Author Archive for
Kristen Boon

Supreme Court Decision Rendered in Dutchbat Case: the Netherlands Responsible

by Kristen Boon

In a hotly anticipated decision, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands affirmed today that the Dutch State is responsible for the deaths of three men at Srebrenica. As the press release recounts, “The men had sought refuge in the compound of the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat). Dutchbat decided not to evacuate them along with the battalion and instead sent them away from the compound on 13 July 1995.” Outside the compound they were murdered by the Bosnian-Serb army or related paramilitary groups.

The decision (in english) is available here, and cites both the 2002 Articles on State Responsibility and the 2011 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, and provides a detailed analysis of attribution doctrines in peacekeeping situations.

On the substance, the decision upholds the Court of Appeal’s finding that the Dutch state exercised “effective control” over Dutchbat pursuant to Art. 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which it defines as “factual control over specific conduct.”  (Para. 3.11.3)  Although the decision cites the commentary to Articles on the Responsibility of IOs for this test, the wording originates from the monumental Nicaragua decision.  Moreover, confirming that Art. 7 of the Articles on the Responsibility of IOs applies (as opposed to Art. 6), the Court found that this was a situation where a State, here the Netherlands, placed troops at the disposal of a UN peace mission, and while command and control were transferred to the UN, disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction reman vested in the seconding State. (Para. 3.10.2). The court also finds that international law permits the possibility of dual attribution, potentially leading to shared responsibility.  As a result, “the Court of Appeal was able to leave open whether the UN had effective control over Dutchbat’s conduct in the early evening of 13 July 1995.”  Interestingly, this aspect of the decision does not follow a May 2013 advisory opinion by the Procurator General, analyzed by Andre Nollkaemper here.

On the question of wrongfulness, which is determined by the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals reasoning, adding that if it accepted the State’s argument for judicial restraint, there would be virtually no scope for the courts to assess the conduct of a troop contingent in the context of a peace mission.

I am sure I will have more to add as I parse this rich decision, but for now, a good day for international law in domestic courts.

New Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Report Out

by Kristen Boon

The United Nations Secretary General’s fifth Report on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was released last week.  This Report is titled “State Responsibility and Prevention” and focuses generally on governance mechanisms and early warning.  It also mentions the situation in Syria, stating that “[r]ecent events, including in the Syrian Arab Republic, underline the vital importance of early action to prevent atrocity crimes and the terrible consequences when prevention fails.”

On the whole, the Report is consistent with prior work, but doesn’t contain much that is new.    The Report focuses in large part on governance, and includes the following points:

  • There is an overlap between risk factors related to armed conflict and atrocity crimes
  • “Genocides [The Holocaust and in Rwanda] started with hate speech, discrimination and marginalization.”
  • Constitutions are mechanisms for creating societies based on non-discrimination
  • Transitional justice mechanisms and security sector reform are important

The Report ends with a call to all countries to:

“ (a) Appoint a senior-level focal point with atrocity prevention responsibilities and adequate resources or establish other national mechanisms to implement this mandate; (b) Conduct a national assessment of risk and resilience, using the analysis framework on the prevention of genocide developed by my Special Adviser, as appropriate, the risk factors outlined in the present report and tools developed by civil society. The review should be system-wide and should include the identification of vulnerable populations and an assessment of existing structures for resilience. Civil society should be included in the review process; (c) Sign, ratify and implement relevant international legal instruments;  (d) Engage with and support other Member States and regional or subregional arrangements to share experiences and enhance cooperation to promote the effective use of resources; (e) Participate in peer review processes, including the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council, as well as regional peer review processes and other options for monitoring the effectiveness of measures taken; (f) Identify and form partnerships with other Member States, regional and subregional arrangements or civil society for technical assistance and capacity- building purposes, exchange of lessons learned and mobilization of resources; (g) Participate in international, regional and national discussions on the further advancement of the responsibility to protect and its implementation.”

What is perhaps more interesting is what the Report does not say:

  • it does not mention Libya, which continues to be the real hot button precedent on R2P
  • it does not mention military intervention, or the role of the Security Council
  • it does not mention extraterritorial obligations of states
  • it does not mention the ICC
  • it does not mention new technology

On the latter two points, see this July 2013 Report on R2P by Madeleine Albright and Richard Williamson.

