Search: UNCLOS

weight to the claim that the the Declaration somehow prohibits parties from resorting to UNCLOS arbitration. If anything, it goes the other way. Given that the Declaration is not technically binding under international law anyway, let’s just say this is the weakest of a series of weak arguments trotted out by China in this dispute. So let’s just call this what it is: China is thumbing its nose at UNCLOS and it has now dealt a serious, near fatal blow, to the UNCLOS dispute settlement system, at least in its...

sure, it did not contest jurisdiction in those cases and neither involved similar facts. But it is striking that Russia has gone from active UNCLOS dispute settlement player to effective boycotter. UNCLOS dispute settlement is not “voluntary.” It is a system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement. Indeed, UNCLOS itself makes clear in Art. 288(4) that UNCLOS tribunals have the power to determine their own jurisdiction. By refusing to participate in UNCLOS dispute settlement based on their own unilateral claims about jurisdiction, China and Russia are essentially telling the tribunal...

...of the U.S. position on UNCLOS issues? China is already a member of UNCLOS and other countries (like Japan and the Philippines) are also members of UNCLOS. But I don’t think UNCLOS has really bolstered their effectiveness in pushing back against China. Moreover, as Professor Dutton explains, China has a radically different interpretation of its authority to regulate foreign ships and aircraft in its Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS. How will joining UNCLOS help the U.S. change China’s interpretation of UNCLOS? As a practical matter, UNCLOS does have a way...

and negating the consensus between China and the Philippines on resolving relevant disputes through negotiations and consultations, the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures, misrepresented the law and obstinately forced ahead with the arbitration, and as a result, have severely violated the legitimate rights that China enjoys as a State Party to the UNCLOS, completely deviated from the purposes and objectives of the UNCLOS, and eroded the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS. Third, as a State Party to the UNCLOS, China firmly opposes the acts of...

[Steven Groves is a Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow at The Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C.] Many thanks to Julian Ku for inviting me to participate in this UNCLOS debate on one of my favorite websites. There is much I agree with in the posts of Professors Kraska, Noyes, and Allen. Professor Kraska correctly emphasizes the victory achieved by U.S. negotiators at UNCLOS III in regard to codifying navigational regimes, particular the regime of transit passage through international straits. Transit passage, along with archipelagic sea-lanes passage and the refinement of...

withdrawing from UNCLOS. In any event, I think it is safe to say this it a game changer in the long-running South China Sea dispute. It is also, without question, the most important case that has ever been filed under the dispute resolution procedures of UNCLOS. It will be a crucial test of the UNCLOS institutions, as well as of UNCLOS members. I am skeptical that China will allow itself to be drawn into serious international adjudication (see my argument here), but it will be fascinating to see how China...

...and senate committees possess oversight jurisdiction which they have yet to exercise to review the various dimensions of the UNCLOS that have not been considered in light of new international environmental law developments since the previous UNCLOS hearings. The American people are entitled to know from their elected representatives how this expansive treaty which will reach into US sovereign territory (land, internal waterways and air above) and into the US regulatory and free enterprise systems, will affect American pocketbooks, small businesses and daily lives. For this reason, my colleague and...

[Jeremy Rabkin is Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law.] I entirely accept what James Kraska says about the benefits of the navigation rules in UNCLOS. But when Kraska and others say these rules are favorable, they mean the UNCLOS rules – as American officials would interpret them. Unfortunately, UNCLOS doesn’t leave it up to American officials to interpret these rules. When there are disputes, the treaty provides that they will be settled by compulsory arbitration. So we need to think about the ways international arbitration panels...

International Seabed Authority; 2)The plans of some UNCLOS State Parties to 'import' norms from such other treaties to interpret UNCLOS norms in the event ITLOS or arbitral jurisdiction is invoked in a dispute with the US, should it ratify; 3)The plans to reform the UNEP and the now moribund UN Trusteeship, to strengthen the UNEP into an IEO, as suggested by France and Germany, and to improve the relationship between the UNEP secretariats and the UN General Secretariat overseeing the UNCLOS; 4)The plans to vest the International Seabed Authority with...

...of the UNCLOS system of dispute settlement. For the first two years of the dispute, I was skeptical that China would suffer any meaningful damage from defying the UNCLOS arbitral system. Thus, I wondered if, combined with Russia’s almost cavalier defiance of an ITLOS proceeding involving Greenpeace, the end result in this process would be a toothless UNCLOS dispute settlement process of little value or significance. This was one of the reasons I sharply criticized the Philippines for adopting a fruitless “lawfare” strategy. Time will tell, but early reviews point...

It’s been a very quiet term for the Senate on treaties. But that may be about to change. The Washington Note is reporting that President Bush will soon publicly announce his support for Senate advice and consent to U.S. accession to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the follow-on Implementation Agreement, which fixes objections by various developed states to the original treaty’s deep seabed mining provisions. This comports with rumors I’ve heard that the SFRC is gearing up to try and move UNCLOS through...

China down the road by using a favorable award as a bargaining chip with China. But in the short-term, the Philippines has enraged China and has also led China to denounce (for the first time) the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal itself. It would not be impossible to imagine China announcing a withdrawal from UNCLOS (just to avoid the dispute settlement provisions) and simply adhering to UNCLOS as customary international law. That result will not be great for China, but I have a hard time seeing how it helps the Philippines either....