In association with the International Commission of Jurists

Recent Posts

11 Apr

[Gabor Rona  is a Visiting Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Armed Conflict Project at Cardozo Law School. Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum is an Assistant Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights, Cardozo School of Law.] “It’s not war. We haven’t gone to war against Syria.” These are the quoted words of former legal advisor of the U.S....

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10 Apr

In a comment to my earlier post on humanitarian intervention and natural rights, Adil Haque asks me the following question: Can States voluntarily make binding agreements that curtail their natural rights of legitimate defense for the sake of greater collective security? Here's my answer. The positive law can expand the natural right but cannot curtail it.  To explain my answer, let's think...

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08 Apr

Everyone seems to have lined up against humanitarian intervention this week.  I'm not sure if the proponents of intervention have changed their mind, or if they are keeping quiet, or if they never existed in the first place. Either way, I want to be clear -- if it isn't obvious already from my prior scholarship -- that I support a limited...

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07 Apr

There are lots of initial takes on the legality of the Syria strike.  (I see, just now, a great compendium of short takes at Just Security.)  Some ask for a legal justification, and other experts are holding (for a bit) until one is proffered.  As the posts below by Deborah Pearlstein and Julian Ku helpfully indicate, one thing to watch for is assumed or disputed equivalencies between the positions of the United States as it contemplated these questions in 2013 and as it now confronts them. Other unfolding differences, naturally, include the reactions of other states and of the U.S. Congress. In addition, watch for explicit or implicit claims about the relationship between international law and U.S. domestic law.  International lawyers are free to ignore the latter.  Thus, for example, Marko Milanovic (via EJIL:Talk!) concludes that the strike was “clearly illegal” under international law, but ventures no particular position on U.S. law.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with the rest of the analysis, focusing on this one question is entirely proper, since a violation of international use of force principles does not depend on whether domestic law is satisfied (and it would be very bad if it did).  Maybe, but only maybe, constitutional lawyers can reciprocate by ignoring international law.  For example, Jack Goldsmith (via Lawfare) largely does, though in his case it could be because he confines himself to looking at the issue of constitutionality through the lens of the Office of Legal Counsel’s 2011 Libya opinion, which did not even use the term “international law” at all.  (It did define promoting the credibility and effectiveness of Security Council resolutions as part of the “national interest” inquiry, but that related only indirectly and partially to international law.)  However, as indicated below, and unlike the international law perspective, this runs the risk of offering an incomplete analysis even as to the domestic law perspective. For those opining about both international law and U.S. domestic law, the ground is treacherous. The safer course, usually, is simply to assume for purposes of discussion that the legal constraints are independent and potentially sufficient.  Thus, for example, John Bellinger (via Lawfare) states that legality under U.S. law is dependent on the scope of Article II, and that as a matter of international law, the United States was lacking “clear authority.”  In contrast, however, Marty Lederman (via Just Security) concludes that the United States is “probably” violating international law, and “therefore” violating U.S. law.  Both have expertise and views that go far beyond these posts.  But one thing that stands out is how they hedge on legality, relative at least to non-U.S. views.  I don’t think that’s due to nationality.  It also reflects complicating assumptions about the right analytical approach entailed by grappling with the two questions, as might too a more recent post by Harold Koh (via Just Security).
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06 Apr

In 2013, there was I think broad agreement that the United States lacked any international law justification for the use of force against Syria following its initial use of chemical weapons: there was no UN Security Council resolution authorizing such force, and no assertion by the United States (or anyone else) that this was an action taken in national self-defense....

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05 Apr

Reports of another horrific use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria seems to have affected President Trump. In comments today, President Trump said the chemical attacks against civilians "crossed a lot of lines for me" and changed the way he views Syria and leader Bashar al-Assad. Although it is always hard to interpret the President's comments, he did cite his "flexibility" to change...

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05 Apr

My earlier Brexit post noted the emerging rigidity of the United Kingdom’s position that its Article 50 notice was irrevocable – not just politically, but to all appearances, also legally.  As the post noted, that evolution has taken place notwithstanding indications that the UK once perceived itself to have the liberty to withdraw that notice.  There are downsides to this new position, particularly if one thinks that Brexit is a bad idea and that history (and the British public) will come to judge it a mistake.  It has also not been well explained, and coverage of the decision has obscured whether the UK is politically or legally committed to this course. Still, the psychology is one familiar to international lawyers, in that the UK is asserting its sovereign authority to bind itself to the mast . . . just in this case, the mast may not be one sailing past a dangerous island and into oceans of multilateral commitment, but rather one that the UK is busy scuttling and directing toward Davy Jones' locker. The EU, however, is joining the UK in obscurity.  In a recent press release, the Commission asked and answered the question:
Once triggered, can Article 50 be revoked? It is up to the United Kingdom to trigger Article 50. But once triggered, it cannot be unilaterally reversed. Notification is a point of no return. Article 50 does not provide for the unilateral withdrawal of notification.
I do not think the irrevocability position is right, for reasons alluded to very briefly in the prior post, and persuasively elaborated in a timely paper by Aurel Sari that has since been brought to my attention. I want here to discuss narrower questions.  First, as with the UK, the EU’s present view is not necessarily the one it has previously had; second, however restrictive both their understandings, there is a potential, meaningful difference, since the EU view is not exactly one of irrevocability.
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05 Apr

The Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review has just published a special issue on the Nuremberg trials. It contains many excellent contributions, including articles by Hilary Earl, David Fraser, Greg Gordon, and Jonathan Bush. I have also contributed a short chapter, entitled "Taking a Consenting Part: The Lost Mode of Participation," which discusses a mode of participation developed by the NMTs...

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03 Apr

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of Jesner v. Arab Bank in order to resolve a single issue: “[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability.” This post will briefly review the case and offer a quick assessment of the ATS corporate liability issue.  Longtime readers will not be surprised to...

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03 Apr

[Daragh Murray is a Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre.] Thanks to Kevin for his post engaging with some of the issues discussed in my recent article on detention authority in non-international armed conflict. I would like to take this opportunity to provide a quick overview of my argument as relevant to this post,...

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