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18 Oct

[Adam N. Steinman is Professor of Law and Michael J. Zimmer Fellow at Seton Hall Law] Cross-posted at Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog This week the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Daimler AG v. Bauman (covered earlier here and here). Daimler resembles last Term's Kiobel case, in that it involves claims against a foreign defendant (Daimler) for human rights and other violations committed abroad (in Argentina, during the "dirty war" of the 1970s and 1980s) under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). But the question for which the Court granted certiorari in Daimler involves personal jurisdiction and is not limited to ATS cases: "whether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum State." During the argument, plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that their ATS claims faced an "uphill struggle" in light of Kiobel, but they are also pursuing state law and foreign law claims – for which personal jurisdiction would remain a live issue. Given the question presented, the more significant SCOTUS precursor may be the 2011 Goodyear decision, not Kiobel. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg wrote in Goodyear that general jurisdiction over corporations is proper "when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." She cited (1) a corporation's principal place of business and (2) its state or country of incorporation as "paradigms" for general jurisdiction; but it remains unclear what else could render a corporation "essentially at home" in a particular forum. In particular, Goodyear acknowledged – but did not address – the argument that distinct corporate entities might be treated as a "single enterprise" for jurisdictional purposes. In Daimler, the Ninth Circuit found that California had general jurisdiction over Daimler based on the activities its American subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA (MBUSA). The most common reaction to this week's oral argument has been that the Justices were quite skeptical of the idea that Daimler was subject to general jurisdiction in California. That may be so, but several interesting issues came up during the argument, and there are still a number of different ways the Court could ultimately dispose of the case (some of them quite narrow). One topic of discussion was whether state law or federal law governed the extent to which MBUSA's contacts could be attributed to Daimler. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) –the basis for personal jurisdiction in this case – a California federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction if a California state court could exercise personal jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdictional restrictions in state long-arm statutes can confine federal courts as well. California's long-arm statute, however, extends as far as the 14th Amendment allows. It would seem, then, that personal jurisdiction ultimately hinges on the federal question of whether, on these facts, the 14th Amendment permits a state court to assert general jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the activities of its subsidiary. Questions by Justices Sotomayor and Alito suggested that this was indeed a federal issue. Justices Scalia and Breyer, however, inquired repeatedly about state law. One line of questioning by Justice Breyer suggested the view that, just as state corporations law defines when a parent company can be liable for a subsidiary's conduct, so too would state corporations law define when a parent can be subject to jurisdiction based on a subsidiary's activities. Another significant issue in Daimler is whether Daimler waived or forfeited certain arguments against personal jurisdiction.
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17 Oct

Your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world: Middle East The latest round of talks between Iran and world powers have concluded in Geneva, with Iran indicating a willingness to scale back uranium enrichment, as well as allowing for snap inspections of its nuclear sites as part of a new proposal to end a decade-long standoff...