The Secretary General has recently appointed a new Special Representative on the Responsibility to Protect – Professor Jennifer Welsh of Canada –  who has written widely on R2P and is currently a Professor at Oxford University.    Hopefully, her appointment will bring new momentum to the campaign.

Many will no doubt be disappointed with the Report.  With the ongoing situation in Syria, and renewed instability in Egypt, this would have been an opportune moment for the UN to move the debate forward on R2P, an opportunity it did not seize in this latest contribution.

The ECJ’s New Appeal Judgment on Kadi

by Kristen Boon

Last week, the ECJ handed down its judgment on the Yassin Abdullah Kadi appeal, marking the end of a decade long legal battle involving the Security Council’s consolidated anti-terrorism lists, and their implementation in the EU.

The decision is available here.   As I noted in a post last fall, Kadi was delisted by the UN Ombudsperson in October of 2012, and so this judgment does not affect his status.

Instead, this appeal against the ECJ’s decision in Kadi II raises the issues of effective judicial protection and standard of judicial review.  In an earlier decision, the ECJ had already established that “Courts of the European Union … ensure review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Union acts … including review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security Council.” (Para. 97)  These rights include respect for the rights of the defense and the right to effective judicial protection.

What is notable about this latest decision is that:

  • The Court finds that judicial review is indispensable to ensure a fair balance between the maintenance of (i) international peace and (ii) international security (para.131), suggesting that Courts will play a role in the collective security going forward, particularly where fundamental rights are at stake.
  • Despite the improvements in the listing / delisting process represented by the creation of the UN Office of the Ombudsperson, the Court decides that UN processes do not “provide to the person whose name is listed on the Sanctions Committee Consolidated List … [with] the guarantee of effective judicial protection.” (133)
  • This decision may set a new standard for the review of Security Council acts in other fields.

Another notable aspect of the judgment is its emphasis on a high level of procedural and substantive review.  The ECJ stated that: (more…)

Syria and New Scholarship in International Law

by Kristen Boon

The many tragedies that have unfolded in Syria and particularly, the failure of the international community to intervene in a prompt manner, have led to a series of new analyses on the scope and application of certain doctrines in international law.

Take for example, the argument made by Laurie Blank and Geoffry Corn, in their forthcoming Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Article “Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition” that the “elements” approach used in determining the existence of an armed conflict delayed the application of IHL in Syria by at least fifteen months, until the ICRC concluded a non-international armed conflict existed in July, 2012.

The upshot, according to the authors, was that the main goals of IHL were compromised because of an overly legalistic approach to determining the nature of the conflict.

Similarly, there was an interesting post on the IPI’s Global Observatory by Jérémie Labbé and Tilman Rodenhauser  that cross-border humanitarian assistance in rebel controlled areas should be permissible regardless of Syria’s consent, because Syria does not effectively control those areas.    Drawing on Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which permits humanitarian agencies to offer their services in times of conflict, the authors argue that:

A progressive interpretation of international humanitarian law does not consider state consent as a strict legal requirement for the delivery of humanitarian relief into territories that are not under state control. Therefore, states willing to support organizations that engage in cross-border humanitarian relief into opposition-held territory in Syria could make a sound—if arguably quite progressive—legal argument in support of their position.

Information on the humanitarian response to the conflict is available here.

Stephan Talmon’s new article in the Chinese Journal of International Law broaches the important issue of recognition of opposition forces in Syria.  He writes:

State practice in the cases of Libya and Syria shows that for an opposition group to be recognized as the legitimate representative of a people constituting a State, four criteria must be fulfilled. The incumbent government of the State must have lost legitimacy and the opposition group must be representative, broad, and enjoy a reasonable prospect of permanence.

In international law, the representative of a people constituting a sovereign and independent State is, as a rule, the government of that State. A government need not be representative or democratically elected. International law accommodates despots, dictators and democrats alike. But, a government that turns against its own people, that uses heavy weapons, fighter aircraft and tanks to fire on its people, may lose its legitimacy. While international law does not yet provide any clear rules for the assessment of governmental legitimacy, the Libyan and Syrian situations show an emerging consensus that governments which use excessive force against their own population to secure their position lose their legitimacy and must or should go. 

