission to the Continental Shelf Commission in relation to the dispute regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Peggy McGuinness congratulated Diane Amann, Leila Sadat and Patricia Sellers on their appointments as special advisor to...