[This post is part of the
Third Harvard International Law Journal/Opinio Juris Symposium.]
I appreciate Professor Vázquez’s thoughtful response to my article,
Executing Foster v. Neilson:
The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties. Professor Vázquez is a brilliant scholar whose many writings on self-executing treaties have made a valuable and enduring contribution to the literature. As he acknowledges, he and I agree on many issues related to the self-execution debate. In this brief reply, I will focus on one area of disagreement: the correct interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in
Foster v. Neilson, decided in 1829.
Marshall stated clearly in
Foster that Article 8 of the 1819 treaty with Spain (the “Florida treaty”) required legislative implementation. What was the rationale supporting that conclusion? Professor Vázquez contends that Marshall applied the “intent-based approach” in
Foster. Under that approach, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties turns entirely on a treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast, I contend that Marshall applied the “two-step approach” in
Foster. Marshall’s conclusion rested partly on a treaty interpretation analysis (step one), and partly on an unarticulated assumption about the constitutional allocation of authority to dispose of property belonging to the United States (step two).