This analysis raises the issue of control over territory in international law and invites us to think about what level of control is required, and what values are served by high or low thresholds in each instance.

Finally, there are a spate of new reports out about the situation in Syria.   Two which I have found particularly insightful are The Syrian Heartbreak by Peter Harling and Sarah Birke, and the International Crisis Group’s new report Syria’s Metastasizing Conflict.    

Have you read anything on the legal implications of the Syrian conflict you would recommend?  Please use the comments box to add to this list.

Haiti Cholera Update: The UN Doesn’t Budge

by Kristen Boon

Following the UN’s rejection of a demand for compensation for Haiti Cholera victims earlier this spring, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti challenged the interpretation and application of Article 29 of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, and formally requested a meeting with UN officials to discuss Petitioners’ claims.

The Plaintiffs asked for the UN to respond within 60 days.  That period ended on July 6, and sadly but perhaps unsurprisingly, the UN has not budged.  The UN responded to claimants, reiterating that the claims would involve a review of political and policy matters.  The other communication forthcoming during this period was a July 5 letter under the signature of Ban Ki-Moon to Maxine Waters, a Member of Congress.  This letter responds to a separate letter by Congresswoman Waters about the cholera epidemic, and reiterates that the UN has determined the claims are not receivable under Section 29 of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities.

Criticism of the UN’s response to the Cholera claims has been widespread. As I noted in an earlier post, the reliance on Article 29, which distinguishes between public and private claims, is questionable.   In a recent paper on the topic, Professor Frederic Megret notes that one of the problems of the public / private distinction is that due to the “internal, confidential and unilateral” character of the review boards’ procedure the UN has never provided a clear definition of public or private.  A guide to UN practice is available here.

The lawyers for the plaintiffs state that they will now file a case against the UN in a domestic court.   I predict this will be an uphill battle.  Although the UN could and sometimes does waive its immunity under Section 2 of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, its posture thus far suggests it will not do so here.  Assuming the UN asserts its privileges and immunities as an affirmative defense before a domestic court, it will probably be successful   There are some decisions in which courts are amenable to limiting the immunities of IOs where there is no available forum, employment cases such as Waite and Kennedy are an example.   If a court were to follow the “no reasonable alternative” reasoning in the Haiti case, the plaintiffs might have a shot.

A recent case against the UN in the Netherlands involving the massacre at Srebrenica illustrates the strength of the UN’s privileges and immunities. In the Mothers of Srebrenica judgement, the Hague Court of Appeals affirmed the UN’s absolute immunity, but found the Dutch state responsible under international law.  This was a compelling set of facts to safeguard IO immunities to be sure:  a peacekeeping mission, the use of force, and an alternative respondent:  the Dutch state.

The takeaway, I believe, is that domestic courts will not provide a satisfactory alternative either. One mechanism that is available – at least in theory –  to the plaintiffs is a request for an ICJ advisory opinion under Article 30 of the Agreement, if someone else takes up the cause:

SECTION 30. All differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.

Under this provision, a UN organ could make the request, although again, this seems unlikely.

International Organizations and the Duty to Prevent

by Kristen Boon

ICJ Judge Giorgio Gaja (who was also the special rapporteur on the International Law Commission for the Responsibility of International Organizations) has made the case that International Organizations have a duty to prevent.  The context was a talk he gave at the University of Amsterdam in April 2013 on the European Union and the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations.

If one takes the approach followed by the International Law Commission on the issue of attribution and applies it to the European Union, the Union would be internationally responsible when its organs or agents commit a breach of one of the obligations that the Union has under international law.

Depending on the content of the international obligation, a breach could consist in the failure to comply with a rule requiring the European Union to ensure that Member States do something or in the failure to prevent them from taking certain actions.

