Search: Syria Insta-Symposium

Last month, Ashley Deeks claimed that France appeared “to be prepared to invoke the ‘unwilling or unable’ concept in the Syria context.” France did indeed attacks ISIS targets in Syria. And it reported those strikes to the Secretary-General of the UN, claiming self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter as a rationale for violating Syria’s sovereignty. But then something funny happened on the way to the Forum: France did not invoke the “unwilling or unable” theory. Here is its Art. 51 letter: Looks like the “broad consensus” in favour...

...a far stretch beyond the OLC Libya opinion, even if one is sympathetic to that opinion (as I am, in large part), because here there is no UNSCR, and thus the national interest is much weaker, and has far less historical precedent. Second, as I wrote here on OJ in 2013 (https://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/syria-insta-symposium-marty-lederman-part-constitution-charter-intersection/), the Charter and constitutional questions shouldn't be disaggregated: *Because* this operation would violate the Charter, I think it's difficult to argue that the President could do it without congressional authorization, because the President does not have an article...

intervention, the consensus remains that such action is illegal, and that the R2P doctrine, excercised through the SC, is the only legal way to pursue such action. This of course then falls foul of the veto problem. The aid and assistance in a civil war point is perhaps the most arguable of the points highlighted here. Dapo Akande's recent article over at EJIL Talk (http://www.ejiltalk.org/self-determination-and-the-syrian-conflict-recognition-of-syrian-opposition-as-sole-legitimate-representative-of-the-syrian-people-what-does-this-mean-and-what-implications-does-it-have/) gives a good in depth analysis of how this might work. As I did over there, I'd also recommend that readers have a look at...

...as such to forms of collective self-defense and a textually sound and policy-serving interpretation of UN Art. 2(4) in the special context of an ongoing civil war in Syria and significant outside recognition of the "rebels" as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people (so that use of force is not actually "against" the "territorial integrity" of Syria, "against" the "political independence" of the Syrian people, and is, on balance, serving of peace, security, self-determination of people, and human rights as well as use of force in the common interest....

...its citizens, and corporations to respect human rights and the rule of law, and to promote international agreements with other nations. It’s time to rebuild the legitimacy of international law, and to reclaim international law and its institutions as the primary methods for global governance. Unilateral domestic regulation, even when purporting to apply a “universal norm” undermines those efforts. These ideas are explored in more detail in a piece written for the Maryland Journal of International Law for the University of Maryland Law School’s Annual International and Comparative Law Symposium....

...of the ICJ. Driven by the same Security Council-spawned frustration, for the first time ever a majority of UN member states worked outside the council to establish unprecedented investigative mechanisms to advance individual criminal accountability in Syria and Myanmar. In December 2016, just a few weeks after Russia’s veto of a Security Council resolution that could have relieved the dreadful conditions in the besieged Syrian city of Aleppo, the UN General Assembly voted to create the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM).                                                   The mechanism was mandated to...

Cross-posted at Balkinization Because it’s too easy for our growing war in Syria to get lost amidst other also-pressing news, I want to be sure to note that last week ended with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee formally requesting the Trump Administration’s legal justification for a growing set of clashes between the U.S. military and armed forces allied with Syrian President Bashar Assad. The U.S. military has of course been engaged in anti-ISIL operations in Syria since 2014. But this recent violence – including the incident last week in which...

that such intervention would actually work. (Hence the scare quotes around “solution” above.) There is evident reason to question the value of external military force in Syria, for reasons explored here and here and here and here and here and here. Those analyses focus on UHI, not humanitarian intervention authorised by the General Assembly. But similar considerations apply as long as Russia remains devoted to Assad’s murderous regime. Indeed, Harold himself clearly recognizes that no durable solution is possible in Syria without Russia’s support (p. 460): To solve Syria, the...

...over whether Israel has claimed sovereignty, this response reflected confusion between belligerent occupation and sovereignty. If the US concern is instability in Syria, Israel can protect itself while occupying Golan as a belligerent, a status that obtains until Syria and Israel make peace. To continue as occupant, Israel does not need sovereignty. So the security issue has nothing to do with sovereignty. From the practical standpoint, Blinken’s answer is troubling, because Syria is likely to be unstable for some time. So his answer raises the prospect that the Administration may...

...current scenario, it has already been reported that the Kurdish administration in Syria contacted the WHO and is awaiting the delivery of testing kits. Moreover, after a recent visit to Gaza, the head of the WHO office for the occupied Palestinian territories identified the need to strengthen the capacities of the health system in order to address its shortages.  In Syria, in Gaza, and beyond, multi-party coordination will be essential to produce reliable information and to adopt timely measures that can help to slow down the spread of COVID-19. For...

States that do not have the veto, including those with rotational seats on the UNSC, have often urged the permanent members to refrain from vetoes in circumstances where grave international crimes are being committed. In addition, the General Assembly, the most representative UN organ, has sought more robust UNSC action when gross human rights violations are taking place. Probably the best example of this is the repeated efforts to secure referral of the Syria Situation to the ICC. Those measures, and other Syria-related resolutions, have been voted down on at...

[ Dr. Kubo Mačák is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom.] Donald Trump’s recent decision to withdraw all US troops from Syria, announced characteristically through a Twitter post, has once again brought the ongoing hostilities in the Middle Eastern country into international spotlight. More than seven years into the conflict, its origins in a series of peaceful protests during the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 seem now part of a distant past. Since then, the situation in Syria has undergone a number...