I’ve been working hard this break teaching in Hofstra’s winter program in Curacao. But I couldn’t resist stepping away from the beach and posting on the India-US flap over the arrest of an Indian diplomat in New York. Dapo Akande at EJIL Talk! has two great posts on the consular and diplomatic immunity legal issues. I have nothing to add, but wanted to focus on how the ICJ could actually play a role in resolving (or not resolving) this dispute.
As those following the incident may know, Devyani Khobragade, India’s deputy consul-general in New York, was arrested and charged with lying on her visa applications about the salary she was paying the maid she had brought from India. As a consular official, Khobragade could only assert functional rather than absolute immunity. Most of the outrage in India is about her treatment after arrest (which does seem excessive to me as well), but the legal issues mostly have to do with her immunity from arrest.
As Dapo points out, India may now be asserting that at the time of the arrest, Khobragade had already been transferred to India’s U.N. Mission. This might entitle her to the broader protections of U.N. diplomatic immunity as oppose to mere consular immunity. According to Dapo, Section 11(a) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations may grant her absolute immunity from arrest (but not from prosecution). India may also argue shifting her to the UN mission now gives her immunity from arrest going forward, even if she wasn’t a UN diplomat at the time of her arrest. Thus, on this theory, Khobragade could at least leave the U.S., or even wander New York free from the possibility of arrest or detention, even though the criminal prosecution would go forward.
Much of this would turn on whether Khobragade would need U.S. consent to acquire diplomatic status within the U.N. Again, I am far from expert on this but it seems a murky legal issue at best with plausible arguments for both sides based on the U.S./UN Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Sounds like a case for international dispute settlement! It turns out there are mandatory dispute settlement procedures under both agreements. The U.S./UN Headquarters Agreement allows the U.N. to take the U.S. to compulsory arbitration pursuant to Section 21. This would require the U.N. to side with India’s view on Khobrogade’s diplomatic status, but this is hardly impossible or even improbable that they would support a broad view of UN diplomatic rights and immunities.
Interestingly, India could also take the U.S. to the ICJ under Article VIII, Section 30 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
SECTION 30. All differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement.
Somewhat surprisingly, both India and the U.S. have signed on to the Convention without trying to limit the effect of this provision through a reservation (as China and others have done). Such a reservation may be of little effect anyway, but at least it would be an argument against ICJ jurisdiction. So I think that India could bring an ICJ case seeking a provisional measure guaranteeing Khobragade’s immunity from arrest under Article 11(a).
It is possible the U.S. would simply ignore any ICJ order, but this is not quite the same as the Medellin cases. First of all, it is the federal government rather than the state governments involved here, and the President probably has authority to order federal agents NOT to arrest Khobragade. Furthermore, the U.S. interest here is far weaker than in the Medellin case, which involved individuals who had been convicted of murder. In this case, the U.S. may be upset over allowing an alleged visa-fraudster to walk, but it is of a completely different magnitude than giving a new hearing to a convicted murderer.
In my view, it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of presidential power to order executive branch officials to refrain from further action in this case. An ICJ provisional measures might provide a clearer justification for the President’s decision, although I think he probably has the authority right now to stop all of this. But the ICJ might provide a face-saving way for both sides to resolve this deeply fractious incident.
In any event, it will be interesting to see if India chooses the ICJ route. Or if the US even invites an ICJ resolution of this conflict. Indeed, if India goes to far in its retaliations against US diplomats, the U.S. might take India to the ICJ under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations!
The current ICJ even has one Indian judge, and one U.S. judge. One problem for India is that its legal position is hardly flawless, and it could very well fail in the ICJ. But if India thinks it has strong legal arguments (and they do look fairly strong to me), it seems like a textbook case for the ICJ. Indeed, since neither side shows any sign of backing down, I think the ICJ might actually be useful here.