Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...reference to the work of other colleagues. But it is not difficult to think of other areas of application. Do international and domestic courts, when faced with competing jurisdiction, consider their authority as an endowment? How could this bear on the positive/negative construction of complementarity in the International Criminal Court? Following on the discussion of proportionality – how do decision-makers consider similar concepts under human rights law – e.g., if an offsetting consideration is phrased as a derogation, a limitation or in terms of proportionality? Does the availability bias skew...

...in the title of this piece. Indeed, it concerns the ICC complementarity principle which entails that states have priority in proceeding with cases within their jurisdiction, and a case is only admissible if a state is unwilling or unable to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. By analogy, if the international community as a whole is unable (due to the US veto) or unwilling (considering the blatant double-standard positions of Western States) to hold Israel to account for its ongoing CAH, where can the Palestinians recourse to seek...

...(SOAS, University of London), Professor Andrew Williams (University of Warwick, UK) and Dr Dominika Uckiewicz (Pilecki Institute, Warsaw). Such items to be addressed include: lessons learned from the limitations and barriers faced by the UNWCC; the legal treatment of questions of immunity in the work and trials under the UNWCC; the prosecution of international crimes under the UNWCC framework; the right to a fair trial in UNWCC practice; the UNWCC as an early example of complementarity. To register for this event, please click here. For further information, please contact amina.adanan@mu.ie....

...principle of complementarity by disregarding Kenya’s own national investigations. This legal critique of  violating the principle of non-intervention helped fuel broader political opposition, with the ICC increasingly depicted as an instrument of Western intervention disproportionately targeting African states. While a motion for mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute ultimately failed within the African Union, the populist reframing of the issue garnered significant domestic support. Formalist legal grievances, therefore, often drive and sustain populist resistance to international courts. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has been criticized for overfitting...

...states: “ICC rules prohibit it from prosecuting cases against a country that has a robust judicial system willing and able to prosecute war crimes of its personnel. Therefore, the ICC’s mandate should not supersede Israel’s robust judicial system, including its military justice system.” (emphasis added). The House letter contains similar language claiming that Israel and the US “are both able and willing to carry out investigations and prosecute offenders.” These assertions misstate the Rome Statute’s “complementarity” regime. The ICC does not cede jurisdiction simply because a country “has a robust...

...if it attributes al-Senussi’s lack of counsel to the “security situation,” therefore, PTC I has absolutely no reason to accept Libya’s assertions that it will be able to provide al-Senussi with counsel prior to trial. And that, of course, is the problem with PTC I’s new “at the time of the admissibility decision” test for complementarity, which I criticized in my previous post. Al-Senussi’s lack of counsel may not threaten his prosecution right now — but it eventually will. And that is true regardless of whether al-Senussi’s lack of counsel...

...ILC’s work as duplicative and redundant as crimes against humanity is already within the mandate of the ICC. Malaysia based its argument on the understanding that the member States of the Rome Statute have an obligation to domesticate the crimes in their jurisdictions in furtherance of the complementarity principle. Further, the replication of the definition of CAH from the Rome Statute to the Draft Articles was flagged as problematic. (pp. 43 – 44, 129, 2016 Verbatim Record) China questioned the relevance and need for a specialised convention and called out...

...of the Court”; (3) admissibility, which focuses on gravity and complementarity; and (4) interests of justice, whether the OTP should decline to proceed despite jurisdiction and admissibility. The OTP opened its investigation into the situation in Afghanistan in January 2007. Yet only now — nearly seven years later — has the OTP concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes were committed there. And what are those crimes? Here is a snippet from the report: 23. Killings: According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”),...

...International Law website: Ms Hélène Tigroudja on “Universal and regional systems of protection of human rights: harmonization, complementarity or fragmentation” (in English and French). The Audiovisual Library is also available as a podcast, which can be accessed through the preinstalled applications in Apple or Google devices, through Soundcloud or through the podcast application of your preference by searching “Audiovisual Library of International Law”. If you would like to post an announcement on Opinio Juris, please contact John Heieck at eventsandannouncements [at] gmail [dot] com with a one-paragraph description of your announcement...

...to make sueing corporations possible. The same is the case of international treaties. There are no such treaties, because powerful states, such as U.S. don't want their corporations to be sued for human rights violations. In short your argument is like saying that Gaddafi should be tried according to the Libyan law, which he dictated himself, stating that whatever he does or say is the law. Jordan Response... AND there are at least 20 Supreme Court cases that have ALREADY decided that corporations and companies can have duties and rights...

...is this: Since the National Transitional Council has been recognized as the legitimate government of Libya, does or does not this status imply the designated government is legally responsible for the disorder and atrocities around the country? There are numerous reports coming from the field pointing to crimes perpetrated by the "agents of new government" against civilians – such as murders, robberies, rapes, racist hate crimes (against blacks). Who gets the bill for all of those crimes? – now when Gaddafi is off the map of legal considerations. Thank you....

...does not claim the right to intervene when purely internal violence conforms to IHL or human rights law, but may intervene when it doesn't (see Libya, Kosovo, etc.). Is this evidence of some form customary international combatant or equivalent functional immunity for the state's leaders and armed forces engaged in purely internal armed violence? Do Gaddafi's ICC charges effectively indicate the removal of a functional immunity recognized by customary international law? Again, I am not making an argument here. I am thinking out loud and welcome your thoughts. Some have...