This type of obligation does not necessarily consider the conduct of Member States in a specific way. It may be an obligation of result, like arguably those under UNCLOS that were at stake in the Swordfish case between the European Community and Chile. The fact that the European Union does not achieve the required result of the conservation of swordfish stocks would be sufficient to cause a breach, whether the failure is caused by its organs or agents or by its Member States. The WTO agreements may provide further examples of obligations of result that may be breached by the Union because of the conduct of its Member States.

The emphasis on the conduct rather result indicates there is no requirement to succeed.  But he goes on to say that this obligation is linked to an IO’s capacity to influence the actions of member states, such that an IO might incur its own responsibility if it fails to prevent a breach of an international obligation.

The simplest, and probably most frequent, scenario of a possible responsibility of the European Union is that the Union is bound not only by the obligation breached by the Member State but also by an ancillary obligation to prevent the relevant wrongful act of member States or at least not to contribute to it. Failure by the European Union to comply with that ancillary obligation would give rise to the Union’s responsibility. The Union would then incur responsibility for the breach of this distinct, though connected, obligation. The responsibility of the European Union would be normally additional to the responsibility incurred by the Member State.

These ideas about an International Organization’s duty to prevent are noteworthy for a few reasons.

  • First, they give more context and detail on the duty to prevent than the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of IOs, which refer in general ways to omissions and the Swordfish case, but do not play out scenarios of ancillary IO liability.
  • Second, this logic suggests that IOs may be independently liable for the failure to prevent acts by their member states.   In other words, states and IOs could be concurrently liable for acts and omissions. For terrific work on shared responsibility generally, see the University of Amsterdam’s SHARES project (where I am spending some of my sabbatical).
  • Third, it raises the stakes for IO “supervisory” capacity generally.  Indeed,  a pivotal question in this regard is what are the circumstances that would trigger the duty to prevent?

An IO must be bound by a relevant primary norm of course, and the acts in question must constitute breaches of those norms by act or omission. These are the two key preconditions for application of the Draft Articles.  An additional third factor would be capacity: the ICJ’s Bosnia decision specifies in this regard that the duty to prevent is heavily contextual, in that an actor must use all means available to them, and it will depend on their capacity to influence.  For IOs that operate on a consensus basis (ie, NATO) or that work through advice and assistance rather than coercion (ie, the WHO), it might be hard to argue they have much capacity to prevent.  On the other hand, IOs like the EU or the UN that can coerce member states, might be facing more liability going forward.

What substantive areas will the duty to prevent be most likely to arise?  I would wager to guess that we can expect to see this duty argued in three cases: the use of force, conservation of scarce resources, and situations involving massive human tragedies that trigger the Genocide Convention or other human rights treaties.  I would be interested if our readers predict other areas of activity with regards to the duty to prevent.

The Deadline for Proposals is Here: ASIL Mid-Year Research Forum

by Kristen Boon

The deadline for submitting your proposal has arrived! A reminder that June 14 is the last day you can submit a proposal for the Mid-Year Research forum to be held in NYC from November 1-3 this year.   This conference features works-in-progress by society members – it is a terrific way to workshop your research projects.   Here is the call for papers.

 

Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations

by Kristen Boon

I’ve spent the last days at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands attending a terrific conference on privileges and immunities of IOs.   (In addition to Leiden’s history of excellence in international law, there were some wonderful revelations at the conference about the university’s history — like the fact that Albert Einstein taught there).

The discussions shed light on the complex and sometimes conflicting caselaw regarding why and when IOs are immune from court jurisdiction, and on areas in which this immunity might be waived by IOs themselves, or limited by courts.   This topic is timely:  there is increasing litigation against IOs generally, prompted in part by the expansion of IO mandates, and in part by more developed litigation culture, particularly where human rights are concerned.  A notable example is the so-called “Mothers of Srebrenica” case brought in Dutch courts against the UN regarding the genocide in Srebrenica.  So far, Dutch courts have found the UN to be immune, although the Dutch state has been found responsible in separate litigation.   For an analysis of recent developments in this latter litigation, see Andre Nollkaemper’s analysis here.

