There are lots of initial takes on the legality of the Syria strike. (I see, just now, a great compendium of short takes at
Just Security.) Some ask for a legal justification, and other experts are holding (for a bit) until one is proffered. As the posts below by Deborah Pearlstein and Julian Ku helpfully indicate, one thing to watch for is assumed or disputed equivalencies between the positions of the United States as it contemplated these questions in 2013 and as it now confronts them. Other unfolding differences, naturally, include the reactions of other states and of the U.S. Congress.
In addition, watch for explicit or implicit claims about the relationship between international law and U.S. domestic law. International lawyers are free to ignore the latter. Thus, for example,
Marko Milanovic (via EJIL:Talk!) concludes that the strike was “clearly illegal” under international law, but ventures no particular position on U.S. law. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the rest of the analysis, focusing on this one question is entirely proper, since a violation of international use of force principles does not depend on whether domestic law is satisfied (and it would be very bad if it did). Maybe, but only maybe, constitutional lawyers can reciprocate by ignoring international law. For example,
Jack Goldsmith (via Lawfare) largely does, though in his case it could be because he confines himself to looking at the issue of constitutionality through the lens of the Office of Legal Counsel’s
2011 Libya opinion, which did not even use the term “international law” at all. (It did define promoting the credibility and effectiveness of Security Council resolutions as part of the “national interest” inquiry, but that related only indirectly and partially to international law.) However, as indicated below, and unlike the international law perspective, this runs the risk of offering an incomplete analysis even as to the domestic law perspective.
For those opining about both international law and U.S. domestic law, the ground is treacherous. The safer course, usually, is simply to assume for purposes of discussion that the legal constraints are independent and potentially sufficient. Thus, for example,
John Bellinger (via Lawfare) states that legality under U.S. law is dependent on the scope of Article II, and that as a matter of international law, the United States was lacking “clear authority.” In contrast, however,
Marty Lederman (via Just Security) concludes that the United States is “probably” violating international law, and “therefore” violating U.S. law. Both have expertise and views that go far beyond these posts. But one thing that stands out is how they hedge on legality, relative at least to non-U.S. views. I don’t think that’s due to nationality. It also reflects complicating assumptions about the right analytical approach entailed by grappling with the two questions, as might too a more recent post by
Harold Koh (via Just Security).
