Although I was up at six, I think Julian must get up a lot earlier than I do, as he is regularly beats me to the punch on what's in the newspapers on drones. I will post something more once Philip Alston's report is out next Tuesday and I have had a chance to read the text. But here are a couple of comments per
Charlie Savage's exceedingly interesting NYT piece.
There are two ways of seeing a call for drone strikes to be turned over to the US military, rather than the CIA. One is fundamentally grounded in the binary that all uses of force must be
either law enforcement or else armed conflict - and if so, there is no room for the CIA to be conducting these strikes. In that case case, the call to take the CIA out of it is a way of reasserting the basic binary. This is problematic from the US standpoint, if it is a way of reasserting this fundamental binary, since the Legal Adviser's ASIL speech specifically preserves an independent ground of self-defense that is not a matter of armed conflict. If CIA participation is unlawful because the binary holds, then the US has simply rejected the underlying premise - indeed, said that it has never accepted it, going back clear to the 1980s and beyond.
The other way to see a call to take the CIA out of the activity is on the ground that because this is an armed conflict, uses of force must be undertaken by lawful participants, and the CIA, as a civilian agency, is not a lawful participant. Insofar as this is offered as something that is not driven by the fundamental binary above, then it is essentially a claim about the CIA not meeting the requirements lawfully to engage in hostilities - some version of the claim that the war with Al Qaeda is an armed conflict, and the CIA are not privileged combatants. This is a technically more complicated claim in the rules of war than much of the public discussion has treated it. Much of the public discussion seems to revolve around the idea that if you are a civilian, you are not allowed to take part in hostilities; the legal point, rather, is that there are numerous categories of civilians that have varying roles in direct participation in hostilities and the point is not to say that their participation is unlawful, it is that - if they were facing a lawful foe - they are themselves lawful targets. Whether they wear uniforms or not is a question of whether the circumstances in which they wear uniforms, or non-standard uniforms (e.g., special forces in Afghanistan), etc., is a question of whether they fail to distinguish themselves from the non-combatants. Insofar as they do this from Langely in some cubicle, that does not really present a problem.
As to the assertion that they have made themselves lawful targets - that would be true if engaged with a foe that could lawfully target anything. In the case of a terrorist group - Al Qaeda, the IRA, ETA, etc., the automatic assumption that military lawyers sometimes make, that jus ad bellum and jus in bello are independent, is beside the point; these groups have no reciprocal right to target anything, irrespective of whether, in a lawful conflict, something or someone would be a target. It is not the case that by flying a drone from Langley, the CIA operator is now a lawful target - he or she
would be if flying it in a conflict with, oh, North Korea, but not Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has no belligerency rights jus ad bellum, just as it has no combatant privilege jus in bello. To suggest that the CIA at Langley has put itself into an "equivalent" position is not correct. If the CIA at Langley were fighting a lawful actor, its participants would be lawful targets - although not, merely in virtue of not wearing uniforms inside Langley, "unlawful combatants." But not as regards Al Qaeda.
