Search: Kiobel

...connection (as in universal jurisdiction). In other words, when Congress authorizes application of international law, it should be presumed to authorize application of all of international law, including the relevant international law of jurisdiction, which may contemplate extraterritoriality. This argument could prove attractive to the Court in Kiobel for a couple of reasons: (1) It would allow the Court to decide Kiobel consistently with Sosa and other pre-Morrison cases like Filartiga that have already endorsed, whether affirmatively or by implication, the application of the ATS to foreign conduct and harms....

[Adam N. Steinman is Professor of Law and Michael J. Zimmer Fellow at Seton Hall Law] Cross-posted at Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog This week the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Daimler AG v. Bauman (covered earlier here and here). Daimler resembles last Term’s Kiobel case, in that it involves claims against a foreign defendant (Daimler) for human rights and other violations committed abroad (in Argentina, during the “dirty war” of the 1970s and 1980s) under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). But the question for which the Court...

...rights violations. The post-Kiobel constraints on the ATS, and the conceptual confusion before Kiobel, thus do not themselves call for switching to criminal liability. Most obviously, civil liability may be viable in other venues, as seen in the other lawsuit against Shell, in the Dutch courts. Moreover, even if we think the conceptual problems in the ATS caselaw somehow doom civil liability, it is not clear how switching to the ICL model eliminates one serious problem with all efforts by home states to regulate corporations through national law — the...

Kiobel litigation. It wasn’t all about Kiobel this week though! Ken wrote about new scholarship, including some of his own, on law and ethics for autonomous weapons systems. Julian discussed reports that Japan is considering to take its dispute with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to the ICJ, and attracted a lot of comments with his argument that the US could legally bomb North Korea’s missile before it is deployed. In ICC news, Kevin wrote about comments by Fatou Bensouda about retroactivity when Palestine decides to ratify the Rome Statute...

...the companies aided and abetted human rights violations through their active involvement in purchasing cocoa from Ivory Coast. While aware of the child slavery problem, the companies offered financial and technical assistance to local farmers in a bid to guarantee the cheapest source of cocoa, the plaintiffs said. The arguments in favor of, and against, Supreme Court review are amply discussed by John Bellinger here. In essence, the corporate defendants argued that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2013 landmark ATS decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell....

State law or the domestic laws of [other] nations, but there may not be ATS Federal common law causes of action against corporations.” The general (but not unanimous) consensus at the conference seemed to be that Kiobel went badly for the petitioners, and that we should anticipate a 5-4 decision favoring the corporations. If so, then what would that post-Kiobel world look like? I asked that question of Paul Hoffman, who argued for Esther Kiobel before the Supreme Court on Tuesday, and he said in such a world human rights...

One of the most popular arguments made against the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell is essentially a policy argument: How could it be possible for Congress to have intended to allow corporations to immune from claims of serious international law violations while at the same time allowing individuals to be liable? This policy argument, I pointed out here, makes the respondents’ legal position in Kiobel singularly unattractive. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision, however, last week in Mohamed v. Palestinian Authority makes...

...civilly liable for violations, but leaves the question of corporate civil liability for damages to each individual State.  The Supreme Court initially agreed to review the issue of corporate liability in Kiobel.  However, after hearing oral argument, the Court directed that the case be reargued on the extraterritoriality issue.  It then decided Kiobel on that basis, without reaching the issue of whether corporations can be sued under the ATS. Since 2011, the Courts of Appeals of at least three circuits [here, here and here] have agreed with Judge Leval and...

...the Alien Tort Statute has extraterritorial reach needed to be resolved first, and sent the case back for re-argument the next term. That re-argued case eventually became the 2013 Kiobel decision sharply limiting the extraterritorial scope of lawsuits brought under the ATS to cases that “touch and concern” the territory of the U.S. The corporate liability issue was left fully argued and untouched. To be sure, since 2013, several other circuit courts have issued opinions on the corporate liability issue and all have split from the original Second Circuit Kiobel...

This week, there was no escaping the second oral argument in the Kiobel case that kicked off the US Supreme Court’s term on Monday. If you are not familiar with this case, it concerns the enigmatic Alien Tort Statute which, as part of the Judiciary Act 1789, holds that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” SCOTUSblog provides more background on the case here...

In the wake of U.S. Supreme Court’s cert grant in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Ninth Circuit has issued its second en banc opinion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, which it had earlier tried to avoid by referring the case to mediation. No wonder: yesterday’s opinion, which addressed multiple issues raised by the parties and at least one issue that the parties did not raise, reads like a virtual catalog of contested questions surrounding the interpretation and application of this 1789 provision from the First Judiciary Act. All this...

This week on Opinio Juris, the discussion of Kiobel continued with guest posts by Jordan Wells asking whether corporate liability is jurisdictional, and Anthony Colangelo arguing that Kiobel actually contradicts Morrison – the case on which it is supposedly based. Kevin asked whether the Al Shimari v. CACI case could be a model for post-Kiobel ATS cases. We also returned to last week‘s discussion of the decision by the Court of Appeals in Versailles on corporate liability for involvement in the construction of Jerusalem Light Rail, with an assessment of...