Search: UNCLOS

...Annex VII of the UNCLOS. ITLOS can appoint members in case of a deadlock, but I don’t know if that happened here. In fact, ITLOS is a largely dormant institution (15 cases so far, in its entire 13 year history). The U.S., for instance, has opted out of the ITLOS for almost all disputes (assuming it eventually ratifies UNCLOS) in favor of the Annex VII arbitral process. This proceeding wasn’t even held at ITLOS’s chambers in Hamburg. Instead, it was administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration situated (where else?)...

...the relevant regime is international human rights law, complemented by the law of the sea, in which intentional lethal force is exceptional and tightly constrained, and distress at sea pulls strongly toward rescue and criminal process, including the duty to render assistance reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  (UNCLOS).  If, by contrast, an International Humanitarian Law (IHL) framework is established, the analysis shifts to the conduct of hostilities rules.  Law Applicable A State can describe an operation as a “war” and still lack an...

...perfunctory commitments such as “capacity-building”, “technical support” and “information sharing”, the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and the MA being major exceptions. The concept of CHM that forms the basis of benefit-sharing in these two instruments, however, has fallen out of favour. This is evident from the reluctance of major space-faring nations to ratify the MA, and more recently, from the departure of negotiations for an implementing agreement concerning the conservation of Biodiversity in areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) from a fully CHM-based model to a narrower “benefit...

...to the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels, all three fishing vessels were flagged to China, owned by Chinese companies, and commanded by Chinese nationals. Because the abuse occurred on the high seas, where no state exercises sovereignty, China as flag state holds exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over those vessels under Article 92(1) of UNCLOS. It also means that China holds the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the alleged forced labour on board, and bears the primary duty to protect the human rights of everyone aboard those vessels. However, no visible...

...of villages, rape and pillage.” The U.S. State Department filed a statement of interest opposing the litigation. By a 2-1 majority, the Ninth Circuit ruled, among other things, that (1) all of the plaintiffs’ claims, with the exception of the UNCLOS claim, assert jus cogens violations that are actionable under Sosa; (2) the UNCLOS claim, while not jus cogens, can provide the basis of an actionable ATCA claim given the widespread ratification of that treaty; (3) corporations can be vicariously liable for violations of jus cogens norms; (4) the State...

Interesting letter to the editor at the WSJ, defending China’s claim to the disputed island/shoal/reef in the South China Seas. It is a good preview of China’s international law argument as well as its view that UNCLOS is largely irrelevant to the dispute. To assert that China “invented” history is a result of ignorance of history. China acquired sovereignty over Huangyan Island through discovery of and presence on the island before anyone else. Hundreds of years of jurisdiction has consolidated China’s sovereignty over the island. Historic and legal evidences are...

...blockade, which was considered nearly extinct, has been resurrected as a crucial element in Russia’s strategy against Ukraine. The exercise of the “visit and search” right by Russia further complicates the situation, posing a threat for NATO members in the region like Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye.  According to Article 57 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), merchant ships passing through the exclusive economic zones shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles, or otherwise will find themselves in a dangerous position. This is because as...

...of state non-consent and lack of jurisdiction, I think it is unlikely to climb down from this position and accept the legitimacy of the UNCLOS arbitration. Which is why I find it hard to accept the theory put forth by the Philippines lead U.S. counsel, Paul Reichler, as to why China will ultimately accept the arbitral tribunal award in that dispute. In an interview in the WSJ, Reichler relies on the reputational damage China will suffer if it defies the arbitral tribunal and the advantages China would get out of...

...due diligence, the principle of prevention, the no-harm rule, the precautionary principle, international human rights and UNCLOS. However, custom is not only shaped through widespread State practice, but also requires opinio juris (the belief that such practice is legally obligatory). As the ICJ notoriously ruled, “not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of...

...relationship between a rising Chinese stake in the international legal system and respect for that system does not appear to be holding, as China leverages its geolegal sphere to carve out a maritime domain of non-compliance. There is thus no prospect of returning to an Asia-Pacific in which maritime order aligns with the rules set out in UNCLOS – previously signed or ratified by all states in the region, including China. Continued denial of the legality of this nascent order remains crucial, as it undoubtedly renders Chinese power less efficient,...

...Let us also not forget that denunciations are only effective for the future, and that all claims arising before the denunciation of the ICSID Convention and of corresponding BITs are still in theory arbitrable. Finally, we thank Prof. Treves for his suggestion to examine the extent to which the ‘prompt release’ procedure under Art. 292 of UNCLOS could be mirrored in international investment law. This sort of mechanism indeed would have several advantages such as, as mentioned by Prof. Treves, bringing the home state back in the picture. This would...

To have your event or announcement featured in next week’s post, please send a link and a brief description (1-2 paragraphs) to ojeventsandannouncements@gmail.com. Call for Applications ITLOS – Nippon Foundation Capacity Building and Training Programme 2025-2026: The ITLOS-Nippon Foundation Capacity-Building and Training Programme on Dispute Settlement under UNCLOS, July 2025 – March 2026, to be held at ITLOS (Hamburg, Germany), is welcoming applications until 6 March 2025. The programme is aimed at junior or mid-level government officials and researchers mainly from developing countries who are currently working on issues related to the law of the...