As I noted last week, I have just finished a long chapter critically assessing the work of the Human Rights Council-created International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (COI). My basic conclusion is that although the COI generally did an excellent job, particularly in terms of its fact-finding methodology, it seems clear that it was less interested in holding the rebels...
I honestly believed that the Libyan government couldn't make a public claim more ridiculous than the one about the Swatch with a hidden camera and GPS locator. Silly me for my lack of imagination! Mark Kersten, whose Justice in Conflict blog should be prominently featured in your newsreader, called my attention to this recent gem from the prosecutor in charge...
For you, dear reader, I risked life and limb to obtain the schematics of the video/GPS Swatch that the OPCD's interpreter used to undermine Libya's national security. After assuming deep cover, prowling some of the world's most dangerous locales, and making contact with too many shadowy characters to count, I finally succeeded. Here it is -- look at your own...
At Justice in Conflict, Mark Kersten calls attention to a recent motion filed by the Libyan government asking for more time -- read: stalling -- to reply to the OPCD's response to its admissibility challenge. The government doesn't actually want a deadline to respond; it would like to have 18 days from whenever it gets around to appointing a new...
In my previous post, I noted that Libya's admissibility challenge should fail regarding Saif Gaddafi because the government cannot demonstrate that it is able to obtain him from the Zintan militia that is holding him. It's now clear that the Libyan government has even less chance of obtaining al-Senussi: Mauritania's president has said former Libyan intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi must be...
In my earlier post on Libya's admissibility challenge, I explained how the Libyan government's failure to provide Saif with due process could be relevant to the admissibility of the case against him. There is, however, a far stronger argument against Libya's admissibility challenge, one that I've discussed before: namely, that Article 17(3) deems a case admissible if "the State is...
In my post on the detention of Melinda Taylor and her team, I mentioned that the "guard" planted by the Libyan government to spy on the OPCD's official meeting with Saif first intervened when Saif tried to sign a statement describing his attitude toward the Libyan criminal-justice system. I thought readers might be interested in the statement itself: Unsigned statement/sentiments from...
I have just uploaded a new essay to SSRN, entitled "The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya: A Critical Analysis." The essay is a chapter of a book on international commissions of inquiry that is being edited by the LSE's Jens Meierhenrich. Here is the introduction: This chapter provides a critical assessment of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, established...
Of all my writing, my article on the relationship between national due process and the Rome Statute's principle of complementarity is almost certainly the most unpopular. (Except in the OTP.) My thesis is a simple one: the failure of a national investigation or prosecution to live up to international standards of due process does not make a case admissible before...
The OPCD has filed its formal response to Libya's admissibility challenge. It's a monster of a brief -- 92 pages -- so it will take a number of posts to deal with it adequately. In this first post, I want to pull together the various sections of the brief that provide unprecedented detail concerning Melinda Taylor's detention. Before I do,...
Yesterday, Human Rights Watch released the report “Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face Justice”: Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor. It examines the conduct of Taylor’s trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the court’s efforts to make its proceedings accessible to affected communities, and perceptions and initial impact of the trial in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
The aim of the report is to draw lessons to promote the best possible trials of high-level suspects who are implicated in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It is based on interviews in The Hague, London, Washington, DC, New York, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, as well as review of expert commentary, trial transcripts, and daily reports produced by trial observers.
This post focuses on Human Rights Watch’s analysis of the trial’s conduct and lessons learned for future proceedings.
According to the Washington Post, Phakiso Mochochoko, the head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division in the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC, said the following in response to Stephen Rapp's recent comments about the potential criminal liability of the Rwandan government for its support of Bosco Ntaganda's M23 in the Congo (emphasis added): The International Criminal Court is...