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16 Oct

[Jens Iverson is a Researcher for the ‘Jus Post Bellum’ project at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, part of the Law Faculty of the University of Leiden.] The debate on the legality of a U.S. strike in Syrian territory is unlikely to produce consensus, in part because those involved in the debate take fundamentally different approaches to international law.  Unless the underlying commitments of each approach are brought to the foreground, contributors to the debate risk talking past each other.  As a result, an important opportunity will likely be lost. Prof. Harold Hongju  Koh, formerly of the U.S. State Department and now back at Yale, argued in favor of the potential legality of a U.S. strike in Syrian territory, as outlined by the U.S. government before the plan was placed on indefinite hold.  Prof. Carsten Stahn of Leiden University critiques Koh’s argument, ultimately supporting the bar on the use of armed force absent self-defense or U.N. Security Council authorization.  Koh then responded to Stahn and others, largely reiterating his earlier points, and Stahn provided a further rejoinder. I will not argue the merits of the debate, but rather highlight issues central to each scholar’s approach that merit further discussion by both sides.  Koh’s emphasis on the unacceptable results of a “rigid” approach is not likely to persuade a positivist focused on existing law.  Stahn’s exposition of possibilities and restrictions within the existing law may seem slightly beside the point for a reader who finds the likely results of restrictions on the (just) use of force intolerable. For the debate to continue productively, a good first step would be to candidly recognize the potential limitations of both positions.  Restrictions on the use of force, necessary to limit international armed conflict, may result in the commission of atrocity crimes that cannot be deterred by non-violent means.  Loosening restrictions on the use of force, even with the best of intentions, not only increases the potential frequency and intensity of armed conflict, but also may weaken the authority and function of international law more generally.  These are issues that should be tackled head-on, not minimized. I focus primarily on these blog posts by these two professors because I think they are exemplary in both senses of the word.  They are among the most well-argued pieces on the subject, and they demonstrate the strengths of their respective positions. Koh's Approach: Koh’s emphases—normative values, connecting law and policy, and a lawyer’s duty to play a leading and constructive role in interpreting law—are no accident.  They are a direct outgrowth of his long and fruitful engagement with the New Haven School of International Law.  In Koh’s 2007 evaluation of the New Haven School, he identifies a number of commitments the School has made, including normative values and connecting law and policy.  He emphasized that competing schools of international law such as those espousing a commitment to a “new sovereigntism” hold a depressing vision of international lawyers as yes men or scriveners, rather than architects, public servants, or simply “lawyers as leaders.”  In Koh’s 2001 An Uncommon Lawyer, he lovingly recalls examples of lawyers as “moral actors” who “guide the evolution of legal process with the application of fundamental values.”  In one of the most cited international law articles of all time, Koh’s 1997 Why Do Nations Obey International Law, he notes that the New Haven School “viewed international law as itself a decisionmaking process dedicated to a set of normative values” in contrast to “a set of rules promulgated by a pluralistic community of states, which creates the context that cabins a political decisionmaking process.”   (He also, notably, critiques past failures of the New Haven School and notes the critiques of others, demonstrating his own intellectual flexibility.)  In Koh’s 1995 A World Transformed, he recalls the 1974 founding of Yale Studies in World Public Order (which later became the Yale Journal of International Law) and recalls the demand for an evaluation of an ethical World Public Order, refreshed through the decades by scholars, including Koh himself.
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16 Oct

[Tomer Broude is Vice-Dean and Sylvan M. Cohen Chair in Law at the Faculty of Law and Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.]

Having set out general considerations and a research methodology framework for “Behavioral International Law" in previous posts, some readers might be wondering how this all cashes out for international law as a discipline?

In their path-breaking 1999 YJIL article on economic analysis of international law, Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman noted that “almost every international law research subject could be illuminated, to some degree, by these research methods” [referring to economic analysis]. With similar caveats, it is tempting to say something similar and related about behavioral analysis and international law. Behavioral international law is not a ‘theory of everything’. Neither is it a normative framework of analysis, as such. But properly constructed behavioral research selectively employing the methodologies I describe here can significantly increase our knowledge in all areas of international law, with respect to many problems and puzzles.

In my article, I developed three examples that cover the entire spectrum of levels of analysis as well as research methodologies. In all of them, a mere theoretical application is sufficient to stimulate discussion by posing alternative hypotheses and explanations, but if one is concerned with empirical accuracy, field studies and experimental work is necessary. Moreover, the examples – essentially three mini-articles - cover diverse areas of international law (treaty law, WTO dispute settlement and international humanitarian law). I will briefly summarize two examples. 

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15 Oct

China's U.N. Ambassador made a typically anodyne statement recently to the U.N. General Assembly on the Rule of Law at National and International Levels. But there are a few interesting nuggets worth noting that reflect China's skeptical attitude toward international adjudication. Anyone who follows the Chinese government's diplomatic statements will know that it repeatedly stresses the U.N. Charter's obligation on states to seek...

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14 Oct

[Faiza Patel is the Co-Director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law]

In the decade that I worked at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, few people outside the arms control community knew about my employer. Now, of course, everyone is talking about the OPCW as its inspectors undertake the difficult and dangerous task of monitoring the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to this previously low-profile outfit has only piqued interest further.