Privileges and Immunities are meant to protect the independent functioning of IOs and shield them from vexatious litigation.  Most of the sources of law on this topic, however, are dated:  the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN was drawn up in 1946 for example, and more recent instruments, such as the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, contain fairly standard provisions that draw on this general approach.  It is sometimes contended that immunities have a basis in customary international law as well, although it appears that the UN is the organization viewed as being most clearly protected in this regard.

Speakers suggested that there has been an erosion of IO immunities at the margins, and that complex tort cases are amongst the most difficult to resolve.  Following Waite and Kennedy, an employment dispute involving the European Space Agency, courts have often linked immunities to “reasonable alternative means.”  Nonetheless, there is little guidance on what standards should be applied to evaluating those alternatives.   Moreover, it is far from clear that claims arising in other contexts – for example under Art. 29 of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (see e.g. Haiti Cholera Claim) would be treated in the same way as an employment case that rests upon Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Lower courts tend to be more willing to restrict immunities, but on appeal, higher courts generally   confirm the absolute immunity of IOs.  The bread and butter of P & I litigation involves rather routine questions of contract disputes, employment litigation, and claims against staff members of organizations for traffic violations or damage to property.  Ultimately, the issue is one of balancing the right of access to courts (or other review mechanisms) with the independence of IOs.  At present, its not clear that the key instruments on privileges and immunities always get that balance right however.

Symposium on the Law of the Sea and the Law of Responsibility

by Kristen Boon

This week we are delighted to bring you a symposium exploring the intersection between the law of responsibility and the law of the sea.   The motivation for this symposium is twofold:

First, although there is long interaction between the law of the sea and the law of responsibility, the law of the sea has become an area where the intersection is of increasing importance.  The posts this week will highlight the ways in which the law of responsibility is being invoked in current controversies involving marine species and resources like whales, sharks and fisheries; and examine the role of the law of responsibility in recent cases involving search and rescue operations, flagged ships, and whaling.  The posts will also show that in some instances, there are gaps in the general rules of responsibility that render them inadequate or inappropriate for certain types of disputes with regards to the law of the sea.  A dimension of particular interest in this regard will be instances in which questions of shared responsibility arise; these posts will be cross-posted on the SHARES website at the University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law.

Although we cover law of the sea issues from time to time here at OJ, its not a field we post on regularly.   The second goal behind this symposium is therefore to engage in a sustained discussion on developments of note with experts in Europe, North America, and Australia.

Our bloggers and commentators this week include:   Natalie Klein, Yoshinobu Takei, Irini Papanicolopulu, Seline Trevisanut, Anastasia Telesetsky, Tim Stephens and Ilias Plakokefalos.

I hope you enjoy the topic, and we look forward to lively exchanges and comments.

2013 ASIL Research Forum

by Kristen Boon

I am delighted to announce that Tim Meyer and I will be co-chairing the 2013 ASIL Research forum.   I hope many of our readers will send in abstracts for this terrific conference.  The deadline for proposals is June 14.  Here is the call:

The American Society of International Law calls for submissions of scholarly paper proposals for the ASIL Research Forum to be held during the Society’s Midyear Meeting at the New York University School of Law on November 1-3, 2013.

The Research Forum, a Society initiative introduced in 2011, aims to provide a setting for the presentation and focused discussion of works-in-progress by Society members. All ASIL members are invited to attend the Forum, whether presenting a paper or not.

Interested participants should submit an abstract (no more than 500 words in length) summarizing the scholarly paper to be presented at the Forum. Papers can be on any topic related to international and transnational law and should be unpublished (for purposes of the call, publication to an electronic database such as SSRN is not considered publication).  Authors may only submit one proposal, although an author may be listed as a non-primary co-author on multiple proposals.  Interdisciplinary projects, empirical studies, and jointly authored papers are welcome. Member proposals should be submitted by Friday, June 14. Please click HERE to get started.

Proposals should include 1) the name, institutional affiliation, professional position, and contact information for the author(s), and 2) an abstract.  Review of the abstracts will be blind, and therefore abstracts should not include any identifying information about the author.  Abstracts containing identifying information will not be reviewed.   The Research Forum Committee will announce selections by July 25.