So what is the OPCW and what does it do?

The OPCW is an inter-governmental organization charged with making sure that countries comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. For the past 16 years it has been doing so without much fanfare. As the Nobel committee made clear, the OPCW’s contribution to world peace is based on this long record, not just for stepping up in Syria.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in 1997, is one of the most important achievements of the post-Cold War period. It is unique amongst arms control treaties because it bans not just the use, but also the stockpiling, of an entire category of weapons (In contrast, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the five permanent members of the Security Council to maintain nuclear arsenals, although they are meant to be working towards eliminating them.) Countries that join the treaty are required to declare any chemical weapons they hold, as well as related facilities, and to get rid of them under international supervision. They must also undertake to never develop a chemical weapons capacity.

Under the treaty, countries were required to destroy their chemical weapons by 2012. Substantial progress has been made towards this goal, with approximately 80 percent of chemical agent stockpiles destroyed. Unfortunately, the two major possessor states, the United States and the Russian Federation, have not yet finished. They are, however, slated to finish up over the next few years and most experts are confident that both countries will eventually fulfill this commitment.

In addition to monitoring the elimination of chemical weapons, the OPCW has important non-proliferation mandate that will continue even after all weapons stockpiles are gone. Facilities producing dual use chemicals – such as Thiodiglycol, which is used to make ink but can also be used to produce mustard gas – are periodically inspected to ensure that toxic substances are not diverted to weapons uses. Since 1997, the organization has undertaken some 1900 of these types of inspections. Of course this represents only a fraction of the industrial facilities that deal in chemicals that could be turned into weapons, but the fact that countries allow inspections increases confidence that they are committed to the goals of the treaty.

Despite this impressive record, the OPCW faces a number of challenges as it embarks on the Syrian mission.