The Research Forum Committee will organize the selected paper proposals around common issues, themes, and approaches. Discussants, who will comment on the papers, will be assigned to each cluster of papers. All authors will be required to submit a draft paper 4 weeks before the Research Forum as a condition for participation.  Failure to submit a draft paper may result in disqualification.   Drafts will be posted on the Research Forum website.

ECHR Case Filed on Extraordinary Rendition

by Kristen Boon

Another extraordinary rendition case has been launched in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that will be relevant to those following Guantanamo detainees:  Abu Zubaydah v Poland involves the CIA’s black sites. The filings are available here.  A press release by Interrights, co-counsel (with Joseph Margulies and the Polish firm Jankowski & Co.) describes the significance of the case as follows:

The case is of interest because the complaint alleges that, through both its acts as well as omissions – including by agreeing to house the secret detention centre, turning a blind eye to normal protections and oversight, and otherwise participating in and facilitating the extraordinary rendition of Abu Zubaydah into and out of Poland – the Polish authorities are responsible for multiple violations of Abu Zubaydah’s rights.
This case is also important because it is the most significant (and potentially only) European investigation into black sites underway.   The decision may help to shape the investigation, particularly because it focuses on the benchmarks for effective review. It follows El-Masri (decided by the ECHR in December 2012).  Related cases, Abu Zubaydah v Lithuaniaal Nashiri v Poland, and al Nashiri v Romania, are still pending before the ECHR.
Abu Zubaydah is a stateless Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia who was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2006 and remains in indefinite detention.   He has not been charged with a crime by a military commission or court.

The Transformation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

by Kristen Boon

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) recently released its 2012 annual report, which documents its remarkable institutional transformation. Established in 1899, the PCA is an intergovernmental organization based in the Peace Palace in The Hague.  Although it has a long and interesting history, including housing the Iran – U.S. Claims Tribunal for a number of years, over the last 12 years the PCA has seen its workload and subject matter scope increase exponentially.  As Secretary General of the PCA, Hugo Siblesz, noted in a speech in February:

“As of this moment, the PCA is acting to administer 71 pending cases, including 5 inter-State arbitrations, 48 arbitrations under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties, and 18 arbitrations in contract disputes involving States, State entities, or international organizations. In total, 152 arbitrations have been brought to the PCA in the past 12 years, in comparison with only 34 cases administered in the first one hundred years of the organization. In inter-State arbitration, the PCA has recently seen more activity than at any other point in its history – including the flush of arbitrations brought to the PCA in its early days before the First World War. And in disputes between States and private parties, the PCA has now handled more arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules than any other institution, developing in the process a singular experience in the application of those Rules.”

There was an extremely interesting panel on the PCA organized by ASIL in February, focusing on the PCA’s reinvention.  The PCA is an active and multi-faceted institution that acts as a registry and/or appointing authority in a range of international law issues, including public international law disputes, investor-state arbitrations, commercial contract disputes, law of the sea arbitrations under Annex VII of UNCLOS, and energy charter treaty disputes.  It has even administered an arbitration between a State and an armed movement within its territory (namely the Abyei Arbitration between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 2008 – 9).

One institutional feature of note is that PCA offers a development assistance fund for states that require financial aid for use of PCA’s services.  Member states donate to the fund, and the 2012 report  notes 8 states – 5 from Africa, 2 from Asia and 1 from Latin America have received assistance thus far.  In addition, the PCA has just adopted new procedural rules for disputes involving at least one State, state-controlled entity, or international organization.    An interesting addition here is Article 34(7) which requires states to report on execution of the award, in an attempt to improve compliance.

Amb. Siblesz noted that dispute resolution in international matters is on the upswing generally, which is a trend to note in terms of the field generally.  Nonetheless, one aspect of the PCA’s comparative success in attracting cases appears to be its ability to provide high quality, quick, and confidential services, in a range of international law matters.  Thus in terms of lessons to be learned, generality rather than speciality appears to be aiding the PCA in its competitive bid.  Its general successes are also leading some to speculate whether it could assist the UN on a more permanent basis with regards to mediation and arbitration of international matters.  Thus, for example, might the PCA be used by the UN as a go-to institution for international dispute resolution generally, perhaps supplementing or even replacing in certain cases, the usual system of special envoys and representatives?