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14 Oct

[Carsten Stahn is Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice at Leiden University and Programme Director of the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies. He is Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Leiden Journal of International Law, Executive Editor of the Criminal Law Forum and project leader of the Jus Post Bellum Project. An earlier post on this appears here.] Harold Koh and Daniel Bethlehem deserve credit for having launched this important and timely debate. Koh has formulated an excellent reply to critiques to his post which stands in the best tradition of debate over the prohibition of the use of force. As we all known, Article 2 (4) has been declared dead and rejuvenated too many times. It is thus legitimate to have struggles as to the proper way forward. I see merit in the need to map ‘current law onto modern reality’.  But I would argue that some of the underlying elements of his existing proposition of an ‘affirmative defence are rooted in tensions that are unlikely to be solved through discourse over the creation a new substantive exception to the prohibition of the use of force. A case-by-case assessment may be ultimately better than an abstract rule to accommodate the problems inherent in a formulation of a doctrine that has been controversial for centuries.  I would like to highlight three aspects that may require deeper reflection in the debate: (i) narratives regarding ‘progress’, (ii) the relationship between ‘threat of force’ and ‘use of force’, and (iii) the choice of the appropriate methodology for the way ahead.   1. Observational standpoints and narratives of progress Firstly, it is important to clarify observational standpoints. Koh presents change to the rule a ‘progress’ and adherence to it as stalemate. I have doubt whether the debate can be adequately addressed, let alone resolved, based on the dichotomy between a progress-adverse ‘absolutist’ view, represented by the illegal per se rule, and a modern ‘reformist ‘view’ which would argue that the rule is not ‘black and white’. It is an oversimplification to divide scholarly opinion into these two camps. Most international lawyers would acknowledge that the Charter is a ‘dynamic instrument’. It is a given, and not a point of controversy’ that it should be interpreted in light of its objectives and purposes. There are cases in which Art. 2 (IV) does not prohibit the use of force, such as intervention by invitation which raises difficult issues of the legitimacy consent in the context of civil war (as noted by Jordan Paust). The ICJ recognized in Nicaragua (Judgment, 27 June 1986, para. 175) that conventional and customary law on the use of force are not necessarily identical in content.  Even proponents of a strict interpretation of Article 2 (4) recognize ‘shades of grey’ and options for development. There may thus more agreement than divide. In my view, Koh takes a shortcut by criticizing international lawyers for having ‘become more comfortable stating rules than in figuring out how international law might help to push unfolding events towards the right resolution’. The roots of the controversy lie deeper. Koh’s position is based on a specific approach towards international law. His argument is based on the premise that international law is an instrument of problem-solving and a tool to facilitate decision-making processes over war and peace. This approach advocates different prerogatives than a more systemic vision of international law that regards norms and institutions as the centre of a normative system that protects collective interests and values and constrains behavior. This tension has been inherent in approaches to international law for decades. The main problem with Koh’s position is not so much the normative content of the proposition, i.e. the claim that use of force may in some circumstances be in the spirit of Charter principles and help ‘protect human rights. The fundamental difficulty of Koh’s argument is that it reduces the options for accountability of military action.  It shifts the balance from a centralized enforcement system to a decentralized system where nations become the arbiters over the legality of their claims to intervention. This causes fears and anxieties among many UN members. Koh’s plea for new abstract regulation would give formal recognition to the claim that the Council is an option à la carte than can be turned on and switched off in ‘hard cases’ where there is no agreement. Giving up this constraint weakens leverage for compliance and the need to justify choices of behavior before a collective forum, in circumstances in which international law is most important in debate. This is a position that many nations will be reluctant to sacrifice for the gain of greater clarity on the rule. One of the main dilemmas of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has been the question of ‘agency’, i.e. that action is carried out in the name of others. It has been inherent in humanitarianism since it its inception. R2P mitigated this dilemma through recourse to collective response schemes.  Koh’s suggested new rule turns a ‘blind eye’ to this. It fails to engage with the question how intervening nations could claim authority to speak for others/victims.  In the African Union, this dilemma has been mitigated by an institutional solution, i.e. consent under Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act which recognizes
‘the right of the Union to intervene in a member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.
Koh’s suggested norm does not address such institutional safeguards.  It simply uses institutional support as one optional parameter to support the claim for legality. He suggests that the claim for exemption from wrongfulness would be  ‘strenghtened’ if intervening nations could demonstrate ‘that the action was collective’. This may simply not be enough.
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13 Oct

Further to the topic of how the U.S. can/should combat terrorism without, as President Obama puts it, “keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing,” Marty Lederman and Mary DeRosa have a post up at Just Security highlighting the recent U.S. operations in Somalia and Libya as examples of what that future might look like. Among its features, a preference...

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13 Oct

One of the most distressing aspects of the admissibility decision in al-Senussi is PTC I's remarkable unwillingness to question Libya's strategic invocation of its precarious "security situation." As described by Libya, that situation really is magic -- somehow managing to prevent the Libyan government from doing anything to protect al-Senussi's rights without preventing the government from prosecuting al-Senussi. Consider the issue I...

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13 Oct

Events The Cassese Initiative is pleased to inform you about its coming workshop on the topic "Enforced Disappearance: Challenges to Accountability under International Law", which will be held at the European University Institute in Florence, on Friday 25 October 2013. Register here. From the organization: "Enforced disappearance remains one of the most heinous human rights violations. From the ‘political cleansing’ campaigns of...

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12 Oct

Pre-Trial Chamber I has granted Libya's challenge to the admissibility of the case against Abdullah al-Senussi. This is obviously a major win for the Libyan government, especially given that the very same PTC denied its admissibility challenge regarding Saif Gaddafi. There is much to like in the PTC's decision. It takes a very broad approach to the "same conduct" requirement with regard...

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12 Oct

This week on Opinio Juris, we had two guest posts from Tomer Broude, the first giving an introduction to behavioral law and the second discussing a methodological framework to behavioral law. Carsten Stahn also delivered a guest post on cautioning against a new affirmative defense to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, in response to argumentation put forth by Harold Koh's Just...

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